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My dissertation is an investigation into the nature, grounds and limits of what 
might be called ‗social moral rules‘, which are informally established and socially 
enforced norms that the members of a group, for better or worse, treat as properly 
regulating their conduct.  I develop, illustrate and partially defend a non-consequentialist 
theory of social moral rules that incorporates themes from act-utilitarianism, rule-
utilitarianism, virtue ethics, Kant and Rawls.  My view includes an improved conception 
of social moral rules, satisfies common concerns about the limits of rules and the need for 
good moral judgment when applying them, abandons utilitarian conceptions of the 
common good and has its foundations in a plurality of values that we commonly affirm.  
An important question to ask about social moral rules is what reasons we have to 
follow them when they exist.  It is common to portray social moral rules as mere 
heuristics that are generally useful as means of social control but should be broken in 
particular cases when this would produce more good overall.  
I argue that the existing social moral rules of a group, which can include some 
imperfect and defective rules, play a vital and non-instrumental role in the best and most 
illuminating interpretation of the mid-level moral values of solidarity and respect.  While 
solidarity and respect can pull against each other in certain contexts, group members 
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often have non-instrumental reasons to follow their social moral rules as ways of 
manifesting solidarity and showing respect. 
We can have reasons of solidarity and respect to follow the prevailing, and often 
imperfect, social moral rules of our group.  We may even have such reasons sometimes to 
break our rules as well.  But solidarity and respect also give us reasons to improve our 
existing social moral rules and help to set a standard for doing so. 
Our focus in developing an ideal moral code, I claim, should be on improving the 
periphery of our code, where the laudable presumptions that make up its core conflict 
with one another.  I show that there are a number of casuistical devices at our disposal to 









―A dissertation,‖ I was once told, ―needn‘t be your dying breath on a subject.‖  I 
took the advice implicit in this statement seriously, maybe too seriously, and so ventured 
to produce a final product that was unabashedly a work in progress.  My goals, for better 
or worse, have been exploratory and constructive – I sought to identify some interesting 
philosophical themes, pursue some promising avenues for investigating them further, and 
lay groundwork for a much larger investigation I have only begun into the nature, 
grounds and limits of social moral rules.  I may not always endorse each and every 
position I have taken here, but I am convinced that the settled views (if any) I ultimately 
take on the issues raised would not have been possible were it not for writing this 
dissertation. 
One idea I develop that continues to resonate with me deeply is that when we are 
engaged in cooperative activities with others, we often find as much, if not more, 
meaning in the solidary relationships with those working alongside us as we do in the 
activities themselves.  This is certainly true for me as I look back over my years in 
philosophy graduate school, first at Oxford University and later here at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  I am especially grateful to Thomas E. Hill, Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord and Susan Wolf, at UNC Chapel Hill, and John Broome, Derek Parfit and 
Joseph Raz at Oxford.  I couldn‘t have asked for a better set of teachers.  I am particularly 
grateful to my dissertation committee – Tom, Geoff and Susan pushed me in different 
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ways to clarify my thoughts and remain attuned and responsive to different philosophical 
and moral outlooks.  I also thank fellow graduate students, other teachers and colleagues 
over the years who have helped me develop my ideas, including Kimberley Brownlee, 
Leonard Kahn, Ros McDougall, Kristen Bell, Joshua Knobe, Douglas MacLean, Bernard 
Boxill, Jan Boxill, William Lycan, Ryan Preston-Roedder, Jamin Asay and Emily 
Kelahan, and there are no doubt many others from whom I have learned a great deal.  In 
the part of my graduate education that falls outside of ethics and political philosophy, I 
have been influenced in many ways by Marc Lange and Alan Nelson.  I‘ve also presented 
some of my ideas at various conferences and workshops, and I am grateful to the 
participants for their help. 
UNC Chapel Hill offered an extremely supportive environment for me to develop 
my ideas.  In his capacity as Department Chair, Geoff Sayre-McCord was particularly 
helpful in securing me funds for travel, organizing conferences and assistive technology.  
The department of disability services also provided scanning services that were 
invaluable to me.  
I am grateful for the generous financial support I received from the Rhodes Trust, 
the National Science Foundation, the Institute for Humane Studies, the Dolores Zohrab 
Liebmann foundation and the Charlotte Newcombe foundation. 
There has been a small group of people throughout my education who have 
chosen, for some reason or other, to ―go to bat‖ for me in various crucial ways, often 
acting on not much more than a hunch about me and my potential for success.  This 
phenomenon started in earnest with Alex Rosenberg, who chose me for a Foundation 
Fellowship at the University of Georgia, and carried on with Eric Dahl, who helped me 
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win a Rhodes Scholarship, Tom Hill, who profoundly shaped my philosophical 
development, and, most recently, David Reidy, who hired me at the University of 
Tennessee.  I‘m not sure why these people did what they did, and there are no doubt 
others in this category I‘m not aware of, but I thank all of them for their kind support.  
Other mentors along the way who have also helped me in immeasurable ways include 
Clark Wolf and Alex Kaufman. 
Tom Hill is a remarkable philosopher, teacher and friend who taught me, among 
other things, the value of having a life's project, to engage with the great philosophers of 
the past, to be humble, and to find the good in people.  Our time together, at K&W and 
elsewhere, has meant the world to me and for that I am forever grateful.  Besides the 
enormous help he provided with particular philosophical issues, Tom‘s influence on me 
extends to philosophical methodology, the appropriate aims of moral and political 
philosophy, the value of systematic theory building, and the need to study past masters.  
Any good idea of mine will be a footnote away from Tom, which is not to say that he 
would endorse all of them, but he has been so effective at instilling in me a tradition of 
moral and political philosophy running through Kant, Rawls and himself, and in leading 
me to take this current of thought on as my own, identify with it, and strive to develop it 
further, that my future work will always be shaped by these three towering figures, and 
Tom in particular. 
Our other friends and neighbors in Chapel Hill and Durham have made our time 
here very enjoyable and rewarding.  Julie, the kids and I owe a special debt of gratitude to 
Robin Hill for her remarkable energy, generosity and kindness – we have thoroughly 
enjoyed countless dinners, activities and babysitting that Robin made possible.  
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Utilitarians have developed and emphasized some very good ideas about the 
nature, grounds and limits of what might be called social moral rules, which are not the 
same as habits, customs, norms of etiquette, or laws even though there can be overlaps of 
various kinds among these things – a socially enforced moral rule, for example, can also 
be a formally enforced law.  When rules of this kind exist, they are part of the informally 
created and enforced moral code or social mores of a society, which means that in general 
members of society accept them, see them as moral guides in our decision-making, teach 
them to our children, and treat them as appropriate standards for condemning, resenting 
or socially pressuring those who break the rules and for feeling guilt or shame if we do so 
ourselves.  Social moral rules are ‗moral‘, in one sense of that term, because of the social 
role they play in a society even though, in a distinct sense, many such rules have been 
quite immoral and unjustified.   
History has shown, Mill thought, that the existence of certain commonly affirmed, 
but not necessarily legally codified, social moral rules about theft, promising, 
beneficence, etc. are essential for us to enjoy even a minimally decent standard of living.
1
  
Establishing such rules, for example, helps us to coordinate our behavior, form legitimate 
expectations, act more quickly without having to perform complicated calculations, resist 
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 Mill, John Stuart and Crisp, Roger (1998), Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 5.13, 5.25, 
5.32, 5.33, 5.34. 
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temptations to immorality, overcome our tendency to make unjustified exceptions of 
ourselves, apply past moral knowledge to unfamiliar situations, educate children and 
socially pressure others in ways that make them more likely to act as they should.  There 
is little doubt that establishing, maintaining and following a moral code can be 
instrumentally useful in these and other ways, but is this all that can be said in their 
favor? 
Act-utilitarians tend to think so.  The general consensus among them is that social 
moral rules are at best just heuristics, rules of thumb, or means of coordination that can 
for the most part cause us to act better than we otherwise would.  Many of us strongly 
resist the implication, however, that commonly accepted social moral rules about lying 
and promising, for instance, must be broken, perhaps even secretly, every time this would 
produce slightly more good overall.  
Partially in response to the concern that social moral rules, conceived as mere 
heuristics, lack any distinctive authority of their own apart from the consequences they 
tend to produce, rule-utilitarianism promised a purely instrumental justification for 




Details aside, rule-utilitarians claim that (1) the basic moral value is welfare, 
which is the sort of thing that is to be promoted; (2) welfare is the only basic moral value; 
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 The most prominent defenders of rule-utilitarianism or rule-consequentialism (which includes fairness as 
another value to be maximized alongside wellbeing) are Brandt, Richard (1963), 'Toward a Credible Form 
of Utilitarianism', in Hector-Neri Castañeda and George Nakhnikian (eds.), Morality and the language of 
conduct (Detroit: Wayne State University Press), 107-43, and Hooker, Brad (2000), Ideal Code, Real 
World: A Rule-consequentialist Theory of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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and (3) the justification of every action depends on its being in accordance with the social 
moral rules that, if they were generally accepted, would maximize overall welfare.   
A common worry, however, is that rule-utilitarians are irrationally fetishizing or 
worshiping rules because they have difficulty explaining why we should follow generally 
useful rules when it is suboptimal to do so on a particular occasion.  Rule-utilitarianism is 
closer to commonsense views about following good rules, but if asked why we should 
stick to the rules when we can do more good otherwise, merely claiming ‗them‘s the 
rules‘ does not answer the charge.  One underlying concern may be that rule-utilitarians 
cannot give the needed sort of explanation for why we should comply with the rules on 
these occasions while also remaining true to their utilitarian commitment that welfare is 
the only basic moral value.  Another may be that rule-utilitarians conceive of morality 
exclusively in terms of rules whereas commonsense says that some areas of life are not 
appropriately covered by rules; instead, room must be made for moral judgment, virtue, 
exemplars, ideals, democratic debate, small group decisions, etc.; and when rules are 
called for, perception of the relevant facts, moral sensitivity and good moral judgment 
will be needed to apply them.  
Act-utilitarians, who rightly emphasize how useful social moral rules can be for 
producing welfare, are too permissive when it comes to rule-breaking; and rule-
utilitarians, who come closer to capturing commonsense ideas about the importance of 
following good social moral rules, leave unexplained why it is that we should always 
comply with them.  I think the main trouble with both ways of attempting to understand 
and justify social moral rules, however, is the value theory that they presuppose, and in 
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particular their myopia about which moral values are at stake in discussions about rules 
and what sorts of responses those values call for.    
Can we nevertheless learn from utilitarian insights about the role and value of 
rules, but refine those views in a way that incorporates an improved conception of social 
moral rules, satisfies common concerns about the limits of rules and the need for good 
moral judgment when applying them, abandons the utilitarian conception of the common 
good and has its foundations in values that we commonly affirm?
3
 
From a commonsense moral perspective, most everyone accepts and affirms a 
plurality of mid-level moral values such as freedom, equality, fairness, happiness, human 
life, integrity, friendship, respect and (arguably) solidarity.  They are ‗mid-level‘ because 
they are substantive and widely held values that help to explain and justify particular 
moral judgments we have about specific cases but are themselves explained and justified 
by more basic and formal considerations about, for example, treating humanity as an end 
in itself, acting only in ways that could be justified to others, maximizing the good, acting 
as the virtuous person would, etc.  As in other systems of mathematics, logic or science, it 
is often the mid-level truths that are most clear to us rather than the foundations of the 
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 My understanding of social moral rules has benefited greatly from the following:  Hill, Thomas E. (1992), 
'Making Exceptions without Abandoning the Principle: or How a Kantian Might Think about Terrorism', 
Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 196-225; Hill, 
Thomas E. (2000), 'A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules', Respect, Pluralism, and Justice : Kantian 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 33-55; Hill, Thomas E. (2000), 'Donagan's Kant', Respect, 
pluralism, and justice : Kantian perspectives (Oxford ;New York: Oxford University Press), 119-51; Hill, 
Thomas E. (2005), 'Assessing Moral Rules', Philosophical Issues, 15, 1-24; Hill, Thomas E. (2007), The 
Importance of Moral Rules and Principles (Lindley Lecture; Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas 
Press); Wolf, Susan (2002), 'The Role of Rules', in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi (eds.), 
Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield); and Wolf, Susan (forthcoming), 'Moral Obligations and Social Commands', in Samuel 
Newlands and L. M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert 
Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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system or particular conclusions we can draw from it.
4
  Most all of us are for respect, 
fairness and human life but we tend to disagree about what grounds these values and 
about what we ought to do in cases in which these values conflict.   A central task of 
moral philosophy, as I see it, is to interpret these somewhat abstract, vague and 
potentially conflicting values, render them more determinate and apply them to real-
world situations in ways that give us consistent and concrete guidance about what to do.  
The values themselves will have to be explained and justified in a different context, but 
we can regard them as provisionally fixed for now and ask how they are to be interpreted 
and applied to the real world.  Social moral rules, I argue, can play a vital and non-
instrumental role in interpreting the mid-level moral values of solidarity and respect and 
applying them to our society.   
Rule-utilitarians appeal to aggregate wellbeing as a common currency for 
evaluating social moral rules and for resolving potential conflicts among them – one rule 
is better than another, they think, if general acceptance of the one would produce more 
overall utility than would acceptance of the other.  This made matters in a way easier 
because there was just one commensurable and aggregative value for comparing possible 
rules.  If, however, we replace wellbeing with a plurality of non-consequentialist values 
like freedom, equality, respect, and solidarity that are not aggregated or made 
commensurate in any simple way and call for being respected, honored and cherished 
rather than just being promoted, how are we to combine these values into a code of social 
moral rules?   Virtue ethicists, Rossian pluralists, anti-theorists and moral particularists 
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forcefully press the concern that no set of consistent and coherent rules or principles can 
codify or systematize, to any real degree, the plurality of mid-level moral values that we 
commonly affirm – because there is no underlying unity and structure to the complicated 
set of mid-level moral values, it must be impossible to construct an ideal code of social 
moral rules.  If this were the case then the social moral rules that already exist would be 
merely part of the background facts against which we must act and the most we could 
hope for when deciding what to do in real-world situations would be to use practical 
wisdom well on a case by case basis, perhaps by appealing to a small set of prima facie 
duties or virtuous traits of character that are drawn from the values.
5
  Once we go down 
this road, we may even find that nothing is reason-giving in all circumstances because no 
such reasons exist, so in the extreme, there are not even any mid-level moral values, 
which, if true, would leave us with only good moral judgment, without the benefit of 
moral values, rules or principles, to decide how the cluster of particular reasons comes 
out in individual cases.
6
  
It may be tempting to think that morality is not very codifiable because any 
proposed systematic moral structure is bound to include principles or rules that are just 
too rigid and inflexible.
7
  Kantians and other principle-deontologists who espouse the 
importance of moral rules or principles are commonly accused of affirming absolute, 
exceptionless standards, such as ‗never lie‘ or ‗never intentionally kill the innocent‘, 
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 As Ross admits, we may even be able to generalize or summarize the deliverances of reflective intuition 
into principles of a sort.  See Ross, W. D. (1930), The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
6
 See Dancy, Jonathan (2004), Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
7
 Bernard Williams expresses a view of this sort in his Williams, Bernard (1985), Ethics and the limits of 
philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
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without allowing for commonsense exceptions in clear-cut cases, particularly those 
involving putative conflicts among the apparently inflexible rules.  Even if we were to try 
formulating less rigid rules, by including all of the needed qualifiers, exceptions and the 
like, the worry remains that morality is just too complicated for us to have much success 
at this task; or else we will merely end up with unwieldy philosopher‘s principles that are 
not useful for much of anything.  Principle-deontologists are also suspected of unjustified 
rule-mongering because, it is thought, they hold that rules are supposed to be 
comprehensive standards meant for all aspects of our moral lives, standards that can be 
deduced from the mid-level moral values and applied using algorithmic decision 
procedures or more and more specific rules of application.   
It may be surprising to some that Kant was also reluctant to make use of social 
moral rules.  In his ethical and political writings, he of course highlights moral principles 
such as the various formulations of the Categorical Imperative, the mid-level principles 
concerned with law, justice and moral attitudes
8
, and the more specific juridical and 
ethical duties, but he affords no explicit place to informally enforced, generally accepted 
social moral rules.  I think Kant is quite mistaken for mostly ignoring and downplaying 
such rules, however.  Kant divides The Metaphysics of Morals, which is his most 
sustained attempt at describing a system of principles for interpreting the moral law and 
applying it to broadly human conditions, into ―right‖ (or ―justice‖), which is concerned 
with legally enforceable rules and rights that regulate and protect our freedom to act in 
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 The Universal Principle of Right says: ―Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in 
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law.‖ (6:230) and the supreme principle of the doctrine 




ways that influence the external freedom of others without taking account of our motives, 
and ―ethics‖ (narrowly conceived), which is constrained by ―right‖ and within its limits 
gives unenforceable principles for personal motivation, deliberation and character 
development.
9
  Interpretations differ, but it is reasonably clear that this division is 
supposed to run deep and seems to make no room for social moral rules, which intuitively 
fall in between these two extremes.
10
  For Kant, (strict) rights and rightful political 
authority exist only in a full-blown legal system, which clearly and publicly specifies 
determinate legal rules that govern (and only govern) intentional external acts that can be 
assessed in a public court of law, enforces those rules by openly threatening penalties for 
breaking them and carrying out those threats when needed, unambiguously adjudicates 
legal disputes among members of society, and has a clear and absolute legal authority 
with the power and responsibility to do these things.  ―Ethics‖, in his special limited 
sense, by contrast, deals with principles about setting commitments or goals for 
ourselves, acting on morally good reasons and motives, exercising our conscience well, 
and overcoming internal obstacles to doing our duty.  These non-juridical ethical duties 
are legally unenforceable, Kant thinks, because it is not possible to coerce someone to 
fulfill them.  Despite his reputation, Kant is even quite sanguine about moralizing busy-
bodies.  He thinks that each person is responsible for fulfilling her own ethical duties and 
for punishing her own ethical transgressions through the rulings of her conscience, so it is 
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 Two exceptions to this general division are, first, that Kant thinks we have an indirectly ethical duty to 
fulfill our juridical duties from a motive of duty and, second, he thinks we are sometimes permitted to 
refuse legal orders to perform grossly immoral acts. 
10
 Kant may be implicitly assuming something like social moral rules in his discussions of international 
relations, history, and perhaps also in his lectures on ethics.   
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usually not appropriate to apply informal social pressures or sanctions, let alone formal 
legal punishments, in attempts to lead other people to be good.  One way of making room 
for social moral rules while remaining close to Kant‘s moral framework, however, is to 
examine the status of certain important moral principles in the Doctrine of Virtue, such as 
those requiring us to avoid disrespect, suicide, unnatural sex, ingratitude, and complete 
indifference to the welfare of others and our own perfection.  These relatively abstract 
principles (once we add some and subtract others) are arguably invariable across cultures, 
accessible through the common human reason that we share with nearly everyone, and 
speak to us unbidden through our conscience.  They are also socially enforced, not so 
much by social pressures themselves, which may be illegitimately moralistic and 
oppressive, but by the ways these pressures from others prick our own conscience and 
alert us to possible failures to live up to the shared moral code of our ethical 
community.
11
  For good moral reasons, then, we might choose to establish, support and 
follow these principles about respecting others, sometimes giving to charity, etc., 
codifying them into a shared code of social moral rules that stands alongside, and 
possibly overlaps with, laws of various kinds and advice for living as a fully reasonable 
person.  
In any case, there is much truth to these concerns, which come from such 
disparate moral outlooks, that warrant a healthy skepticism about rules and principles and 
also help to explain why these things have lost prominence among moral philosophers in 
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 Kant discusses the possibility of what he calls an ‗ethical community‘ in Kant, Immanuel, Wood, Allen 
W., and Di Giovanni, George (1998), Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other writings 




recent years.  Commonsense morality agrees that there is an important place in our moral 
lives for laws, ideals, exemplars, virtues, aspirations, personal values, personal 
relationships of various sorts and good moral judgment, and none of these appears to be 
all that expressable or codifiable in terms of rules or principles.  We can also agree that 
the parts of morality that are the best candidates for systematization, including some of 
the mid-level moral values, are unlikely to ground strict deductions of principles or rules 
and good moral judgment, not more rules, would be needed to apply the principles or 
rules in particular cases.  We must also be careful about how oppressive and stifling 
social pressures can be and sensitive to the need for publicity, determinacy and impartial 
enforcement of the rules.  In spite of all this, however, can we draw from themes 
emphasized by utilitarians, Kantians, virtue ethicists, anti-theorists and particularists and 
mark out a restricted place in morality, alongside virtues, laws, ideals, etc., for social 
moral rules that play a limited role in interpreting, rendering determinate, expressing and 
making manifest some of the basic mid-level moral values in our world?   
Any system of social moral rules that can serve as a standard for improving our 
own existing one will have to be worked out holistically using exceptions, qualifiers, 
secondary rules, etc.  But unlike moral principles, the rules will also have to be sensitive 
to more practical concerns such as being simple enough to be widely known, generally 
understood, taught to children, useful in everyday moral deliberation, guides in public 
discussions, or grounds that could reliably move us to act.  
John Rawls attempted something what I am proposing when he took commonly 
held values, such as freedom, equality and impartiality, and set out to specify principles 
of justice to govern the basic structures of a closed, well-ordered society existing under 
11 
 
reasonably favorable conditions.  Rawls began his career doing moral philosophy, 
however, suggesting early on a practice-based form of rule-utilitarianism and later 
sketching a procedure for thinking about certain issues of interpersonal morality, but he 
soon turned his attention to justice and was in time pushed to make his theory even more 
political and separated from normative ethics and metaethics.  There is a left-over, 
unifinished project that Rawls did not pursue very far but is suggested to some extent by 
his earlier papers, by his remarks in various places about moral methodology and 
promise-keeping, and by the structure of the theory of justice he does develop, which is 
to specify a moral, rather than a political, framework for evaluating, assessing, and 
justifying moral principles and rules.  This is not as simple as applying Rawls‘ theory of 
justice directly to ethics because his view is explicitly concerned with justice, conceived 
as a matter of impartially adjudicating conflicting, mostly self-regarding claims that 
people press against or the state.  Still, we can learn from the way Rawls connects mid-
level values with principles of justice by describing a procedure of construction that 
precisely specifies the problem to be addressed, the standpoint that the representative 
parties are meant to take up when assessing proposals for resolving that problem, and the 
motivations of the parties in accepting and rejecting those proposals.  It is also instructive 
that Rawls utilizes several stages or levels of principles, with corresponding standpoints, 
for progressively applying the most basic principles of justice, which are chosen at the 
highest stage under strict constraints of information, to more particular questions, which 
are addressed at the legislative and administrative stages under relaxed assumptions.  
Rawls also focused initially on easier cases rather than beginning with very difficult ones 
in which our intuitions are unlikely to be displayed without distortion. 
12 
 
The non-consequentialist ethical framework I envision, which will serve as a 
central and organizing idea for my future research and picks up on and incorporate some 
partially lost themes from rule-utilitarianism, virtue ethics, Kant and Rawls, is addressed 
to the limited moral tasks of justifying the core of our existing moral code, assessing 
whether these rules include the right sorts of exceptions, qualifiers, etc., and determining 
what reasons we have to follow social moral rules.  The structure of the theory is more 
complicated then rule-utilitarianism but structurally similar to it:  (1) among the plurality 
of mid-level moral values that we commonly affirm is a set of them, which includes 
freedom, equality, respect, solidarity and others, that is specifically relevant to answering 
moral questions about establishing, maintaining, following and improving social moral 
rules; and these values, in general, are the sorts of things that we have reasons to respect, 
honor and cherish, and not just promote; (2) the set of rule-specific values are the only 
ones that are relevant to answering these particular moral questions, but a different and 
overlapping set of the mid-level values may be at stake when it comes to discussions of 
other moral issues such as justice or virtue
12
; and (3) some, but not all, acts are partially 
justified by conforming to social moral rules that express, manifest and promote the rule-
specific values.  A theory of this sort is non-consequentialist, then, because it rejects 
utilitarian views about the common good in favor of a plurality of moral values and 
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determinate way – and I think for too long moral and political philosophers have not adequately 
appreciated the differences among these things.  We should not assume at the outset, then, that the same 
values will be relevant to an account of what social moral rules we should establish, what principles should 




denies that these values must be maximized and instead affirms that we should manifest, 
respect, honor and cherish these values as well as sometimes promoting them. 
My aim in this dissertation is limited to filling in some of the details of this moral 
framework for deliberating about rules by drawing out some of its implications, partially 
defending it and illustrating how it might be used to help us think about certain practical 
questions having to do with what rules to adopt and how to act.  The inter-related aspects 
I have chosen are some of the most crucial for the success of a non-consequentialist 
theory of social moral rules, but they also raise interesting philosophical questions in their 
own right.  (1) What are social moral rules and how do they compare to laws, 
conventions and norms of etiquette?  (2) What is the moral status of such rules - are they 
just useful heuristics that help us to coordinate our activities or are they sometimes 
valuable in themselves in a way that gives us reasons to follow them that do not just 
depend on what good can be produced by doing so?  (3) Must we always follow social 
moral rules or are their times in which we should, perhaps reluctantly, break them?  (4) 
And how should we go about evaluating and improving the code of social moral rules 
that prevails in our own society, which has seen great progress over the years but can still 
do with some serious reform?  A theory of social moral rules would answer at least these 
questions about the nature, grounds and limits of those things. 
The first task, of describing the nature of social moral rules and distinguishing 
them from other similar things, is taken up in the first chapter.  Paradigmatically, I claim, 
social moral rules exist in a group when:  (a) the rules are widely accepted, which 
basically means that many group members believe that the group as a whole has good 
moral reason to follow the rules, and this makes them generally disposed to use the rules 
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to guide their own conduct, to feel guilt or shame if they violate the rule themselves, 
condemn those who break the rules, and to form favorable attitudes towards those who 
comply with them; (b) the rules are generally complied with; (c) the rules are not created 
by anyone in particular, and no one has the special authority to modify or destroy them
13
; 
(d) the rules are socially enforced in an informal way, which means that social 
enforcement is done by unorganized social pressures such as gossip, mockery and 
shunning rather than by formal institutions having been specifically assigned that task; (e) 
and it is widely known in the group that these conditions are met.
14
  Conceived in this 
way, social moral rules differ in important ways from shared habits, behavioral 
regularities, social rules, rules of etiquette, conventions, constitutive rules of practices 
and moral principles that exist ‗in the head‘, although social moral rules can be these 
things as well.   
Answers to the other three questions, about the authority, limits and grounds of 
social moral rules, can best be found, I think, by investigating what mid-level moral 
values properly stand behind social moral rules and give us reasons to establish, maintain, 
follow and improve them.  My suspicion, as I have said, is that there are many mid-level 
moral values that are relevant to why we should follow social moral rules, when we 
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should break them and how they should be improved, but these values tend to be vague, 
indeterminate, and poorly understood.  Ultimately we will have to examine the values 
one by one to see how, for example, freedom, integrity, fairness or self-perfection should 
be understood for the limited purpose of developing a theory of social moral rules.  But 
for now we can take just two of these values, solidarity and respect, settle on provisional 
conceptions of them, and then apply them to our questions about the moral status of 
social moral rules, when we should break them and how they should be assessed and 
improved.  Once we have done the same for the other values and are sure enough that we 
have not left out any then we will have to fit all of these conclusions together in reflective 
equilibrium.   
I chose to concentrate at this early stage on solidarity and respect because both 
values are extremely important, commonly affirmed, but under-discussed as mid-level 
values (respect is more commonly assumed to be a comprehensive requirement to treat 
people appropriately rather than a mid-level value having to do with not humiliating, 
degrading or demeaning others).  Also, the case for a non-consequentialist account of the 
value of social moral rules is very compelling when solidarity is emphasized because 
social moral rules are often integral part of what binds together groups in those sorts of 
valuable relationships.  Social moral rules can also provide some determinate structure to 
the value of respect by partially specifying what it takes to express respect to one another.  
Finally, even though solidarity and respect are united in providing non-instrumental and 
sufficient reasons for establishing, maintaining and following a code of social moral 
rules, when it comes to evaluating the content of our own code of social moral rules and 
suggesting where it could be improved, solidarity and respect are relevant as well.  But 
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these values tend to pull against each other, with one more likely to favor rules requiring 
group loyalty, conformity and cooperation and the other tending to favor individuality, 
freedom of thought and expression and self-respect.  The ways solidarity puts pressure on 
us, for example, to make great sacrifices for the group, prize group members above others 
and shun those who do not belong while respect for ourselves and others often 
counteracts these demands.  This tension illustrates the most pressing general problem for 
a non-consequentialist theory of social moral rules of the sort I am proposing, which is 
how to organize and combine the potentially conflicting mid-level moral values into a 
consistent and coherent code of social moral rules. 
Let‘s briefly consider solidarity first.  Solidarity would probably not make it onto 
a list of values that most people take themselves to affirm, but in spite of this I think most 
of us do in fact hold solidarity as one of our most deeply held values even if it would take 
careful reflection for many of us to realize it – don‘t we deeply value the solidary bonds 
that form when we are doing our part in a sports team, a climbing expedition, a 
widespread effort to clean an oil spill or save a child who has fallen down a well, an army 
unit fighting in a worthy struggle, an environmental protection organization, a political 
party, or a community festival?  There are many ways for people to be in solidarity with 
one another, they can be united by shared experiences of oppression, joint history, or 
common tradition, for example, but one sort of solidarity exists, I argue, when the 
members of a group of people are engaged together in cooperative activities in support of 
shared values, ideals, aspirations and ends and value for their own sake the ties among 
them that form on this basis.  Cooperative solidarity, as I call it, is best understood as 
valuable for its own sake and as most centrally giving us reasons to live up to the 
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requirements of that relationship rather than just to promote more of those relationships 
in the world.   
Now respect.  There is a thin notion of respect having to do with treating people 
in all the ways they should be treated and a thick one which has more to do with not 
degrading, humiliating or ridiculing others.  While our intuitions are often quite clear 
about cases in which we fail to respect someone as a person by, for example, laughing 
with others about their mistakes, defiling their religious texts, forcing them to beg for 
their food, spitting on them and so on it is difficult to say just what it is to respect 
someone in this thick sense and why doing so is important.  My suggestion is that, 
paradigmatically, to respect someone as a person (in a thick sense of ‗respect‘) is to honor 
her as a person, which involves both seeing or regarding her as a person rather than as 
something else and honoring, and not dishonoring, the rational capacities and equal moral 
status that make her a person.  When we fail to see someone as a person, which can 
happen when, for instance, a boss momentarily sees her assistant as a useful object, when 
the Nazi‘s began to see Jewish people as sub-human, or when people with disabilities are 
seen more like children then full moral persons, we are not concentrating on the features 
of her that make her a person, which I claim are her rational capacities of deliberation, 
thought and action and the equal moral status she has in virtue of having these.  The other 
part of respecting someone as a person is honoring her as such – not defiling, ridiculing 
or humiliating her – which I claim also centrally involves not demanding or intending to 
cause her to lose respect for herself by failing to see herself as a person – slave-owners 
often dishonored their slaves by trying to ‗break them‘ and so come to see themselves as 
something with a lesser moral status than whites.  I also think there is a sort of argument 
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that, when fully developed, can show why we have reason to respect others in this thick 
sense.  Details aside, if we are all rationally disposed to respect ourselves and also 
rationally disposed to reciprocate with others then it may be that we would settle on some 
arrangement in which everyone is afforded the freedom to respect herself within limits 
that afford others the same liberty.  We would have good reason not overstep these 
bounds by attempting to interfere with the respect that others can rightfully have for 
themselves by, for example, demanding that they lose their self-respect or making it clear 
to them and others that we do not see them as persons, which can be extremely wounding 
to how one sees oneself. 
One can see how these values can give conflicting advice about which social 
moral rules to enact.  For example, as I explain in the final chapter in an attempt to 
illustrate how my basic framework can be used to improve codes of social moral rules, 
the members of sports teams are often in a sort of cooperative solidarity with one another 
that can lead them to require great personal sacrifice, conformity and bad behavior 
towards non-team members, whereas respect can require protections for individual 
decision-making and positive interaction with members of other teams even when these 
interfere with the team‘s overall performance.  Sports teams may be governed by rules, 
for instance, that allow friendships with members of other teams as long as secret team 
information is not passed to others; there must be adequate safeguards against excessive 
physical and emotional harm during practices and games; players who satisfy a minimum 
level of skill and work should be given some opportunity to play while those who exceed 
in either category can be given preference, etc.  
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With the values of cooperative solidarity and thick respect in hand, we can now 
turn to our second question about the moral status of social moral rules.  My view is that 
when we are cooperative solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have 
established among ourselves to guide the cooperative activities we are pursuing together 
in support of our shared ends, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive 
part of our solidary relationships with each other; and it is part of being in cooperative 
solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social 
moral rules that join us together.
15
  Similarly, I argue that respecting someone as a 
person, in the thick sense of respect, not only requires that we see her as a person but also 
that we are disposed to express this or at least refrain from expressing that we do not see 
her as such.  Often it can happen in a society that our notion of a person is 
operationalized and instituted in social moral rules that partially define what, for purposes 
of our society, we take a person to be – much like the way the rules of a game specify 
what counts as a player of it, the social moral rules of a society set out expectations, 
requirements, powers, and rights that, perhaps with the laws of our society and other 
shared moral ideas, define a forensic conception of a person.  In our society, then, part of 
what it is to see someone as a person is to see her as a co-participant in our moral code, 
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and if we see her that way and are disposed to express that we do, then we will be 
inclined to treat her in accordance with that code.  We often have non-instrumental 
reasons to follow our society‘s shared moral code, then, as ways of respecting others as 
persons. 
When we are addressing particular moral problems, we must be thinking in part 
about what applicable social moral rules already exist and what publicly known and 
socially enforced rules we and others should adopt for situations of that sort.  Doing this 
appropriately will require tailoring the rules to our cognitive limitations, constraints on 
how much information we can reasonably be expected to have, what sorts of precedents 
the rules might set, how liable they will be to abuse, what effect social pressures of 
various kinds will have, how complicated they are, and so on.  These relevance of these 
considerations means that the best social moral rules for a given situation will almost 
certainly elide over many moral distinctions, but because of the constitutive role the rules 
play in standing in solidarity with others and showing them proper respect, how we ought 
to act in particular cases often depends crucially on what the rules are and should be. 
Our third question is about breaking the rules.  It is widely assumed among those 
who write about moral rules either that once we have settled on an ideal set of them then 
these rules should never be broken or that the rules are just heuristics that should be 
broken (perhaps secretly) when we can produce even slightly more good by doing so.  I 
think both attitudes about rule-breaking are mistaken.  When actual, and perhaps 
imperfect, social moral rules are playing certain roles in keeping a group in cooperative 
solidarity and helping them to show thick respect to one another then these values give us 
reasons to follow the potentially defective rules.  Such rules, then, deserve our allegiance 
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even when, on the one hand, following them conflicts with the rules that would be best 
for our society and, on the other, we could produce slightly more good by breaking them.  
The reasons we have to continue following the rules even when we know they are 
defective or the standard justification for having the rule does not apply in an oddball 
case that is still technically covered by the rule, however, are not absolute.  While these 
reasons must be reckoned with in an overall judgment about what we ought to do, 
sometimes the same mid-level values that justify having and following social moral rules 
also give us sufficient reasons all things considered to break them.  Solidarity, for 
example, can give us strong reasons to keep our group together, so while breaking our 
rule about lying would normally be a way of failing to live up to our solidary 
relationships with others in our society, in certain extreme cases lying to one of our 
comrades to avert the destruction of our society may actually be the best way of standing 
in solidarity with them. 
The second and third chapters are concerned with understanding the values of 
solidarity and respect and then explaining how these values often give us non-
instrumental reasons to follow social moral rules but can also give us good reasons to 
break those rules as well.  Our final question, about what it takes to improve our own 
imperfect code of social moral rules, is taken up in the fourth chapter.  There I explain 
that because the core of our code, which is the part of it that we are most firmly 
committed to, consists of prohibitions on the most egregious and obvious acts of killing, 
torture, lying and so on, the part of our code that most needs improvement is its periphery 
where it makes exceptions to the general prohibitions, interprets those prohibitions and 
includes rules for more specific circumstances and areas of life.  What we need is a 
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standard to which we can compare our own moral code, an ideal code of social moral 
rules worked out for our social world that includes the right sorts of exceptions and 
qualifiers, correctly interprets key moral concepts and helps to justify the core that is 
common between our actual code and the ideal one for us.  The best way to construct an 
ideal set of social moral rules, I suggest, is by examining our own code piece by piece to 
see whether, for example, our rules about lying include the right sorts of exceptions, 
qualifiers and the like, and along the way trying to fit the various rules we settle on into a 
consistent and coherent scheme.  The ideal moral code for one society may be different 
than that of another, but once we have one in hand for one like ours, with its functioning 
and more or less liberal legal system and its reasonably favorable social conditions, we 
must face the problem of utopianism about whether we should immediately begin 
following it or, as I suggest, working piecemeal to improve our code while paying due 
deference to the one that has served us well. 
A deep suspicion one might have about this task of defining an ideal code of 
social moral rules for a society like ours, which we can then use as a standard of 
improvement for our own moral code, is that it is impossible because there is no 
underlying unity or structure to ethical thought.  I explain, however, that solidarity and 
respect give us strong non-instrumental reasons to maintain and follow a coherent system 
of social moral rules, that our own moral code can certainly use some improvements, and 
that many other parts of morality may not be codifiable by principles or rules – my view 
is that we need social moral rules as an oasis of structure in what may otherwise be a 
mostly untamable wilderness of moral thought.   
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We must be sensitive, however, to the worry that an ideal code of social moral 
rules will inevitably include rigoristic and inflexible rules that cannot be supported by 
commonsense or else they will be riddled with so many exceptions and qualifiers that 
they will no longer be able to serve their public social role.  The best way to respond to 
this concern, I explain, is to list out and investigate the devices that are available to us 
when constructing an ideal code of social moral rules that allow us to avoid absolutism 
while keeping the rules within grasp of normal people – these devices include not only 
exceptions but also levels of rules, presumptive rules, thick evaluative concepts, 
individual decision-making and many others.  The remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
filling in some of the details of a contractualist framework for making the hard choices 
involved in constructing an ideal moral code, including a fuller account of the mid-level 
values and what I think justifies them, a conception of the person and society that are 
drawn from those values and can then be reflected in a point of view for evaluating our 
moral code, and an account of what we assume would be motivating those who took up 
that standpoint from which a group of people would deliberating about what social moral 







THE NATURE OF SOCIAL MORAL RULES 
Examples of social moral rules 
Here are some paradigmatic examples of social moral rules. 
(1) Nudist colonies typically have social moral rules that are intended to show 
proper regard for their common moral belief that nudity and sexuality should be kept 
separate (as far as possible).  One such rule is ‗no staring at others in the camp‘, since 
members do not want others gawking or visiting for sexual reasons.  If someone is caught 
staring at another person while in the camp then that individual is subject to ridicule, 
shunning, or even exile from the group.  Other camp rules include ‗no sex talk‘, ‗no body 
contact with strangers‘, ‗no dancing‘, and ‗no alcohol‘.16   
(2) In many inner-city neighborhoods, there is a social moral rule that says ‗stop 
snitchin‘‘, meaning ‗do not ever cooperate with the police under any circumstances.‘  
Being labeled a ‗snitch‘ in these places brings severe ridicule, ostracism, and even 
physical violence, and the rule is glorified by celebrities in music, movies, and clothing.  
Most of those who follow the rule seem to do so out of a belief that the police are the 
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(3) The American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics includes a set of 
rules meant to govern the behavior of doctors.  As is the case with most professional 
codes of ethics, the people who wrote the AMA code were for the most part attempting to 
capture the rules that had already been governing the professional conduct of members of 
their profession rather than trying to create new rules that that would be imposed on 
them.  The following is a sample of some of those rules:
18
 
A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health 
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the 
constraints of the law. 
   
Physicians should not offer financial incentives or other valuable considerations 
to patients in exchange for recruitment of other patients. 
 
Withholding medical information from patients without their knowledge or 
consent is ethically unacceptable. 
 
Physicians may use placebos for diagnosis or treatment only if the patient is 
informed of and agrees to its use.  
 
Sexual relationships between a medical trainee and a supervisor even when 
consensual are not acceptable regardless of the degree of supervision in any given 
situation. 
 
It is unethical for a physician to practice medicine while under the influence of a 
controlled substance, alcohol, or other chemical agents which impair the ability to 
practice medicine.  
 
A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing 
to the improvement of the community and the betterment of public health. 
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The AMA code also specifies certain formal procedures, such as convening ethics 
panels with the authority to issue reprimands of various sorts, to enforce the code.  
However, studies of the way the AMA code functions in practice suggest that its 
enforcement usually falls to informal social pressures, most notably those having to do 
with the reputation of a physician among his peers and the general public.
19
  According to 
these findings, it is rare for cases to be brought before formal institutions of the AMA, in 
part because doctors are often reluctant to testify against each other, but doctors 
themselves and the public at large exert a strong influence on them to conform to and 
accept the rules of the AMA code. 
(4) There is a neighborhood swimming pool near my house with a sign that lists 
ten or so pool rules, which include ‗no pets in and around the pool area‘, ‗no running on 
the pool deck‘, and ‗patrons must shower before entering the pool‘.  There is no lifeguard 
on duty, and there is no formal mechanism in place for enforcing these rules – informal 
social pressures such as dirty looks, gossip, and verbal confrontations make sure that the 
rules are followed.  Despite being listed on the sign, the rule about showering, however, 
does not seem to exist there as a social moral rule since it is usually violated, never 
socially enforced except in extreme cases, and most people probably do not know all of 
the specifics of what it requires (how soon before entering the pool must one shower, 
etc.).   Another interesting feature of the rules is that the one about pets probably includes 
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an implicitly recognized exception for guide dogs even though this was not included on 
the sign itself. 
(5) Among the nomads of Northwestern Greece, there are social moral rules 
forbidding what they regard as immodest behavior among married women.  This includes 
prohibitions on laughing and joking because these apparently indicate that one is guilty of 
sexual transgressions.  Once a woman is commonly understood to have violated those 
rules, a typical punishment is that no ‗honorable‘ man will agree to marry any of her 
daughters.   
(6) The Mbuti Pygmies of what was once Zaire possess a highly flexible system 
of social moral rules.  One such rule, which is strictly enforced, is that a Mbuti should not 
substantially harm another Mbuti, but this rule includes an explicit exception that during 
one of their ritual festivals, adolescent girls are permitted to attack males with switches 
and inflict serious harm on them.
20
 
(7) The rule ‗children should be seen and not heard‘, which was common practice 
in some societies, requires that children not speak in the presence of adults.  In these 
social groups, it was widely believed to be a justified way of raising children, teaching 
them their social position, and showing respect for other adults. 
(8) There are certain basic social moral rules that may be nearly universal across 
different times and cultures.
21
  Some of these include:  ‗do not intentionally kill another 
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innocent person‘, ‗do not engage in pedaphilic behavior with very young children‘, ‗do 
not forcibly take the property of another person‘, ‗do not commit adultery‘, and so on.  
Basic rules of this sort may differ with regard to their priority, what exceptions they 
include, how they are specified, how they are applied, the extent and manner in which 
they are enforced, and there are no doubt many other respects in which these basic social 
moral rules can vary across societies, but there is some reason to think that the basic rules 
themselves exist in most every society. 
A Paradigm of Social Moral Rules 
Here, then, is a paradigm of social moral rules, which tries to capture some 
distinguishing features of at least the clearest examples of them.  My claim is not that 
these features are part of the concept of a social moral rule or follow from the meaning of 
that term.  Rather, I hope that this paradigm describes a pervasive, fundamental and 
recognizable aspect of a wide variety of societies and cultures.  I should emphasize that 
as far as possible this paradigm is meant to be non-normative in the sense that it does not 
depend on the truth of any normative claim – the term ‗social moral rule‘ is not a term of 
commendation because many of them are quite reprehensible.  My aim here is to describe 
a paradigm of social moral rules as putative objects of moral appraisal before 
investigating what standards, if any, we should use to assess them.  This way of 
proceeding is similar to certain moral investigations that begin with, or at least 
presuppose, some account of the nature of actions, personal character traits, basic 
institutions, or laws.  Some social rules may not satisfy this paradigm while it may be 
indeterminate or too difficult to tell whether others do.  My focus, however, will be on 
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those rules that clearly satisfy the paradigm, while recognizing that other sorts of rules 
may require a different treatment.
22
 
There is an ambiguity I need to address first.  A social moral rule, such as ‗do not 
intentionally kill an innocent person‘ or ‗do not snitch‘, may be thought of as an abstract 
proposition that specifies a possible way of acting or as an entity that is realized in the 
attitudes and actions of a group of people.
 23
  I will consider social moral rules as the 
latter because these are pervasive features of our social world, so it is worth investigating 
how, if at all, they should be morally appraised.  It may also be that abstract social moral 
rules are appropriate just in case any realization of them would be morally appropriate as 
well.
24
  None of this precludes, of course, trying to specify the standard we should use to 
assess our moral code by imagining what social moral rules would exist among a group 
of idealized persons.  But this way of conceiving of social moral rules does imply that 
when proposing improvements to them, we must take in to account various ‗practical‘ 
considerations related to their being widely accepted, known, enforced and otherwise 
affecting how people act, think, and feel.  Social moral rules, then, bare a close analogy 
to laws, which we typically think of as existing in some legal system or other and which 
we assess in view of their potential for abuse, enforceability and so on.  
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To begin spelling out my paradigm of social moral rules, the acceptance condition 
says that a social rule exists in a group only when many people accept the rule.  
Acceptance of a rule involves having a complicated set of dispositions, which includes 
being disposed to comply with the rule and to socially enforce it in others, which is a 
matter of applying social pressures to encourage others to comply with and accept the 
rule, discourage others from violating or rejecting the rule, and criticizing those who do 
not follow or accept it.  Acceptance of a rule also involves feeling guilt or shame if one 
violates the rule oneself; forming favorable attitudes towards those who comply with and 
accept the rule; and forming unfavorable attitudes towards those who do not.  
Additionally, there is an ‗internal aspect‘25 to accepting a social moral rule:  One must 
judge that the group generally ought to follow and accept the rule, and this judgment is 
taken as legitimate grounds for fulfilling these various dispositions.  For example, if a 
gang member accepts the social moral rule ‗don‘t snitch‘ then he thinks that the rule 
generally ought to be followed and accepted by himself and his comrades, he thinks it 
justified to disparage and condemn those who break it, he would feel guilt or shame at 
breaking the rule himself and he would find this appropriate, and so on for the rest of the 
dispositions involved in accepting a rule. 
Three points of clarification about the ‗internal aspect‘ of the acceptance 
condition, which I take to be one of the more important features of this paradigm.  First, 
the judgment that the group generally ought to follow the rule is meant to invoke the 
moral concept of ‗ought‘, so in holding this judgment, one cannot consistently believe 
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that following the rule is just a matter of furthering one‘s self-interest, satisfying 
immediate feelings or desires, avoiding social reprisals, or garnering social benefits.  
Second, this also places some constraints on what sort of rules can count as social moral 
rules, since we cannot consistently think that rules with certain features morally ought to 
be followed.  In particular, such rules must be general in that they must be articulable 
without the use of proper names and the like, and they must be universal in that they must 
hold for everyone to whom they apply (?).  Within these broad constraints, people may 
accept social moral rules on the basis of a wide variety of moral views and doctrines. 
Third, a person need not think that the group ought to follow the rule in every case – he 
may believe that breaking the rule is sometimes justified.   
The acceptance condition implies that social moral rules are not created by 
anyone in particular, and no one has the special authority to modify or destroy them.
26
  
Instead, social rules come in to existence only when they are generally accepted by the 
group, they are altered when the group comes to accept a different rule, and they are 
destroyed when the group ceases to accept the rule.  Whereas the Queen-in-Parliament 
can make binding laws, the Queen herself can only have a causal influence on what social 
moral rules exist in her country by, for example, setting an example, trying to convince 
others of her opinions, establishing public relations campaigns, funding certain groups or 
projects, or perhaps even being the leader of an appropriately worshiping group of 
people.   
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According to the compliance condition, social moral rules are normally complied 
with by the group on the basis of their accepting the rules, though perhaps not invariably 
so.  Next, the informal social enforcement condition holds that social moral rules are 
socially enforced in an informal way, which means that social enforcement does not rely 
on any formal institutions having been given that task even though such institutions may 
also exist.  Theft, for example, is often punished by formal legal institutions, but it can 
also be condemned by informal social pressures.  The social pressures that we use for 
informal social enforcement vary widely.  We discourage and criticize non-compliance 
and non-acceptance of a rule by, for example, using ridicule, mockery, stigmatization, 
gossip, dishonor, ostracism, exile, or force; and we encourage compliance and acceptance 
of a rule by celebrating, praising, honoring and rewarding those who do so, guiding 
others to do the same, etc.
27
  These social pressures are a pervasive part of our lives.  We 
may exhibit certain mumblings and mannerisms when someone cuts us in line, ridicule a 
friend who breaks a promise to us, and break off ties with a person who commits spousal 
abuse.  We may also praise children who share with others, honor people who abide by 
their profession‘s code of ethics28, and guide others to do better for the environment by 
pointing out the good reasons for doing so.   
Often what makes social pressures so effective is that they are commonly 
understood to express moral condemnation or approval, in addition to whatever other 
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costs or benefits they impose.  In certain circumstances, moral condemnation by others is 
severely wounding to us, both because we are committed to maintaining valuable 
relationships with others of a sort that may be damaged by such attitudes, and because the 
moral disapproval of others may lead us to reevaluate our own actions and decide for 
ourselves that we indeed acted wrongly.  The reverse is typically true for social pressures 
that express moral approval – these often help to firm up worthwhile relationships with 
others and reassure us that we are acting appropriately. 
The teachability requirement says that when a rule of social morality exists in a 
group, there is an effective social mechanism for teaching the rule to others and for 
transmitting it from one generation to the next.  This usually involves explicit instruction 
in the rules from teachers, parents, siblings, and friends, but we also tend to learn and 
come to accept rules through the social pressures that others exert on us and our 
observations of their behavior.
29
 
Finally there is the formal publicity condition:  A rule of social morality exists in 
a group only when it is public knowledge that the rule is to be followed, generally 
accepted, complied with, socially enforced and taught, all in the ways I have described. 
Public knowledge is a matter of most everyone knowing these things and knowing that 
others know them as well.  And this knowledge need not be articulable by most people; 
rather, it can be implicit in their belief systems and manifest in their attitudes and actions.  
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For example, many of us may not be able to state precisely the rules governing how close 
to stand to others when engaged in everyday conversation, although we know these rules 
quite well. The formal publicity requirement ensures that there is a shared understanding 
that the group affirms the rule, and so provides a shared basis for resolving conflicts and 
engaging in public arguments. 
Contrasts 
These features, taken together, constitute the paradigm of social moral rules that I 
will be exploring.  As a way of clarifying this paradigm, it may be helpful to contrast it 
with certain other things, although I emphasize that there may be substantial overlap 
among all of these. 
(1) Shared habits, behavioral regularities and fads are among the normal or typical 
behaviors in a group.  While they exist in virtue of being generally complied with and 
perhaps accepted (in some minimal sense) by the group, they differ from social moral 
rules in that acceptance of them need not involve the ‗internal aspect‘ of believing that 
they ought to be followed and accepted.  Additionally, these habits and the like need not 
be socially enforced or taught to others.  
(2) A social convention, in the way it is understood by philosophers, is basically a 
pattern of mutually beneficial behavior that is normally exhibited by a group of people 
who do their part in the pattern because they believe it to be in their interests to do so and 
they expect most everyone to conform to it as well.
30
  Social conventions are also self-
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enforcing in that if the group is generally following that pattern of behavior then most 
everyone has self-regarding reasons to do so as well.  Sometimes social conventions are 
arbitrary in that there is more than one pattern of behavior that would satisfy the interests 
of each member of the group more or less equally.  Driving on the right side of the road is 
a social convention; other examples may include language, money, property dress codes, 
and manners.
31
  Contemporary discussions of social conventions have tended to make use 
of the formal methods of game theory to offer a more precise analysis of them, but they 
all seem to be versions of this general characterization.
32
 
Social moral rules and social conventions share certain similarities.  Both are 
social in that they depend for their existence on being complied with and accepted (in 
some sense), and because they involve a shared understanding about how the group 
behaves in the relevant contexts.  There are important differences, however.  First, 
accepting a social moral rule involves judging that the rule morally ought to be followed 
whereas someone in the grip of a social convention can regard his reasons for following it 
as wholly prudential.  Second, social moral rules are socially enforced whereas social 
conventions need not be – openly violating a social convention can in principle be met 
with no social sanctions.  Third, social moral rules involve a more robust notion of 
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acceptance than do social conventions, most notably in that accepting a social moral rule 
involves forming favorable attitudes towards those who comply with the rule and 
unfavorable ones towards those who do not, and feeling guilt or shame if one breaks the 
rule.  Finally, social moral rules are transmitted to others and from one generation to the 
next. 
Social moral rules can at the same time be conventions since conditions for 
existence of these things are often compatible in that, for example, someone can take 
himself to have moral and prudential reasons for behaving in some way – truthfulness in 
what we say and property arrangements, for example, are regulated by social moral rules 
in our society and they also probably constitute mutually beneficial patterns of behavior 
that meet the other requirements of being a social convention.  This seems to be a good 
way of understanding certain forms of etiquette, manners, and codes of dress, which on 
the one hand may be mutually beneficial and also self-enforcing on account of the social 
pressures that typically accompany them; on the other hand, they may be ways of trying 
to express proper respect to others, fulfilling legitimate expectations, and being kind, 
agreeable, or sensitive to the desires of others. 
(3) Social moral rules are a subset of social rules.  In their paradigmatic forms, 
both satisfy all five of the conditions I described above, with this difference:  social rules 
need only be accepted on the basis of a judgment that they are to be followed, whereas 
moral social rules require having the belief that they morally ought to be followed.  
Additionally, the attitudes associated with the breaking of social rules need not be 
morally loaded ones, such as guilt, shame, or resentment.  Non-moral social rules may 
include rules of environmental protection, such as those that require recycling.  In my 
37 
 
neighborhood, the recycling cartons are quite visible, and neighbors who do not use them 
suffer mild social criticism, even though most of us think that this is not a moral failing 
on their part.  Other examples include certain of the more esoteric rules of etiquette, 
speech or dress, which are often accepted as ways to express the natural, though perhaps 
not moral, superiority of the upper classes and so to distinguish them from others.
33
 
(4) Positive laws are laws that exist in virtue of being enacted in accordance with 
social moral rules (or something like them) that specify the social facts that are necessary 
for creating, modifying or destroying such legal standards.
34
  Positive laws, then, depend 
on a group realizing so-called ‗rules of recognition‘, which specify, for example, that 
such laws can be enacted by the legislature, modified or interpreted by judges and so on.  
The main differences between social moral rules and positive laws are these:  First, 
positive laws are created, changed and annulled by formal institutions whereas social 
moral rules depend for their existence on being widely accepted, complied with, socially 
enforced and so on – positive laws can exist even if very few people comply with or 
accept them, and they can be very complicated and unknown to most people.  Second, 
positive laws are usually enforced by formal institutions whereas social moral rules are 
socially enforced in an informal way through the use of social pressures of various sorts.  
Of course, there are many laws that are also social moral rules, but these two sets are not 
always coextensive – our society has certain social moral rules against adultery between 
consenting adults but most states have no laws against it, and there are laws here that 
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govern copyrighted music for which there is arguably no corresponding social moral rule 
(at least among certain sub-groups). 
(5) Constitutive rules are ones that make up a practice by defining certain actions, 
offices, moves, and excuses.
35
  Some constitutive rules are social moral rules – those 
governing promising and marriage in our society, for example, because for the most part 
we comply with, accept, socially enforce, teach and know these rules – but other ones are 
not, such as constitutive rules of certain games.  The rules that determine how Bishops 
may move on a chess board are not social moral ones since we do not think that they 
morally ought to be followed and accepted, although there may be more general social 
moral rules of sportsmanship that enjoin us to follow the constitutive rules of the games 
that we are fairly playing with others.  
Other distinctions 
To conclude this section, I‘ll briefly introduce a few more distinctions that will be 
relevant to our discussion.  Social moral rules, or ‗rules‘ as I will sometimes say, can vary 
with regard to the sort of people to whom they apply and the areas of life that they 
govern.  The rules of a nudist colony have a wide range, since they are meant to apply to 
everyone, not just to nudists, but a narrow scope, since they are meant to govern 
everyone‘s behavior in our interactions with nudist colonies.  On the other hand, the 
AMA rule forbidding sexual relationships of any kind between supervisors and trainees 
has a narrow range, since it only applies to certain people, but a moderately wide scope, 
since it governs aspects of their lives that go far beyond their professional capacities.  
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Basic social moral rules, then, are those that apply to everyone and are meant to constrain 
all areas of their lives – suitably abstract rules about murder, adultery, theft, and rape are 
most likely part of the core of the moral code of most every society.   
A related point is that social moral rules are often hierarchically structured, with 
the basic ones guiding and constraining the more specific ones, which are more sensitive 
to cultural variations, local needs, historical contingencies, traditions and so on.  A 
society, for example, may accept the more specific rule that their children, though 
perhaps not those in other societies, should be seen and not heard as a way of interpreting 
and applying the more basic social moral rule that children should be properly educated.   
Secondary social moral rules are those that specify how to react when others have 
broken other social moral rules, and primary social rules are not secondary ones - they 
permit, forbid, require, discourage, encourage, or whatever, types of acts in a way that 
does not make essential reference to the breaking of other rules.  Among the Greek 
nomads I described earlier, it is arguably a secondary social moral rule that no 
‗honorable‘ man may marry the daughter of a sexually immodest woman. 
Social moral rules are rarely absolute and they tend to exist in systems of other 
such rules.  They typically include exceptions, limiting conditions, qualifiers, 
defeasibility conditions, priority rules, decision procedures, and other devices that allow 
them to exist as a more or less coherent moral code, although most actual moral codes 
include inconsistencies, ambiguities, and gaps.  Typically a society‘s set of basic social 
moral rules is also limited in the sense that they constrain, but do not determine, all 
aspects of our moral lives because they usually exist alongside societal values, personal 
goals and projects, ideals, laws, commended character traits, and recognized exemplars.  
40 
 
Additionally, adequately applying social moral rules usually requires some sensitivity, 






SOLIDARITY AND SOCIAL MORAL RULES 
When we have established among ourselves what might be called social moral 
rules, which are informally established and socially enforced standards that members of a 
group generally treat as properly regulating their conduct, the fact that these rules prevail 
in our group seems to be a new reason for us to follow them.
36
  Social moral rules are all 
around us – they exist in our clubs, universities, teams, political parties, neighborhood 
associations, families, and our society – so we should ask what sorts of reasons we have 
to follow the norms that our group treats as moral, even when we know that our rules are 
not as good as they could be.     
Here are some examples of prevailing social moral rules that, just in virtue of 
being rules of the group, seem to give members some reason to comply with them:  The 
Mbuti Pygmies of Zaire have a rule according to which a Mbuti must not substantially 
harm another member of the tribe except during one of their ritual festivals where 
adolescent girls are permitted to attack the men of the tribe
37
; the Siriono people of 
eastern Bolivia enforce a rule against eating raw meat even in the face of impending 
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38; residents of a certain halfway house affirmed the rule ‗don‘t snitch‘, which 
they took to mean, ‗do not cooperate with the authorities under any circumstances‘39; 
lawyers recognize a rule among themselves to do some pro bono legal work
40
; stand-up 
comedians informally enforce rules about stealing one another‘s jokes41; when I was 
growing up my family had a rule about eating Sunday brunch together; and the moral 
code that exists in our own society includes social moral rules about lying and killing. 
It is clear from these examples that the prevailing social moral rules of a group are 
not the same as its habits, customs, norms of etiquette, or laws even though the content of 
these things can be the same – a moral principle against killing an innocent person, for 
example, can be instituted as a socially enforced rule and enacted as a formally enforced 
law.  Social moral rules are distinctive in part because they are enforced in informal, 
unorganized ways.  A lawyer who took no pro bono cases, for example, would be subject 
to gossip, mockery and perhaps ostracism by his colleagues while a neighbor who broke 
a promise to water our plants would not likely be invited for dinner anytime soon.  Social 
moral rules are ‗moral‘, in one sense of that term, because of the social function they play 
in a group, even though, in a different sense, a group can affirm social moral rules that 
are incorrect and unjustified. 
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When social moral rules prevail in our group, what kinds of reasons (if any) do 
we have to follow them?  A natural response is that the existence of a social moral rule is 
at most an instrumental reason to follow it.  Maintaining and enforcing social moral rules 
can help us, individually or as a group, to stay connected, survive in a dangerous 
environment, garner a valuable reputation, or bring about shared ends.  This explanation, 
I argue, does not do full justice to the value of existing social moral rules and the reasons 
such rules can provide. 
My question is:  Are the prevailing social moral rules of a group – or, more 
specifically, the complicated complex of attitudes, dispositions and actions in virtue of 
which social moral rules exist in a group – valuable for their own sake, apart from any 
instrumental value there may be in having those rules; and if the social moral rules that 
exist in a group are valuable in this non-instrumental way, do they give us non-
instrumental reasons to follow the prevailing rules?  Take, for example, our socially 
enforced rule against torture, which has been criticized as defective by some for allowing 
too many exceptions and by others for allowing too few.  Even if we, as a society, had 
not managed to establish and implement that rule (indeed, some societies in the past may 
have had no such rule) torture would still be inhumane, cruel, and painful, which is 
usually more than enough reason not to torture one another.  But we do generally affirm 
and socially enforce a rule against torture here, so we should ask what sort of value (if 
any) our prevailing rule has – what good is there in continuing to affirm this rule, 
appealing to it in public discussions, and pressuring others to comply with it as opposed 
to leaving such matters to the law or individual conscience.  And what additional reasons 
44 
 
(if any) does the presence of our rule give us not to torture others that we wouldn‘t 
already have if no such rule existed here? 
The utilitarian tradition has been at the forefront of discussions about the nature 
and value of prevailing social moral rules.  History has shown, Mill thought, that the 
existence of certain commonly affirmed, but not necessarily legally codified, social moral 
rules about theft, promising, beneficence, etc. are essential for us to enjoy even a 
minimally decent standard of living.
42
  Establishing and maintaining such rules, for 
example, helps us to coordinate our behavior and makes us more likely to act as we 
should.  There is little doubt that a moral code can be instrumentally valuable but is this 
the only sort of value it can have?  Act-utilitarians tend to think so.  For them, when 
social moral rules exist, they are at best just heuristics, rules of thumb, means of 
coordination or tools of social control that can for the most part cause us to act better than 
we otherwise would.  Many of us strongly resist the implication, however, that commonly 
accepted social moral rules about lying and torture, for instance, must be broken, perhaps 
even secretly, every time this would produce slightly more good overall.  Those who 
nonetheless favor sticking to the rules, however, are accused of ‗fetishizing‘ or 
‗worshiping‘ rules because they leave unexplained why we should always comply with 
the rules even if it makes sense for our group in general to maintain and support them. 
Partially in response to the concern that existing social moral rules lack any 
distinctive authority of their own apart from the benefits they tend to produce, rule-
                                                 
42
 Mill, John Stuart and Crisp, Roger (1998), Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 5.13, 5.25, 
5.32-34.  See also Sidgwick, Henry (1962), The Methods of Ethics (7th edn.; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press) and, for a related discussion of the law, Bentham, Jeremy, Burns, J. H., and Hart, H. L. A. 
(1996), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
45 
 
utilitarianism promised a more sensible view about rule-following that also retains 
utilitarian insights about the instrumental value that prevailing moral codes can have.
43
  
Details aside, rule-utilitarianism holds that the justification of every action depends on its 
being in accordance with the social moral rules that, if they were to exist, would 
maximize overall welfare.  A common worry, however, is that rule-utilitarians have 
difficulty explaining, in a way that remains faithful to their utilitarian commitments, why 
we should follow generally useful rules when it is suboptimal to do so on particular 
occasions.     
Act-utilitarians, who rightly emphasize how useful prevailing social moral rules 
can be for producing welfare, are too permissive when it comes to rule-breaking; rule-
utilitarians, who come closer to capturing commonsense ideas about the importance of 
following good social moral rules, leave it unclear why we should always comply with 
them.   
One of my aims is to offer a new and non-consequentialist account of the value of 
having and following social moral rules, one that explains why we should sometimes 
follow prevailing, but perhaps defective, rules independent of the instrumental benefits 
there may be in doing so.  My other aim is to begin developing a non-consequentialist 
theory of social moral rules that incorporates an improved conception of social moral 
rules, satisfies common concerns about the limits of rules and the need for good moral 
judgment when applying them, abandons the utilitarian conception of the common good 
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and has its foundations in a host of mid-level values that we commonly affirm, such as 
freedom, equality, respect and (I would add) solidarity.   
My account of the value and reason-giving force of social moral rules can be 
summarized in this way.  When we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united 
by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have 
developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary
44
 relationships with one 
another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are 
presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together.
45
  This kind 
of solidarity, in which we are bound together by social moral rules, is widespread and 
often valuable for its own sake quite apart from any propensity to bring about other good 
ends.  It follows that the social moral rules that hold us in solidarity are often valuable for 
their own sake as well or, more precisely, they are non-derivatively valuable in virtue of 
being a constitutive part of a relationship that is valuable as an end.  And, when social 
moral rules exist and play an essential role in constituting the intrinsically valuable 
solidarity of a group, we have non-instrumental reasons to follow the rules because doing 
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so is often a way of manifesting or expressing these valuable relationships by living up to 
their requirements.  Breaking the rules can be a way of betraying or letting down our 
compatriots.  My family‘s rule about eating Sunday brunch became part of the solidary 
relationship that we had with one another.  We didn‘t have to settle on this or any social 
moral rule, but we did, so that rule became our rule, and its role in the relationships we 
developed gave me some reason to show up on Sunday mornings as a way of living out, 
manifesting and standing in solidarity with my family. 
My characterization of the non-instrumental value of social moral rules and the 
non-derivative reasons we have to follow them is analogous to Aristotle‘s account of the 
value of particular justice, which is a matter of repaying debts, keeping promises, etc.  In 
addition to being desirable for the sake of happiness, Aristotle argues that the particular 
virtue of justice is also desirable for its own sake in virtue of being part of the highest 
good of happiness.  According to him, being just to our friends is a way of manifesting or 
expressing our own happiness.  Similarly, I explain how our group‘s shared moral code 
can be valuable for its own sake in virtue of holding a group together in solidarity and 
also how we have non-instrumental reasons to follow those rules as a way of living up to 
the requirements of our worthwhile solidary relationships.  
One feature of my view worth emphasizing is that it partially explains why, 
within certain limits, we have good reasons to follow imperfect or defective social moral 
rules even when we could do more good otherwise or, paradoxically, even when an ideal 
moral code requires us to break the flawed rules we actually have.  It is important to think 
about what an ideal moral code would be like, but our society already has some non-
ideal, though still fairly good, social moral rules that unite us in solidarity with each 
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other, so we have non-instrumental reasons to continue affording our rules some 
allegiance even while working to make them better. 
I will proceed as follows.  In the first section, I discuss in more detail the nature of 
social moral rules and distinguish them from habits, customs, rules of etiquette, 
conventions, laws and abstract moral principles.  Then, in the second section, I describe 
solidarity in a way that shows it to be valuable for its own sake, at least in some contexts.  
I continue my discussion of the value of solidarity in section three by arguing that it is 
valuable as an end, to each individual in the relationship rather than in some agent-neutral 
way, but not in all circumstances – the solidarity among the Nazi‘s was not, I claim, 
valuable for its own sake, but there may be some redeeming value in the solidarity of 
certain less defective but still imperfect teams, marriages, armies, societies, etc.  In 
section four I explain how relationships of solidarity can be partially constituted by the 
prevailing social moral rules of a group.  I then argue in sections five and six that when 
social moral rules play this constitutive role in uniting a group in intrinsically valuable 
relationships of solidarity, we can draw the following conclusions.  First, those 
potentially defective rules are valuable for their own sake in virtue of being components 
of a relationship that is valuable as an end.  Second, the members of the group have non-
instrumental reasons to follow what may be imperfect social moral rules as ways of 
manifesting the solidarity they have with one another and living up its demands.  Third, 
the solidarity that unites them also gives members of the group non-instrumental reasons 
to improve their shared rules.  Finally, their solidary relationships can sometimes even 
give them, what may seem paradoxical, reasons to break their social moral rules. 
49 
 
I end with the proposal that we see our society as being in a sort of solidarity, 
united together in meaningful relationships by values of respect, freedom, justice, etc. and 
by our shared project of living out those values together, which we do in part by 
maintaining, following and steadily improving our own code of social moral rules. 
Social moral rules 
Mill famously said that we ―do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply 
that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the 
opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own 
conscience‖ (my emphasis).46  Here are a few more examples the sorts of things I want to 
talk about, which fall somewhere in between laws and traits of character.  Our society 
accepts social moral rules about giving up bus seats to elderly people or those with 
disabilities; people who choose to smoke around children are often met with scowls; 
journalists have an unwritten rule about protecting confidential sources; and police 
officers generally recognize the ―Blue Wall of Silence‖ not to report the errors, 
infractions or crimes of one another.
47
 
Drawing on similar accounts of social moral rules offered by H.L.A. Hart, Kurt 
Baier, Richard Brandt and John Rawls, I suppose that, paradigmatically, social moral 
rules exist in a group when:
 48
   (a) the rules are widely accepted as social moral rules in a 
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way that I explain shortly and (b) are generally complied with; (c) the rules are not 
created by anyone in particular, and no one has the special authority to modify or destroy 
them
49
; (d) the rules are socially enforced in an informal way, which means that social 
enforcement occurs through the use of unorganized social pressures such as gossip, 
mockery and shunning rather than by formal institutions having been specifically 
assigned that task; and (f) it is widely known in the group that these conditions are met.   
Someone accepts the social moral rule ‗respect others‘, for example, as a social 
moral rule if she believes (perhaps implicitly) that everyone in her group has good moral 
reasons to respect others and she is disposed, in light of her belief, to use that rule in her 
practical deliberations, to feel guilt if she disrespects someone, to condemn, resent and 
socially pressure others who do so, and to form favorable attitudes towards people who 
respect each other.  In other words, she sees the rule as appropriately regulating the 
conduct of the group. 
Anthropological evidence suggests that that the moral codes of most societies 
have a morally laudable core, which is the part of their code that they are most deeply 
committed to – it is generally against the prevailing rules of any society, for example, to 
kill another member of the group intentionally for personal gain without provocation 
when reasonably favorable conditions obtain, and this part of most any code is not likely 
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to be abandoned easily.
50
  One reason for this is that it is very unlikely that a group can 
genuinely and sincerely believe that they have good moral reasons to follow rules that 
require or permit those acts of rape, torture, intentional killing, etc. that are profoundly 
immoral, reprehensible and unjustified.
51
  This leaves ample room, however, for stifling, 
exclusionary, and otherwise imperfect social moral rules that nonetheless manage to 
forbid acts that are most obviously wrong.  Prevailing social moral rules will still vary 
greatly with regard to what (if any) exceptions they allow general prohibitions on killing, 
lying, etc., how their most general and widely-applicable social moral rules are to be 
interpreted and implemented in concrete situations and what non-basic social moral rules 
they allow for particular groups or restricted areas of life.   
It may be helpful to clarify this paradigm by contrasting it with some other things, 
while keeping in mind possible overlaps in their content.  First, shared habits, behavioral 
regularities, fads and other normal or typical behaviors of a group exist in virtue of being 
generally complied with, whereas social moral rules must also be generally accepted.  
Second, social moral rules are a subset of social rules, which include conventional and 
more or less arbitrary rules of politeness and etiquette.  In order for social moral rules to 
exist, there must be the widespread belief that everyone has good moral reasons to follow 
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them along with corresponding dispositions to have certain appropriate moral emotions 
when these rules are followed or broken by oneself or others; and codes of social moral 
rules must have a minimum moral content whereas codes of social rules need not.
52
  
Third, constitutive or practice-based rules are ones that make up a practice by defining 
certain actions, offices, moves, and excuses.
53
  Constitutive rules can be social moral 
rules – perhaps those governing promising and marriage are examples – but they need not 
be, such as constitutive rules of certain games.  Fourth, a social convention, in the typical 
way it is understood by philosophers, is basically a pattern of mutually beneficial, self-
enforcing behavior that is normally exhibited by a group of people who do their part in 
the pattern because they believe it to be in their interests to do so and they expect most 
everyone to conform to it as well.
54
  Even though social conventions and social moral 
rules share certain similarities, they differ in the following ways:  (a) accepting a social 
moral rule involves having certain moral beliefs and attitudes whereas someone in the 
grip of a social convention can regard his participation in it as just a matter of prudence; 
(b) an existing social moral rule may not be mutually beneficial or self-reinforcing in the 
way that social conventions are; and (c) social moral rules are socially enforced whereas 
social conventions can be stabilized in other ways.  Fifth, positive laws are created, 
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changed, annulled and enforced by formal institutions whereas social moral rules depend 
for their existence on being widely accepted, complied with, socially enforced and so on.   
A final distinction worth noting is between social moral rules and moral 
principles, which are sometimes conceived as abstract propositions that do not depend for 
their existence on being generally accepted and complied with.  Social moral rules are 
meant to regulate the behavior of groups of people, so they must be simple enough to be 
widely known, generally understood and taught to children; they should also be stable 
and sensitive to what information is available to those who are regulated by them and to 
the ways that the rules can liable to abuse.
55
  Moral principles, in contrast, are sometimes 
conceived as objective criteria of right action that, as such, need not be sensitive to such 
‗practical‘ concerns.  
When social moral rules exist, they are part of the natural order, so we can ask 
what sort of value, if any, they have when they prevail in a group – what sorts of reasons 
do members have to maintain, support, and follow them? 
First we need some background.  The notion of something‘s being valuable ‗for 
its own sake‘, we sometimes say, or valuable ‗as an end‘ or ‗non-derivatively‘ valuable 
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basically means that it is valuable and not just in virtue of its tendency to produce, 
contribute to or make possible other things that are valuable.  Saying that something is 
valuable ‗for the sake of something else‘, ‗as a means‘ or ‗derivatively‘ valuable is 
roughly to say that its value depends at least in part on having this tendency to promote 
other good ends.  The contrast between ends and means is one way of disambiguating the 
philosophical terms of art ‗intrinsic‘ and ‗extrinsic‘ value, and the one I am most 
concerned with here.
56
  The other is roughly the distinction between value that 
supervenes on something‘s non-relational, ‗intrinsic‘ properties and value that supervenes 
on its relational, but not necessarily causal, properties.
57
   
Here is a brief survey of a few of the ways to think about the value of existing 
social moral rules. 
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One is to deny that social moral rules, when they exist, have any value.
58
  Rules of 
that sort, it may be argued, are merely part of the morally neutral background norms and 
understandings against which a moral agent in our world must act.  Good moral judgment 
requires thinking and deciding for ourselves on the basis of the particularities of the 
individual cases we face.  Because of vast moral complexity, it is impossible to codify a 
simple set of moral principles or to formulate a reasonably accurate and useful decision 
procedure for ethics.  Indeed, preoccupation with principles and rules, it is sometimes 
thought, can even distort our moral judgments by obscuring morally relevant features of a 
situation and encouraging rigidity in our moral thinking, leading us to stick to the rules in 
cases in which we should not do so.
59
 
Another possibility is that social moral rules can be valuable, but only 
instrumentally, as heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination.  Given certain 
persistent features of human nature, particularly our susceptibility to social pressures of 
various kinds, establishing and maintaining rules that we socially enforce in each other 
can have tremendous instrumental value in helping us, for example, to coordinate our 
behavior, give and receive assurances, etc.  On this conception of social moral rules, the 
existence of the rules can only give us instrumental reasons to follow them.  Sometimes 
we have good reason to follow the rules when they are serving a useful social role and 
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when doing otherwise would risk undermining general confidence in them; at other times 
the strong social reprisals we would face for breaking the rules gives us sufficient reason 
to do what they require.  The general hunch, however, is that social moral rules are of 
secondary importance because they are just another means of social control that can 
encourage, prod, guide and goad us into acting as we should. 
Deontologists who are inspired by W.D. Ross might take a different route by 
claiming that we can intuit certain social moral rules, such as ‗respect others‘ and ‗do not 
be completely indifferent to their welfare‘, and immediately see that we have non-
instrumental reasons to comply with them and also that such rules would be non-
instrumentally valuable were they to exist.  This is not Ross‘ own view – he thought that 
we intuit the prima facie duties, but there is no general principle that specifies our actual 
duty when these prima facie ones conflict, so in such cases we must use reflective 
judgment to come to all-things-considered judgments about what we ought to do.
60
  A 
deontologist who wanted to draw from but go beyond Ross‘ theory might instead think 
that there are a few basic and self-evident social moral rules, which are not derived or 
generalized from particular moral conclusions about specific cases, and each of them is 
an absolute duty.
61
  Ross also claimed that alongside the self-evident and not merely 
instrumental goods of justice, knowledge and innocent pleasures is virtue, which includes 
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a disposition to do our duty.
62
  According to the deontological view I envision, it is 
valuable for its own sake, and self-evidently so, when a group of people generally 
accepts, complies with and socially enforces the social moral rules that are also duties.  
Rule-utilitarians have developed and emphasized some very good ideas about the 
nature and function of social moral rules.  On their basic view, (1) the fundamental moral 
value is welfare, which is the sort of thing that is to be promoted; (2) welfare is the only 
basic moral value; and (3) the justification of every action depends on its being in 
accordance with the social moral rules that, if they were generally accepted, would 
maximize overall welfare.  Rule-utilitarians appeal to aggregate wellbeing as a common 
currency for evaluating social moral rules and for resolving potential conflicts among 
them – one rule is better than another, they think, if general acceptance of the one would 
produce more overall utility than would general acceptance of the other. They conceive 
of morality exclusively in terms of rules and leave largely unexplained why we should 
comply with rules when we can produce more good otherwise. 
There is much to learn from these views about the limits of rules, the need for 
good moral judgment when applying them, the significant instrumental value they can 
have when they exist, and the kinds of social roles they can play, but I will now try to 
show that none of them offers a complete explanation of the value that social moral rules 
can have when they exist and of the types of reasons we can have to follow them.   
 Solidarity 
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Having described the conditions in which social moral rules exist and raised the 
question of what value such rules have when they are enacted in a group, I will now 
characterize solidarity in a way that partially exhibits the sort of value it is. 
My methodology for justifying why solidarity is often valuable as an end is to 
reflect from a commonsense perspective on a series of examples and look for an 
explication of our reflective moral intuitions that shows the reasons and principles that 
underlie them.
63
  We sometimes do not have all things considered moral judgments about 
cases we encounter, and even when we do we recognize that reasonable people may 
disagree with us, but what I find interesting is how complex our reflective moral 
intuitions often turn out to be.  When looking at various examples, therefore, we can ask 
what pulls us to judge one way or the other and why we have more confidence in some of 
our judgments than others.
64
  I take a bottom-up rather than top-down approach here – 
rather than beginning from moral first principles, I claim that the fullest explanation of 
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some widely held considered moral judgments about particular cases appeals to a sort of 
solidarity that commonsense presupposes is often valuable for its own sake.
65
   
Solidarity, in general, is a matter of a group of people being united or at one with 
regard to something (sympathies, interests, values, etc.), having genuine concern for each 
other‘s welfare, respecting others as group members, trusting one another not to 
intentionally undermine or free ride on the group, taking pride in the group as a whole, 
being ashamed of its failures and suffering loss or betrayal if members of the group do 
not live up to the requirements that the group places on itself, and perhaps having certain 
other affections for one‘s compatriots.66   
One of the distinguishing features of solidarity, at least in its paradigmatic form, 
is that people are in solidarity over, for or with respect to something.  For instance, we 
can be in solidarity over a shared loss, such as when a child falls down a well or Martin 
Luther King, Jr. was killed, or in solidarity with respect to common oppression or 
suffering, as exemplified by African American slaves
67
 and soldiers in times of war.
68
  
We may be in solidarity with those in our family or ethnic group; or in solidarity over 
religious beliefs.
69
  Solidarity can sometimes be akin to pride in one‘s country and its 
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people, as it seems to have been for the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer when he chose to 
return from America to fight with the German Resistance and ―share the trials of this time 
with my people.‖70  It can be a matter of sharing certain goals with others, such as 
fighting breast cancer; we can be united in solidarity by cooperative activities, as 
sometimes happens in amateur orchestra; or we can be united with others by religious 
beliefs or rituals.
71
  In practice, however, there are usually overlaps among these different 
ways of being in solidarity – the Civil Rights Movement, for example, involved shared 
ends and projects along with elements of religious affiliation, ethnic identity, and 
common oppression.   
Being united with others in these ways provides the basis for the formation of the 
solidary bonds that I just described, which involves respecting one another as group 
members, caring about each other‘s wellbeing, taking pride in the group and so on.  
These relationships are not just seen by participants as instrumental to individual goals or 
as mere means to common ends.  Rather, members of the group regard their relationships 
as valuable in themselves, and when this is widely known, it provides further support to 
the cohesion of the group.  They take themselves as having reasons to be loyal to others 
in the group, trust them, care about them, etc.  Over time, members may even begin to 
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identify themselves with the group, seeing its aims along with their joint projects and the 
corresponding relationships as part of who they are as persons.
 72
 
Ties of solidarity can be powerful motivators.  Members are strongly inclined to 
live up to the expectations of others, avoid betraying them, letting them down or losing 
their trust, and otherwise supporting and maintaining the valued bonds that exist among 
them.  Solidarity can be intentionally undermined when these relationships are targeted.  
This can happen when someone tries to engender intra-group conflict by playing on 
individual interests, regional conflicts and sub-group affinities to lead people to focus on 
differences among themselves rather than their shared aspirations, activities, religious 
beliefs, etc. 
In order to explain and exhibit the nature and value of solidarity more fully, I 
want to highlight one particularly worthwhile sort of solidarity in which people are united 
both by shared ends and cooperative activities in support of those ends.  Consider some 
examples. 
First, on August 14, 1980 workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, Poland called 
a peaceful occupation strike, demanding that the communist government there provide 
guarantees of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right to 
organize and maintain trade unions, and better working conditions.
73
  Soon thereafter 
delegates from strike committees at 200 or so other factories, mines and shipyards across 
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Poland, along with members of the intelligencia and the Catholic Church, began arriving 
at the Lenin Shipyard ready to offer their support.  After securing substantial concessions 
from the government that ended the strike, these groups quickly organized themselves 
into Solidarność, or Solidarity, which became a nationwide labor union of 9 to 10 million 
members.  Solidarity employed highly coordinated tactics such as general strikes, worker 
slow-downs, and hunger marches in support of the shared values that bound its members 
together.  As one observer wrote: "What we had in mind were not only bread, butter and 
sausage but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of 
convictions, and the repair of the republic."  He continues that the ‗‗intense unity of 
thought and feeling which previously had been confined to small circles of friends – the 
intimate solidarity of private life in Eastern Europe – was now multiplied by millions‘.74 
Second, many Jews had a special bond with African Americans who were 
fighting against the oppression of the Jim Crow South.
75
  As active participants in the 
Civil Rights Movement, many Jews engaged in marches, Freedom Rides, boycotts, sit-ins 
and legal actions alongside African Americans.  These people were moved in part by 
analogies they saw between the treatment of African Americans and the German 
persecution of Jews.  As one person put it: ―I felt that the most important thing that I 
could do is to work in the Black movement. If anything happened, then somebody didn‘t 
have to say to me, what did you do?‖76   
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Third, for as long as anyone can remember, the town of Odessa, in West Texas, 
has been fiercely devoted to its Permian High School football program.
77
  Children are 
raised admiring the Panthers, as many as twenty thousand fans from a wide variety of 
backgrounds attend home games, a great many of them travel with the team and regularly 
attend practices, the booster club organizes very successful fundraising events and is the 
largest social club in town, Panther apparel is widely worn and their symbols are 
commonly displayed by local businesses, the marching band, cheerleading squad and 
dance team are first rate, coaches and trainers relentlessly strategize and prepare for 
opponents and the players themselves devote extraordinary time and effort to workouts, 
practices and games.  As one fan describes the pride the town takes in its football team 
and the meaning it has for their way of life:  ―There is nothing to replace it.  It‘s an 
integral part of what made the community strong.  You take it away and it‘s almost like 
you strip the identity of the people.‖78 
These examples are very complicated, but they are real-world scenarios in which, 
it seems, valuable relationships of solidarity formed among people from a diverse range 
of religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds who we may not otherwise think of as being 
united or at one with one another.
79
  This type of solidarity, perhaps unlike some of the 
others, has the potential to unite pluralistic societies together, taking their cooperative 
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activities (including economic activities, social structures, political institutions, social 
moral rules, etc.) and shared ends (such as values of respect, freedom, justice, etc.) as the 
basis for valuable and reason-giving relationships.   
When we reflect on what is valuable in the examples, then, part of the answer is 
that they involve relationships of solidarity among members of a group of people who are 
cooperating together in support of shared ends and valuing for their own sake the 
solidary relationships that form on this basis.   
The shared ends that can unite people in solidarity are their values, ideals, 
aspirations and the like, although these things need not actually be valuable – while the 
aspirations of the Polish Revolution and the Civil Rights Movement were certainly 
worthwhile, the shared goal of high-school football success is arguably not all that 
valuable, at least for its own sake.  The ends are shared because there is public knowledge 
in the group that they are generally affirmed, and the group generally takes responsibility 
for these ends by taking them on as their own and as worthy of their respect and support. 
The cooperative activities undertaken in support of those ends may involve taking 
steps to promote them, manifesting and showing respect for them, interpreting them in 
action, honoring them or participating in them.  The joint-projects of the group are not 
just seen as ways of coordinating their behavior; rather, those involved in cooperative 
activities do so freely, on mutually agreeable terms, and each enjoys a basic moral 
standing – none of them is treated as a slave, animal, or mere tool, for example, and the 
group gives some priority to each of their interests and concerns.    
The cooperative activities of the group can be quite organized and structured, or 
relatively informal.  The particular roles that group members play can vary widely, with 
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some of them actively engaged ―on the front lines‖, others supporting their efforts, while 
still others using symbolic gestures or protests to express their support for the cause.  We 
may not even know or meet the people with whom we are cooperating, and some of the 
details of our joint-projects may be hidden from us, but in general the group knows that 
they are working with others and know in broad outline the nature of the cooperative 
activities in which they are taking part.  This is true even when the larger project is 
carried out by a series of interlocking subgroups, who may have their own bonds of 
cooperative solidarity in addition to the ones that bind everyone as a whole.  We may also 
be engaged in cross-time projects involving the efforts of those in the past and the future.  
Cooperating with these people in on-going endeavors involves, for example, trying to 
respect their wishes, show gratitude for their sacrifices, refrain from belittling their 
accomplishments, and so on.  The various parts of a joint project of this sort may not be 
perfectly integrated, but those in the group know that they are all part of a larger pursuit 
in support of their common aims. 
These three things – cooperation, shared ends, and solidarity – are clearly very 
different from one another and each can occur without the others, but my suggestion is 
that when they exist together in the way my examples highlight, when what unites us in 
solidarity is not just our culture, religion or history but our organized activities in support 
of our shared ends, the result can be an extremely valuable sort of solidarity.  The sort of 
solidarity I am now emphasizing is an ―organic unity‖ in the sense that the non-





  From a commonsense perspective, there is an exponential progression of 
value in the following:  An individual by herself promotes, manifests or otherwise 
supports her ends; a group of individuals coordinates their activities so as to support their 
common ends more effectively; these people freely choose to cooperate together in 
support of shared ends on the basis of mutually agreeable terms that afford everyone a 
basic moral standing; they come to value for their own sake the relationships of mutual 
concern, reciprocity, pride, loyalty and trust that form on the basis of cooperating with 
one another in these ways; and the ends that they are supporting together are themselves 
morally valuable.  Odessa was galvanized by their collective support for the Permian 
football team, but these relationships of solidarity appear to be valuable even though their 
shared ends were arguably not moral ones.  The coordinated efforts of those in the Polish 
Revolution and the Civil Rights Movement were enormously valuable in their own right 
because of the way they promoted and manifested laudable ends, but my suggestion is 
that it seems even more worthwhile that these people were also cooperating together on 
mutually agreeable terms and forming lasting bonds with one another that were based in 
their shared vision for a better world and their desire to take concrete steps together in 
support of it. 
More on the value of solidarity 
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I have tried to describe solidarity in a way that exhibits the sort of value it is, in 
much the way that one could argue for the value of friendship by giving detailed 
examples of such relationships that most of us would, on reflection, recognize as 
intrinsically valuable.  Solidarity is not on the usual list of moral values, however, but it 
is something we seem to care about as humans and perhaps also as rational agents.  
Although I cannot go into details here, there is growing evidence from economics, 
psychology, neuroscience and evolutionary biology that human beings are strongly 
predisposed to engage and integrate with others in solidary ways, which may help to 
explain certain kinds of altruism, reciprocity, and moral concern for others and shed some 
light on how morality as we know it may have evolved from its familial and tribal 
beginnings to its current, more inclusive, form.
81
  It may also be part of our rational 
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nature to be disposed to interact with, communicate with, cooperate with, connect with 
and relate with other rational people in support of common moral ends.
82
  And, as I 
suggest later, solidarity is similar in many ways to friendship, which we tend to find 
valuable for its own sake.  
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In this section I continue my investigation of the value of solidarity by examining 
its structure – (1) is solidarity merely an instrumental good or is it also good as an end? 
(2) If it is good as an end, is it always so? and (3) when solidarity is good as an end (if 
ever) then is it good tout court or just good for the various members of the group and 
perhaps other people?    
(1) Merely instrumental or good as an end? One might think that solidarity is 
merely instrumental for promoting other valuable ends.  There is nothing worthwhile 
about solidarity for its own sake, on this view, but given our social conditions and 
psychology, such relationships may useful for bringing about laudable aims and 
purposes.  The solidary relationships of those in the Polish Revolution, for example, 
moved them to undertake greater personal risk then they may have been willing to accept 
otherwise, so those relationships helped them to achieve their shared moral ends more 
effectively.   
The instrumental value of solidarity should not be underestimated, but there are 
good reasons to think that this cannot explain all that is worthwhile about it.  First, from a 
commonsense perspective, solidarity can be valuable when it involves acting in ways that 
do little or nothing to promote or bring about good ends.  The Polish Revolution may 
have been more successful at achieving some of its goals if it had empowered a strong 
executive to make decisions for the group, but many of us respect them for mostly 
resisting this temptation and generally conducting themselves on the basis of their liberal 
and democratic ideals out of their sense of solidarity with one another.  And flying flags 
and wearing buttons and armbands probably had very little impact on the overall success 
of the Polish Revolution, so part of what explains why we think these practices were 
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worthwhile is the value of standing in solidarity by showing solidarity, whether or not 
there is any instrumental benefit in doing so.  Secondly, we can imagine cases in which 
solidary relationships are counter-productive but still seem valuable.  There was a time in 
the Polish Revolution in which it seemed likely that the Soviet Army would have invaded 
Poland if the Solidarity trade union had not disbanded and ceased their cooperative 
activities.  Luckily this did not happen, but there would have been something admirable, I 
think, if the union members had chosen to stand their ground out of a sense of solidarity 
with one another in the face of impending doom for themselves and their hope for a 
democratic Poland.  Finally, the instrumentalist view fails to explain the ways that the 
people in solidarity see the value of their own joint-projects and mutual relationships.  
From their perspectives, these things are valued for their own sake and not just as means 
to anything else, whereas the instrumental account denies this, regarding their attitudes as 
mistaken but perhaps useful.  When we take ourselves to be fighting for worthy social 
causes or supporting common ends, for example, it may seem that the relationships we 
form are secondary to the good we are doing or goals we are achieving.  However, what 
we most value about these activities may not be apparent to us ‗in the moment‘.  After 
some deep reflection, however, we may find that what we valued most was the 
cooperative solidarity we enjoyed with our brothers and sisters who were working 
alongside us, which may be revealed in the sacrifices we were willing to make, our 
feelings of guilt and shame and how we choose to remember our experiences and recount 
them to others. 
(2) Good in all circumstances or not?  If solidarity is good as an end, a natural 
next question is whether those who are united by repugnant ends, immoral cooperative 
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activities, oppressive religious views, etc. can stand in solidarity and, if they can, whether 
their relationships are valuable in the same way as those of the Polish Revolution or the 
Civil Rights Movement.  In other words, what about the Nazi‘s?  There are several ways 
one might try to handle this concern – we might hold that the Nazi‘s were indeed in 
solidarity and so had some reason to be loyal to one another but any value these 
relationships may have had is overwhelmingly counterbalanced by the evils they 
involved; we might build in more moral content into the notion of solidarity by requiring, 
for instance, that what unites the group must be morally valuable or at least permissible, 
which would disqualify the Nazi‘s from standing in solidarity; or perhaps the Nazi‘s did 
indeed stand in solidarity, it‘s just that the intrinsic value of solidarity is conditional on 
the group being united by morally valuable or permissible ends, projects, etc.  My view is 
that there is no easy and general answer to these questions.  Rather, we should draw on 
some themes from traditional virtue ethics, Kant and Moore (specifically his idea of 
organic unities) and say that solidarity is valuable for its own sake but only conditionally 
so, but the conditions under which it is valuable depend on how solidarity fits together 
with other moral values.  Ultimately what will determine the value of solidarity (if any) 
as exhibited, for instance, by the Nazi‘s or in less extreme cases such as those who are 
united against school bussing or by the exclusionary scientific community of the 1800‘s, 
is how widely shared and mid-level moral values of freedom, equality, respect, solidarity 
and the like are collectively interpreted, rendered determinate and applied to our social 
circumstances.   
A loose analogy is to the way some virtue ethicists think that a generous 
disposition, for example, is not always good, while true generosity, we might say, is good 
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in all circumstances because the latter, unlike the former, is implicitly qualified by the 
other virtues.
83
  The Panthers football team are in solidarity with one another, but these 
relationships can also demand excessive personal sacrifice, isolation, humiliation, and 
ridicule, while the value of respect (of a commonsense sort)
84
 grounds protections against 
these things even if the team‘s overall cohesion and performance are diminished as a 
result.  While virtue ethicists tend to think that there are no hard-and-fast rules for 
specifying precisely how the virtues fit together – practical wisdom is needed for such 
matters – I think that certain widely held and substantive moral values can, when 
interpreted and applied together, ground principles and rules about, for example, whether 
we should betray, dismantle, maintain or support groups of various kinds who are in 
solidarity and how those groups can conduct themselves in ways that are also respectful, 
fair and just.   
There are limits to the value of solidarity, then, and this general framework can be 
used to assess where they are.  Communitarian values like solidarity are important, but 
we must also be careful to protect, in addition to their self-respect, lives, etc., the freedom 
of members to think for themselves, to enjoy the free play of ideas, commitments, plans 
and projects, etc., to take responsibility for their own ends, and (within limits) to act as 
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they choose.  My approach is to begin from the mid-level, which is where we find widely 
held and accepted values such as solidarity, freedom, respect, equality, etc. that will 
themselves have to be justified in a different context.  We should aim to interpret and 
apply these values systematically to questions about what laws to adopt, what character 
traits to cultivate and what social moral rules to maintain and follow. 
(3) Good tout court or good for persons?  Finally, one might wonder whether 
solidarity is good in a way that does not depend on being good for anyone, on the one 
hand, or whether, on the other, its value depends only on the contribution it makes to the 
hedonistic wellbeing of individuals.  Theories of value differ, but it is consistent with 
what has been said that solidarity is valuable as an end just in virtue of the value it has for 
persons, and in particular those who stand in relationships of solidarity.
85
  But the value 
my solidary relationships have for me is not reducible to the contributions they make to 
my overall balance of pleasure over pain; instead, being in solidarity is a component of a 
life that is good for me.  A life is arguably defective if it includes no meaningful 
relationships at all, and solidarity is one relationship of that sort along with friendships, 
loving relationships, etc..
86
  A life goes better for the person who lives it, in other words, 
if she is in relationships of solidarity with others, not just because it gives her more 
pleasure or fulfills her desires, but also because solidarity, like friendship, can be 
constitutive of what counts as a good life for her. 
Social moral rules as constituent parts of cooperative solidarity  
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So far I have described the nature of social moral rules, given an account of 
solidarity and argued that solidarity is often valuable as an end.  Now I want to return to 
my original question, which was about the sort of value existing social moral rules can 
have and the reasons they can provide, and try to answer it by examining some possible 
connections between solidarity and social moral rules.  My view is that when our group is 
in a valuable sort of solidarity, and our social moral rules are a constitutive part those 
relationships, then our rules are valuable for their own sake and give us new (but 
potentially defeasible) reasons to do what the rules require.   
When people stand in cooperative solidarity with one another other, they often 
settle on a set of social moral rules to regulate their behavior.  The Permian Panthers and 
their fans, for example, developed informal rules of conduct against betraying or 
deserting the group, fighting among themselves and cheating; and those who break these 
rules face harsh criticism, resentment and perhaps ostracism.
87
  Similarly, from its 
inception, the Polish Revolution was fiercely public, non-violent, democratic and 
egalitarian.  They had well-established and socially enforced rules that said, for instance, 
that negotiations with the government must be broadcast widely, everyone has the right to 
challenge, discuss and vote on all aspects of the group‘s operations, violence is strictly 
prohibited, and everyone in the group must receive the same basic benefits from any 
deals with the government.
88
  Some of these rules were eventually codified into union 
regulations and formal structures were established to enforce them and to adjudicate 
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disputes, but throughout its history, Solidarity has depended on organic, informal 
maintenance and execution of these main rules.  Those in the Civil Rights Movement 
had, in addition to some of the ones already mentioned, social moral rules reserving 
leadership roles for African Americans and forbidding white members from being 
complicit in racist practices.  Members of solidary religious groups may establish rituals 
of various kinds that are accepted as morally binding.
89
  Families like mine have social 
moral rules about eating brunch on Sundays.  And nationalistic groups who are in 
solidarity can have rules about proper social punishment for betraying or deserting the 
group, and rules about who counts as a member and who does not.   
What role (if any) might the prevailing social moral rules of a group play in 
relationships of cooperative solidarity?   One possibility is that the role of such rules is 
purely instrumental.  Groups that have and enforce social moral rules are generally better 
at achieving their common ends then those that do not because, for instance, the rules 
help the group coordinate its efforts more effectively and the rules protect, reinforce and 
promote bonds of solidarity by diminishing behaviors that would tend to break-up or 
undermine the group.  This is probably how some social moral rules begin in a group, 
particularly as the size of the group increases and it becomes more difficult to maintain 
the unity of thought, feeling, action, etc. that is characteristic of solidarity.  A group may 
develop social moral rules that are meant to standardize the activities of the group, 
minimize variation on certain group matters, provide an easy and public way for 
members to recognize who the other members are and how committed they are to the 
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group, and so on.  Using social moral rules in these instrumental ways can help to support 
and maintain the solidary bonds of the group even though the rules themselves may not 
be, at least initially, part of what holds the group in solidarity.  An analogy is with some 
distant friendships, in which we and our friend may develop rules about correspondence 
even though we both recognize that accepting and enforcing such rules is merely a good 
means of staying in touch.  But, over time, our rule may take on a new role – it may 
become a constitutive part of our friendship itself, a key element in the sort of friendship 
we have developed, so that following our rule about checking in every few months 
becomes a way of manifesting or living out the sort of friendly relationship we have.  The 
same sort of phenomenon, I think, can occur in relationships of solidarity. 
Social moral rules can be useful for a solidary group in many ways, but they can 
also become constituent parts of the cooperative solidarity of the group as well.  
Establishing, maintaining and following these rules can become an essential component 
of the cooperative activities that hold some groups in solidarity.  For example, those in 
the Polish Revolution were strongly committed to ideals of democracy and freedom, and 
they demonstrated their respect for these values by organizing their joint activities around 
social moral rules requiring majority rule and publicity on important union matters.  
These rules were not just means to other good ends, they were part of the cooperative 
activities that united the group in solidarity.  Sometimes social moral rules can be an 
essential part of the shared ideals that unite a group in solidarity.  Those in the Civil 
Rights Movement partially saw themselves as fighting for a better social world, and one 
aspect of their ideal was a society in which the informal social moral rules were free from 
racism and prejudice.  Social moral rules can be part of the programme of a group – the 
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specific cooperative activities they are employing in support of their shared aims – but 
they can also be part of its platform – the more abstract values and objectives that they 
are working for together.  In addition, following, maintaining and supporting the rules are 
ways to signal and express to one another that each is recognized as part of the 
community and ‗one of us‘.  And, the rules can figure among the (perhaps implicit) 
demands and expectations that they place on one another and themselves so that rule-
following comes to be seen as something members owe to one another and rule-breaking 
is viewed as a way of betraying or letting down the group.   
In sum, when a group has united in solidarity by a set of social moral rules that 
they have instituted among themselves, the rules often come to play a distinctive social 
role in the group by figuring in the requirements of what it takes to stand in solidarity 
with one‘s comrades.  
Social moral rules are valuable for their own sake 
Given that social moral rules can be a constitutive part of worthwhile solidary 
relationships, we can now ask what conclusions to draw about the value of existing social 
moral rules and the reasons we have to follow them. 
Consider Aristotle again, who thinks that the highest good for human beings, that 
of ‗happiness‘ or eudaimonia, is living a life of rational activity in accordance with the 
virtues.
90
  Happiness is taken to be the only good that is desirable for its own sake and 
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nothing else; all other goods are desirable for its sake.
91
  However, Aristotle defines a 
third class of goods, the virtues, which are desirable both for the sake of happiness and 
for their own sake.
92
  Aristotle wonders how there can be goods of this latter sort if 
happiness is defined as the final, self-sufficient and most complete end.  His elegant 
solution to this puzzle is instructive for how to understand the value of social moral rules.  
Exercising the virtue of particular justice (e.g. fulfilling promises, repaying debts, etc.) 
and not seizing what belongs to others (their property, office, etc.)
93
 is a virtue that stands 
alongside temperance, courage, etc.  For Aristotle, this virtue is often desirable as a 
means to happiness, but being disposed to think, feel and act justly is also desirable for its 
own sake in virtue of being a component of happiness (at least of the second best sort) in 
the sense that this kind of happiness partially consists in having the virtue of particular 
justice. 
When it comes to the value of existing social moral rules, there are other ways for 
a group to be in solidarity that involve different types of rules or perhaps no rules at all.  
My suggestion, however, is that when a group is in a valuable sort of solidarity and its 
social moral rules are an essential part of that relationship then the rules of the group are 
valuable for their own sake in virtue of the role they play in unifying the group in a 
relationship that is valuable as an end. 
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An upshot of this conclusion is that it is explains the value of prevailing social 
moral rules in a way that is compatible with some of the themes that, as we saw earlier, 
moral particularists and some virtue ethicists have pressed against those who espouse the 
importance of moral rules and principles.  Their main worry is that that morality is far too 
complicated to be systematized or codified in any useful way, so the best we can do is 
employ practical wisdom and careful reflection, without the aid of principles and rules, to 
decide what to do.  There is much truth to this concern, I think.  Particularists and virtue 
ethicists may be right that what we owe to each other, what we ought to do, or even 
morality as a whole are not codifiable by a set of moral principles, conceived as abstract 
propositions that do not depend for their existence on the attitudes and actions of persons.  
But, as I have emphasized, social moral rules are different from moral principles in that 
social moral rules are standards of social regulation, they are meant to guide the 
deliberations, discussions and actions of actual persons, they are publicly known, socially 
enforced, etc.  A sophisticated moral particularist or virtue ethicist could admit, therefore, 
that social moral rules of my sort, when they exist, can be valuable in virtue of the role 
they play in uniting a group in valuable relationships of solidarity.
94
   
Reasons grounded in solidarity 
If the prevailing social moral rules of a group are valuable in virtue of the 
constitutive role they play in uniting them in solidarity, what (if any) reasons do the rules 
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provide to the members of the group?  Someone may recognize the intrinsic value of his 
group‘s solidarity and the rules that partially constitute it but still wonder what he should 
do with regard to the rules – must he always follow them, should he publicly support the 
rules, refrain from undermining them, sometimes break the rules when he can get away 
with it?  What if he recognizes that some of his group‘s rules are stifling, inefficient, 
exclusionary or otherwise defective?   
My view is that when social moral rules exist and play an essential role in the 
solidarity of a group, we typically have non-instrumental reasons to follow those rules 
because doing so is a way of manifesting, expressing, honoring, valuing or standing up 
for these valuable relationships by living up to their requirements.  Breaking the rules that 
hold us together can be a way of betraying or letting down our compatriots. 
To explain this, let‘s look again at what sort of value solidarity is and in particular 
ask what sorts of reasons it provides.  One possibility is that solidarity is valuable for its 
own sake, but merely in the limited teleological sense that the only reasons it gives have 
to do with bringing about more and better relationships of that sort, whether we are a 
party to them ourselves or not.  We may need to follow our group‘s shared rules as a 
means of keeping us united, expanding our membership, and setting a good example to 
entice other groups to form such bonds, but we can just as easily break our rules as long 
as we would bring about more cooperative solidarity as a result.   
This teleological conception, however, fails to capture the sorts of reasons that we 
think, on reflection, solidarity can provide.  When we are in solidarity ourselves, part of 
our concern may be to expand our group or help other groups unite in worthwhile ways, 
but what is much more important to those who are in solidarity is that they and others 
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manifest or live out their valuable relationship by complying with the demands it places 
on them – they are disposed to do such things as care about the wellbeing of their 
comrades, trust them and work diligently for their common cause if they have one.  
Solidarity is different from, say, happiness (as utilitarians conceive of it) because it gives 
us what are often called agent-relative reasons to abide by its requirements and to be a 
good compatriot, and these reasons are different from the agent-neutral reasons we may 
have to bring about more relationships of that type.
95
  Similarly in the case of friendship, 
what is most essential about the value of friendship is the set of reasons we have to be a 
good friend (i.e. to be loyal to the other person, visit her in the hospital, do these things 
out of our concern for her, etc.), although we may also have some reasons to bring about 
more and better instances of friendship in the future.
96
   
When a group in solidarity has organized itself around a set of social moral rules 
then the rules figure into the demands of those relationships.  People in the Polish 
Revolution, for example, believed that they owed it to one another to do their part in their 
joint-activities by following their shared social moral rules about, for example, majority 
rule and publicity in group decision-making as ways of standing in solidarity with their 
compatriots while they usually saw breaking the rules as ways of betraying or letting 
down their compatriots.  Those who took part in the Polish Revolution had non-
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instrumental reasons to maintain and follow their social moral rules, not only as ways of 
supporting their ends, but also as ways of manifesting the valuable relationships they had 
with one another.
97
   
Does my view imply that those in the Polish Revolution should always follow 
their group‘s social moral rules?  No, because sometimes solidarity gives us sufficient 
reasons to break the social moral rules that unite us.  Consider Lech Wałęsa, the founding 
leader of Solidarity, who faced a crisis in March of 1981.  A few days earlier, a group of 
Solidarity members were severely beaten by the communist security services while 
protesting at a local council meeting.  Infuriated, Solidarity readied itself for a general 
strike to force the government to come clean about the events and punish those who were 
responsible for the violence there.  Wałęsa correctly feared that if the matter of a general 
strike were put to a union vote, as was required by a firmly held social moral rule of their 
intensely democratic organization, the strike would go forward and lead to a civil war and 
severe reprisals from the Soviet Union that would ultimately destroy the Polish 
Revolution.  Rather than taking those chances, he chose to negotiate directly and secretly 
with the deputy prime minister (violating another one of their rules about publicity) and, 
without consulting other members, signed a face-saving agreement to call off the strike if 
the government conceded to a few watered-down demands.  Whether we think Wałęsa‘s 
actions were justified or not, in his emergency situation we should admit that he had non-
instrumental reasons of solidarity both to remain true to his group‘s shared social moral 
rules as a way of standing with others in support of their shared ideals and also to break 
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those rules in order to protect the group from disintegration.  We should say that it is part 
of being united in solidarity by social moral rules that we are presumptively required to 
follow those rules.  Typically this presumption will not be defeated by a presumptive 
requirement of solidarity to break the rules, so from the standpoint of solidarity, we will 
usually have most reason to follow our group‘s social moral rules when they are part of 
what unites us in that relationship.  This leaves it open, however, whether other values, 
such as respect, freedom, etc., might ground sufficient reasons to break those rules.   We 
see a similar phenomenon with friendship, where being a good friend presumptively 
requires us to follow shared rules that have become an essential part of our relationship, 
e.g. rules about correspondence, hospital visitation, or confidentiality, even though that 
same relationship can give also give us sufficient reasons to break those rules when, for 
example, doing so would ruin our friendship.
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When solidarity requires us to follow our group‘s social moral rules, we usually 
have non-instrumental reasons to do so as ways of standing in solidarity with others, and 
this is true even when our rules are not as good as they can be.  Perhaps the rules of our 
group are a bit too rigoristic or they are maintained long past the circumstances in which 
their inclusion in our moral code originally made sense, but my conception of solidarity 
explains a common intuition that we owe some allegiance to the perhaps imperfect social 
moral rules that already exist in our group, as long as the rules are not too repugnant.
99
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While it often grounds reasons to follow somewhat defective rules, solidarity also 
grounds reasons to improve our social moral rules as well in order to bring them more in 
line with our group‘s ideals or make us more effective at promoting our shared ends.  
This suggests a philosophical project of specifying a standard of improvement for codes 
of social moral rules, an ideal code of social moral rules that interprets widely held 
values, renders them more determinate and applies them to real-world situations. 
Conclusion 
The Polish Revolution and the Civil Rights Movement involve particular groups 
of people working together for specific moral values.  There is a sense in which many of 
us in our society as a whole are in a similar sort of solidarity with one another, united by 
basic values of respect, freedom and equality, living out these values together through our 
basic social and political institutions, and developing social bonds on the basis of these 
shared ends and cooperative activities.  Solidarity, in the way I have described it, has the 
potential to reach beyond local clubs, teams, organizations and movements and partially 
explain the nature and value of our own society, including its institutions, practices and 
social moral rules.
100
  The laws of our society are our laws, and the social moral rules 
here are our rules, so these things deserve some allegiance as part of our valuable kind of 
solidarity. 
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BASIC RESPECT FOR ONESELF AND OTHERS 
When we respect someone, we typically respect her relative to some category or 
other – we may respect her as a friend, but not as a scientist; as an accomplished pianist 
but not as a boss; as a person but not as who she is in all of her individuality.
101
  From a 
commonsense perspective, when we think about what it takes to respect (or disrespect) a 
person as a person, we find ourselves with a series of judgments that are difficult to 
reconcile.  On the one hand, I may think that a burglar disrespected me as a person by 
stealing my laptop, that a colleague did so by breaking his promise to cover one of my 
classes, or that a stranger shows his respect for me as a person by helping me carry a 
heavy piece of furniture to my car.  On the other hand, we may find ourselves thinking:  
Even though making me the butt of your cruel joke was quite disrespectful to me as a 
person, I now see that that was the right thing to do for it placated others who would have 
otherwise killed or seriously injured me; the Starbucks thief violated my property rights, 
sure, but he didn‘t mean to demean or ridicule me, he just needed the money that my 
swanky computer would bring; I admit that you have always behaved towards me in 
more or less appropriate ways, you keep your promises, help me when I need it, and 
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86 
 
never violate my rights, but sometimes I find myself wondering whether, in spite of all 
this, you really do respect me as a person.   
A common philosophical view has it that to respect others as persons is to treat 
them in all the ways persons ought to be treated.
102
  This formal, and possibly even 
platitudinous
103
, account of basic respect, however, tells us next to nothing about the 
content of more specific moral requirements, about how in particular we should be 
treating each other.  While there may be some philosophical use for a thin concept of 
basic respect
104
, when we reflect on our everyday understanding of what it is to respect a 
person as such, it seems a stretch to say that respecting someone as a person requires 
treating him in every way we should, taking in to account every morally relevant aspect 
of him, including his happiness, his choices, his relationships, etc, and affording him the 
fullest dignity and honor that are due to him.  Rather, commonsense marks a distinction 
between the requirements of morality in general and what it takes to have a sort of basic 
respect for others, which has more to do with seeing others as persons rather than as 
objects or animals, not humiliating, ridiculing or debasing them, and honoring them.  We 
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disrespect someone in this thicker and more familiar sense when we mock him for his 
religious convictions, degrade him by forcing him to engage in compromising acts, 
embarrass him by making him prostrate himself before us, and address him with racist 
epithets that tell him that he is a despised animal in our eyes, etc.   
The notion of respect I am highlighting cannot be the basis for a comprehensive 
moral theory because it leaves out many other morally appropriate ways we should treat 
people – we have strong presumptive reason to aim for the happiness of others, to avoid 
physically harming them, to treat them justly, to refrain from interfering with their 
freedom, to keep our promises to them and so on, and these are not obviously reducible to 
basic respect in this thicker sense.  We can demean, debase, humiliate or otherwise 
disrespect someone by actions that are not otherwise immoral – using certain words or 
gestures, snickering at them behind their backs, calling attention to publicly accessible 
but embarrassing information about them (e.g. choices they have made, relationships they 
have), etc.  Sometimes, however, we use actions that are already immoral as ways of 
disrespecting others as persons in a thick sense.  You may express disrespect to me by 
continually showing up late or not at all to our scheduled meetings even though you 
promised to be on time; stealing my books in plain view of others and throwing food at 
me when I inquire after them may be your way of humiliating me; causing me 
excruciating pain unless I divulge some secret to you can be quite demeaning; stealing 
my computer may express your attitude that you regard your endeavors as so much more 
88 
 
important than mine that your need for my computer at the moment outweighs any claim 
I have on it.
105
   
The theoretical structure I am proposing, then, is similar to the one Aristotle gives 
in his discussion of the virtue of justice, when he distinguishes universal justice, which is 
virtue in its entirety, and the more familiar particular justice, which is a particular virtue 
that stands alongside courage, temperance, and so on as being part of universal justice 
and which has to do with giving others their due (e.g. fulfilling promises, repaying debts, 
etc.) and not seizing what is theirs (their property, office, etc.).
106
  Similarly, we may 
formulate, if we like, the most comprehensive and basic moral principle in terms of a 
more formal notion of respecting others as persons, but thick basic respect is a 
substantive mid-level moral value that, together with the values of freedom, beneficence, 
self-perfection, and the like, determines more specific content for that overarching 
principle.  To what extent we are morally required to respect others in these ways is a 
further moral question that will depend, among other things, on what justifies the value of 
thick basic respect and how that value should be combined with other moral values of 
freedom, justice, beneficence, etc.  Thick basic respect may not be the only sort of mid-
level respect there is – we have strong moral reasons not only to respect someone as a 
person but also to respect her as a wife, as an accomplished pianist, as who she is in all of 
her individuality; and we also have strong moral reasons to respect someone‘s culture, to 
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respect her views, to respect her values, and so on.  There are interesting connections 
among these different forms of substantive respect, but my focus here is limited to thick 
respect for persons as persons. 
One of the main aims of this chapter is to call our attention back to this thick sort 
of basic respect, which seems to be out of philosophical fashion nowadays even though it 
resonates in commonsense as being an extremely important moral value.  There are many 
questions we can and should ask about this value, but my remarks, which are sketchy and 
preliminary, will concentrate on three interrelated issues.  First, how, more specifically, 
should we characterize thick basic respect and what is involved in having substantive 
respect for someone as a person?  Second, what is the relationship between having thick 
respect for others and having that sort of respect for oneself?  Third, is there any 
argument we can give for why we have presumptive reason to respect others in this 
substantive way?   
My main claims are these:  In most general terms, respecting someone as a person 
involves having a set of intentions, attitudes and dispositions.  My aim in the first two 
sections is to formulate a conception of thick basic respect that can capture the 
commonsense elements of respect that, on reflection, we think are most central.  
Paradigmatically, I claim, respecting someone as a person requires that we honor her as a 
person, which involves both seeing or regarding her as a person rather than as something 
else and honoring, and not dishonoring, the rational capacities and moral status that make 
her a person.  In the third section I highlight an interesting class of cases in which, 
contrary to common philosophical understanding, honor-respecting someone else 
depends on a prior idea of what sort of honor-respect he should have for himself.  In the 
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final section, I begin to develop a strategy for arguing that we have strong moral reasons 
to honor-respect all others as persons.  The key to my approach is the set of reasons we 
have to honor-respect ourselves as persons, which, along with a relatively uncontroversial 
principle of reciprocity, can be used to establish certain presumptive requirements to 
honor-respect others as persons, without the need to assume that persons antecedently 
have an agent-neutral, intrinsic value that makes them worthy of this sort of respect. 
Seeing others as persons 
The basic proposal I will be arguing for is that having thick basic respect for 
others is paradigmatically a matter of honoring them as persons.   
Beginning with our commonsensical notion of thick respect for others as persons, 
an initial strategy for trying to clarify this idea is by looking more closely at what it takes 
to respect (in the thick sense) x (Bob, Joe, Sue) as y (a teacher, a soldier, my friend, a 
person).  We may respect, in this sense, someone as a wife, as a mother, as a boss, as a 
doctor, as a tennis opponent, as a Nobel Prize winner, and so on.  One possibility, which 
we have seen fails to capture our common notion of thick basic respect, is that to respect 
x as y is to treat x in all the ways that y‘s are to be treated (perhaps these standards are 
part of the concept of y, or they are given by a practice, or they are set by morality).
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The alternative that I want to explore is that to thickly respect x as y requires, 
among other things, that one see, in the sense of regard or cognize, x as falling under the 
category of y.  We fail to respect someone as a husband in this sense if we do not see him 
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as our husband, but instead just see him as a stranger, as an acquaintance, as an enemy, as 
an animal, as an object, etc.  To respect someone as a comedian is, in part, to see her as a 
comedian – we may be told that a curmudgeonly colleague often performs at area 
comedy clubs, and we may even come to believe and know that she is a comedian on the 
basis of reliable testimony from others, but we do not really respect her as a comedian, it 
seems, unless we come to see or think of her as being funny, outgoing, clever, etc., which 
may be possible only after we attend one of her performances for ourselves.  When 
immigrants to this country claim that they are not respected as members of American 
society, part of their complaint seems to be that they are not seen as full-fledged 
Americans, but instead as outsiders.  A woman may feel that she is not generally 
respected as a judge because, despite her education, official appointment and robe, many 
of the people who come before her just cannot see a woman as having that kind of 
authority over them.  An African American may rightly feel disrespected if someone sees 
him as a member of the wait staff rather than as a guest of the party.
108
   
The phenomenon of seeing one thing as another is general and pervasive.  It can 
be quite devastating to hear from one‘s beloved, for example, that she doesn‘t really see 
you ‗like that‘ but instead sees you as a platonic friend or brother.  Other examples 
include:  I just do not see myself as a leading man; his new step-son doesn‘t see him as a 
father yet, but hopefully he will come around soon; I see Toyotas as reliable cars and 
Fords as unreliable ones even though I admit that recent evidence suggests the contrary; I 
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see snakes as threats; John does not see golf as a sport;
109
 friends who have worked 
together for a longtime may be unable to see one another as boss or subordinate; some 
people see fetuses as babies while others see them as bundles of cells; when I am quite 
hungry, I sometimes see the family pig as food; and, finally, others usually do not see me 
for who I am. 
Seeing one thing as another, in the sense exhibited by these paradigmatic cases, is 
a matter of cognizing, regarding, or understanding our concept of one thing as falling 
under our concept of another.
110
  We can contrast this sort of ‗seeing as‘ with other, 
similar phenomena. 
First, what is going on in these examples is related to but not the same as what 
many philosophers think is happening when we see x as y by perception.  According to 
the standard view, when we look at a drawing and undergo a Gestalt switch between 
perceiving it as a duck and perceiving it as a rabbit, we do so without mobilizing our 
concepts of duck or rabbit; rather, our experience has one phenomenal character and then 
another phenomenal character, the first experience having the non-conceptual content of 
a rabbit-form and the other of a duck-form.
111
  There is room for doubting this account, 
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but for my purposes the main point is that when we see a fetus as a baby and then as a 
bundle of cells, for example, we need not be perceiving a fetus before us; rather, we can 
be conceptualizing or categorizing the notion of a fetus differently depending on whether 
we place them under our idea of a baby or our idea of a bundle of cells.  Or, to put the 
point another way, I can see you as my friend without seeing you in front of me.    
Second, the sense of ‗seeing x as y‘ that interests me here is not the same as 
‗believing that x is y‘.  While there are many similarities, the main differences are these.  
First, it is part of believing that tomatoes are vegetables that one takes it to be true that 
tomatoes are vegetables, whereas I can regard tomatoes as vegetables without taking this 
to be a fact about the world; this is just how I now choose to categorize them.  I may even 
be convinced by the newest scientific research that tomatoes are fruits but continue to see 
them as vegetables anyway (which I may indicate by, for example, finding myself storing 
them with my carrots, cucumbers and onions; focusing my attention more on their 
vegetable-like properties when I think about or consider them; refusing to eat them on 
their own as I do with apples, bananas and other fruits; etc.).  Illusions of a non-
perceptual sort, or what others have called cognitive biases, are familiar examples 
involving ‗seeing as‘ in my sense – after watching a few rounds of roulette, I may see this 
square, which has been a loser four times in a row, as a good bet even though I know, 
‗deep down‘ we sometimes say, that it is no better than any of the others because the 
probabilities of each round are independent of each other.  A second difference with 
belief is that what it is to be a belief in the first place may actually depend on there being 
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a prior and distinct notion of ‗seeing as‘ if, as seems natural, believing some proposition 
requires that I regard the proposition as true (take it as true, see it as true) and also have 
other dispositions with regard to it.  A further difference is that, at least paradigmatically, 
if I believe that x is y then I am rationally committed to abandon my belief if I learn that 
my belief is false or unjustified
112
 and to give reasons for my belief if called upon in 
appropriate circumstances, whereas merely seeing fetuses as persons, for example, does 
not saddle me with these commitments, although I may be subject to some other rational 
standards.  Additionally, I tend to have more control over what I regard things as than I 
do over what I believe – with some effort, I can sometimes voluntarily switch between 
seeing the family pig as food and seeing it as a pet, whereas I do not have the same ability 
with regard to my beliefs about whether it is food, a pet or both.  But sometimes a 
conceptual switch of this sort occurs without me noticing that it has occurred, or when I 
am trying to prevent it from happening – I may have finally come to see the pig as a pet 
and only realize this after someone points out to me that I tend to sing the pig to sleep, 
take it on family trips, etc.  Finally, ‗seeing as‘ may have stronger motivational and 
attitudinal requirements than do certain kinds of beliefs – I may believe, in a sort of 
abstract way, that snakes are threats, but how I live my life may not be all that affected by 
this until I actually come to see them as threats, which may happen only after hearing a 
horrifying story or having a frightening experience that make their dangerous qualities 
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vivid or salient to me.  Later I may come to believe that snakes are actually not threats 
but still continue to see them as such.  
Third, when some people see fetuses as babies, they are really just hedging on 
whether they believe fetuses are babies or not – perhaps they haven‘t reflected on the 
issue enough, or they may not wish to commit themselves to certain kinds of challenges 
or to regarding others who do not share their views as mistaken.  Merely claiming to see 
fetuses as babies can also be a way of expressing that one does not want to ‗go there‘, to 
engage with others about that contentious and potentially uncomfortable issue.  There 
may be something wrong with resting satisfied with the way one sees fetuses without also 
reflecting on whether one believes that things are that way, and it may be disingenuous 
merely to claim that one sees fetuses as babies when one also believes that they are; but 
these possibilities allow for genuine and non-culpable cases in which someone is 
genuinely conflicted about what to believe, or else has firm convictions one way or the 
other, but nonetheless sees fetuses at one time as babies and at another time as bundles of 
cells. 
It is notoriously difficult to say just what it is to perceive x as y, and it is just as 
problematic to explain what it is to regard or cognize x as y.  Nonetheless, I think that 
‗seeing as‘ in the latter sense is widespread and easily recognizable, particularly when we 
attend to paradigmatic examples of the sort I have suggested.  The conception of thick 
basic respect as honoring others as persons requires only this much familiarity with this 
notion of ‗seeing as‘, but before moving on, I want to venture a partial account of what it 
is to see or regard one thing as another that makes that account of respect more 
substantive and possibly more plausible. 
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My tentative proposal is that, paradigmatically, when someone regards me as a 
platonic friend, for example, whenever she thinks of me, calls me to mind, or engages 
with me, she is disposed to direct her attention to features of me that make me a platonic 
friend (or even imagine that I have these features), such as my generosity, my willingness 
to console her through long breakups, etc. and to downplay or even ignore features of me 
that tell against me being ‗just a friend‘, such as my rugged good looks and charm.  If it 
dawns on her to try out regarding me as a love interest, she will try to categorize me 
under her concept of ‗love interest‘ in part by concentrating on features of me that could 
make me one of her beaus, which of course include many of the same qualities as what 
makes me a friend to her, and mostly setting aside or ignoring properties of me that are in 
tension with me being so.  Once she has accomplished whatever else is involved in 
thinking of me under the aspect of ‗love interest‘, she does not yet fully see me as a love 
interest until she also responds to me in the practical ways that are characteristic of being 
a love interest for her.  She must also find herself with romantic feelings towards the me 
that she is now conceiving in this new way, a disposition to care about the new me for my 
own sake, and whatever other attitudes, intentions, dispositions, etc. are involved in 
something‘s being a love interest for her.  After some reflection, perhaps she cannot find 
enough romantic about me even to categorize me as a love interest, or if she can manage 
that much, she may find that the needed feelings, intentions and dispositions just aren‘t 
there.
113
  Another example:  Seeing a fetus as a baby implies categorizing those things 
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under the concept ‗baby‘, which involves focusing on the baby-like qualities of a fetus 
and downplaying the features that are not, and having done that, also structuring our 
deliberations, actions, attitudes and so on around its being a baby (e.g. having 
dispositions to protect such things).  On the other hand, seeing a fetus as a ball of cells 
implies categorizing ‗fetus‘ differently, by focusing on the ball of cell-like qualities of it 
and downplaying the baby-like properties, and also having whatever other attitudes and 
dispositions, if any, that are part of subsuming something under our notion ‗ball of cells‘.  
A reformed religious conservative, we can imagine, believes on good evidential grounds 
that fetuses are not babies, but he nonetheless continues to see them as babies, both by 
focusing on their baby-like features and by ordering his actions, attitudes and other 
aspects of his practical life around their being so.  Finally, when a loving mother just 
cannot see her son as a gangster, this may be for two reasons:  either she chooses not to 
focus her attention on his violent temper, etc. perhaps because this would be too painful 
for her, or she may be able to focus on these features of him but, because she lacks the 
disapproval towards him that are part of her notion of gangster, she sees him instead as a 
protector of her community.  
Part of what it takes to have substantive respect for someone as a person is to see 
her as a person, and seeing someone as a person involves concentrating on the features of 
her that make her a person when we think about and engage with her, downplaying any 
features that speak against this, and, because ‗person‘ is a thick concept, having whatever 
other attitudes, dispositions, intentions, etc. that are involved in our categorizing 
something as a person.   
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In order to fill in this account further, we must specify a rough conception of what 
it is to be a person that can tell us what features make someone a person and what else is 
required of us by applying that concept to someone.  Commonsense judgments about 
basic respect presuppose, I think, a rough model of the person according to which persons 
are living human beings who have, to some minimal extent, rational capacities and 
dispositions for such things as thinking for themselves, forming relationships with others, 
valuing things, and being moral; and, in virtue of being minimally rational in this sense, 
persons enjoy a moral status or dignity that means in part that they are not 
commensurable values to be ‗weighed and balanced‘ among themselves or with other 
things and that they must be treated in morally appropriate ways that are at least partially 
defined by reference to their rational abilities and dispositions.   
With this rough account of what it is to be a person in hand, we respect someone 
as a person only if we see her as a person, and seeing her as a person requires that, when 
we think about or engage with her, we focus our attention on what makes her a person, 
i.e. we concentrate on her possessing rational capacities and dispositions that ground an 
inviolable moral status.  And once we have categorized her in this way, we do not fully 
see her as a person unless we are also disposed, to some minimal extent, to respond to her 
in whatever morally appropriate ways are demanded by her moral status.  I would also 
add:  we are disposed to respond to her in these ways out of our recognition of her as a 
person.  Even when we save a spouse because of our love for her, part of our motivation 
seems to be that we see her as a person, albeit one of a special sort.  
Kant seems to suggest something like the claim that thick respect involves seeing 
others as persons in the way I have suggested when he says: 
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The respect that I have for others or that another can require from me (observantia 
aliis praestanda) is therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human 
beings, that is, of a worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the object 




We disrespect someone, then, by downplaying and ignoring the features of him 
that make him a person or by lacking any disposition to acknowledge this status in 
attitude or action.  A frazzled boss may find herself seeing her assistant as an object 
rather than as a person – in the heat of a deadline, she may let herself focus mostly on the 
features he shares with calculators, calendars and computers and briefly set aside thinking 
about his rationality and inviolable moral status.  She may quickly catch herself regarding 
him as a tool, and immediately return to seeing him both as a person and as someone who 
happens to be useful to her.
115
  We may find ourselves failing to see someone as a person 
when we are impatiently awaiting our morning coffee; answering the 500
th
 person who 
asks us how much longer this will take; talking with a colleague about a medical patient 
as if he were not there; thinking of the people on our cruise ship as cattle, etc.  We must 
be careful always to regard others as persons, and so keep our attention at least in part on 
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 This is part of the complaint that miners and factory workers have had over the years, that their bosses 
do not see them as persons. 
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their status, while also, if we like, focusing on other features they have, such as their 
beauty, usefulness, or poor manners.  This helps to explain a longstanding complaint 
among African Americans, women and people with disabilities, who claim that even 
though our society may treat them with justice and charity by affording them certain 
political protections and rights, often they are not fully respected as persons because they 
are not in everyday life generally seen as persons, but instead seen as having a lesser 
moral status than able-bodied, white men.
116
  At times in our history, many people were 
not seen as full political persons with voting rights, the ability to purchase and transfer 
property, etc.  But even when these political rights and protections came, so that from the 
standpoint of our legal and political system these people were full participants, those in 
the larger society and even the people charged with enforcing the rights and protections 
of political persons may not have seen them as full moral persons even while they 
recognized them as people who were protected by the rule of law.  In each of these cases, 
we may well believe that the others are persons, but what is more central to respecting 
them is that we actively and conscientiously strive to see them as persons as well. 
There are at least five ways, then, to fail to see someone as a person.  First, we can 
fail to see him as a human being, which does not presuppose anything normative.  The 
racism of some people has gone so deep that they thought that those of certain other races 
were of a less-developed species than homo sapien.  Second, we can fail to see him as 
having the requisite rational capacities and dispositions of being a person.  We may agree 
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that someone is of the biologically same species as we are but think that she does not 
have the abilities of thought, deliberation and action to be a person – those with severe 
disabilities may fall into this category.  Third, we can fail to see him as having an 
inviolable moral status.  The slave before us may be of our same species and have the 
basic rational capacities to be a moral person, indeed slave-owners often saw some of 
their slaves this way as a result of ingenious escape attempts, but the slave-owner may 
nonetheless refuse to admit that the slave has an inviolable moral status.,   Fourth, we can 
fail to see him as having that status in virtue of having those capacities (we may see the 
popular kids as rational but think they are inviolable because they are popular, which 
would not, it seems, be to see them as persons).  Finally, we can fail to be disposed to 
respond appropriately to his rational capacities and moral status.  We see the person 
before us as a person, as having the requisite rational capacities that make her an 
inviolable person, but we may have no disposition to treat her in accordance with that 
value.   
There are a few points to note about this way of respecting someone as a person.  
First, it is possible to see someone as a person in this sense without activating the 
dispositions to respond appropriately to his status as such – we may decide that, even 
though we see the man over there as a person, we are still going to steal his laptop when 
he is away.  Most wrongdoing probably does not result from a deep dismissal of someone 
as a person but rather comes from weakness of will or choosing to act against the status 
on a particular occasion that we nonetheless recognize and are disposed to respect.   
Second, seeing someone as a friend, daughter, compatriot, concert pianist, or as falling 
under many of the other categories under which we typically subsume people, 
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presupposes that we see him or her as a person because part of what it is to be a friend or 
concert pianist is to be a person.  So there can be hierarchies and overlaps among these 
categories in which, for example, by seeing someone as one‘s husband we thereby see 
him as a loved one, as a friend, and as a person, or seeing someone as a concert pianist 
implies that we see her as a musician, as a performer, as one with certain 
accomplishments, and also as a person.  Third, in rare cases there may be good moral 
reasons not to see someone as a person in the way I have been describing but rather to see 
them as something else.  A life-boat captain or emergency surgeon may be incapable of 
making the right choices if he sees those who will be affected by what he does as persons 
rather than as objects.  As a psychological matter, if we see the person we are supposed to 
operate on as our daughter then we may be less capable of doing our job well.  Similarly, 
emergency workers in disaster zones may be so overwhelmed by the devastation if they 
see all of the suffering people around them as person then they would be paralyzed so as 
a defense mechanism they may start to see them as objects instead.  Even though there 
are cases in which, for example, a military general does not see his troops as persons and 
so does not respect them as such, what is more common is that captains, surgeons, 
scientists, coaches, and military commanders still see us as persons, for if they didn‘t, 
could we fully explain why their jobs can be so difficult and stressful for them?  Fourth, I 
have put my account in terms of thinking about or engaging with others, which implies a 
sort of sensitivity to the presence of other people – we can disrespect a homeless person, 
for example, by choosing not to see him as a person as we stroll by, whereas it may not 
be disrespectful if, having seen him as a person, we still choose to stroll by.
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My view has been that to respect someone as a person is in part to see them as a 
person.  In conclusion, I note only briefly that this account of respecting someone as a 
person helps to explain some intuitions we have about how to respect ourselves as 
persons.  We sometimes find, don‘t we, that we see ourselves as something less than a 
full person when, for example, we are servile to others, try too hard to please them, or 
refuse to stand up to them?  This may even explain why we may sometimes fail to respect 
ourselves as persons when we give ourselves over in certain extreme ways to gluttony, 
drinking or sexual satisfaction.  Engaging in these activities may express that we do not 
see ourselves as persons but rather as things that are meant for the amusement and 
enjoyment of oneself or others, whereas when we typically enjoy food, drink and sex, we 
continue to see ourselves and anyone else involved as persons rather than as objects, 
animals, etc.
118
  Indeed, isn‘t that an important part of why we tend to value these things 
                                                 
for persons:  
to say that persons as such are entitled to respect is to say that they are entitled to have other persons take 
seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do.  Such 
respect is recognition respect; but what it requires as appropriate is not a matter of general agreement, for 
this is just the question of what our moral obligations or duties to other persons consist in (Darwall 1977, 
38). 
As the last sentence indicates, Darwall means that we give people due consideration in our deliberations, 
and so respect them as persons, by treating them in all morally appropriate ways.  A thicker way of 
interpreting the idea of weighing people appropriately in our deliberations, and this may be part of what 
Darwall was hinting at, is that we see them as persons, not only by focusing attention on their rational 
capacities and moral status, but also by being disposed to react appropriately out of a recognition that they 
are persons.   
In a much later essay, Darwall characterizes recognition respect as ―a disposition to regulate conduct 
toward something by constraints deriving from its nature.‖ (Darwall 2004 ??????)  He says later in the 
same essay:  ―A natural response to this hypothesis might be to object that it gets things backward, that 
what must surely be basic are constraints on conduct that derive simply from the nature of persons, or from 
some basic value underlying these, and that we respect persons when we respect these requirements or this 
value.  This used to be my view also, as I said before‖  Darwall now thinks that this account of respect 
because ―it fails to appreciate an equally central component of our dignity 
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so highly – the activities we value so highly of enjoying a dinner with friends, drinks 
after work, or sex with our spouse involve mutual recognition and reciprocal engagement 
with others that would not be possible if we did not see the others as persons.
119
  
Honoring others as persons 
According to the honor conception of respect, we paradigmatically respect 
someone as a person by honoring her as a person, which involves seeing her as a person, 
in the sense I just described, and, I will now claim, also by honoring the rational 
capacities and moral status that make her a person.   
Before examining what it is to honor someone as a person, we can ask more 
generally, why even try to understand thick basic respect in terms of honor?  Here are 
three prima facie reasons, which come from ordinary language, for attempting to do so.  
First, in some ordinary contexts, we tend to use ‗honor‘ and ‗respect‘ as (near) synonyms 
when we say, for example, ‗you should honor your parents‘, ‗we honor our soldiers for 
their service‘, or ‗I honor Wordsworth but I love Shakespeare‘.  It is this sort of thick 
respect that I am attempting to characterize, so thinking about honor may help us to 
clarify our intuitions about thick respect, if only by making it easier to mark the 
distinction I started with between thin and thick respect for persons (there is less 
inclination to say that honoring someone as a person in any ordinary sense is treating him 
in all the ways that persons ought to be treated).  Second, the relevant notion of honor has 
roots in feudal and religious systems of rank and status – we must honor god, the King, 
and the nobility.  This association between honor and status seems to hold today as well, 
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which fits well with my conception of thick basic respect because when we have honor 
respect for someone as a person, on my view, we are honoring her for her inviolable 
moral status as a person.  Third, when we say that you should honor your parents, the 
sense of honor we intend is ambiguous between having an attitude of honor towards 
them, expressing honor, and treating them in honorable ways in just the way that 
‗respect‘ is ambiguous when we say that you should respect your parents. 
What can we say more specifically about what it is to honor someone as a person?  
One way to begin is to differentiate this sort of attitude from other things.  First, treating 
someone justly, protecting her, aiming for her happiness, loving her, liking her, treasuring 
her and admiring her are not the same as honoring her.  Having honor for someone as a 
person can cause me to love her – I may honor a favorite author for her work and as a 
result of this come to have concern for her wellbeing for its own sake, however; and I 
may express the honor I have for her by refusing to harm her.  Second, honoring someone 
as a person is different from esteeming her as a person, at least in the sense of ‗esteem‘ 
that we sometimes use when we talk about the self-esteem of children.  In those contexts, 
self-esteem is a matter of feeling good about oneself and one‘s abilities, so having esteem 
for others is akin to having pleasant feelings towards them.  Third, this sense of honor is 
not the same as the sort of self-respect involved in the primary good that Rawls calls the 
social bases of self-respect.  As Rawls understands self-respect in the limited context of 
his theory of justice, it is basically about having a positive sense that one‘s personal 





  Fourth, honoring someone in the sense I am using it is not a passive response 
to the ‗awesome‘ value of something, as when we find ourselves, for example, exalted by 
a beautiful landscape, cherishing a work of art, or revering a philosophical treatise.   In 
contrast to each of these, honoring someone as a person is more centrally concerned with 
taking active steps to decide for oneself to live by certain stable policies, commitments, 
and stances to treat people in honorable ways and not to treat them in dishonorable ones.   
What then does it take to treat someone honorably and not dishonorably as a 
person?  We obviously do not mean to honor her for her physical beauty, membership in 
the species homo sapien, values, beliefs, relationships, moral accomplishments, 
intelligence, wit, or moral virtue.  People who have mundane, wrongheaded, vile or 
irrational beliefs, values and the like may nonetheless deserve to be honored (or at least 
not dishonored) as persons, although there are additional questions we could ask about 
when, in addition to respecting someone as a person, we should respect her for her 
abilities, values, beauty, etc.  Honoring someone as a person, on my view, presupposes 
that we see him as a person, that is, as someone with an inviolable moral status in virtue 
of possessing certain capacities and dispositions of reason.  So honoring her as someone 
like that, whatever else she may be, seems to require that we honor her moral status, by 
not degrading or ridiculing her for example, and honoring her rational capacities, by not 
mocking or defiling them.   
Let‘s consider some examples.  Sometimes, the object of our mocking or ridicule 
is ostensibly something else about a person (her faults, beliefs, etc.) but really what we 
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are doing is mocking or ridiculing her rational capacities themselves.  We may have a 
good laugh when a friend claims to believe in psychics, but it may be that our laughter 
also expresses dishonor for his theoretical rationality – how could any rational person 
believe that? – whereas in other cases we may honor our friend‘s theoretical capacities 
and make clear that our laughter is not meant as an indictment of these so much as an 
expression of surprise and amusement that he reached that particular conclusion and a 
genuine interest in what errors may have led him to that belief.
121
  Mocking someone 
with a mild mental disability by imitating his unconventional behavior or speech can 
dishonor him as a person by demeaning his capacities for thought and action.  Having 
utter contempt for a criminal dishonors him by dishonoring his rational potential for 
reform.  Other examples include
122: pulling down someone‘s pants in public, pointing out 
their ‗wardrobe malfunction‘ to others, and laughing at the outward signs of their 
embarrassment; forcing an inmate to beg or dance in order to receive any food, which 
you then make him eat like a dog; burying a new recruit up to his shoulders in a mock 
grave while yelling that he is dead; forcing Jewish prisoners in concentration camps to 
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; making someone perform meaningless, arbitrary, and difficult 
work to excessively or even impossibly high standards with little or no pay; etc.    
There may not be much more we can say in general about what it takes to treat 
people honorably and dishonorably as persons.  For that, it is perhaps best to look more 
closely at particular examples in specific contexts, taking into account existing cultural 
norms, relationships, expectations, history, etc.  Instead of pursuing this avenue any 
further here, I want to turn to take up a different set of issues that I think are closely 
related, namely:  What is the relationship between having honor-respect for others and 
having that sort of respect for oneself; and why should we have honor-respect for others 
anyway?   
Respect and Self-Respect 
Philosophers have long wondered about the relationship between respect for 
others as persons and respect for oneself as a person.  A widely held view is that the 
notion of basic respect for persons does not distinguish in any deep way between 
ourselves and others; rather, whatever it takes to respect someone else as a person applies 
more or less equally to respecting myself as a person, and since our intuitions and 
judgments about respect for others are so strong and clear, it is most promising to 
concentrate on them and later try to derive a notion of self-respect.  However, the 
connection between thick basic respect for others and that sort of respect for oneself is 
much more complicated and fruitful than that, and my honor based account of thick basic 
respect can help to explain why.   
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The following examples involve dishonoring others as persons in a way that 
depends on how they are honoring themselves as persons.  First, a senior law partner may 
disrespect a new associate by excessively berating him for having committed a minor 
transgression, but it seems that her actions would be especially dismissive of the associate 
as a person if her intention was to undermine his self-confidence and lead him to become 
servile to her.   
Second, Kant gives the following example of disrespect in the thick sense:  
On this is based a duty to respect a human being even in the logical use of his 
reason, a duty not to censure his errors by calling them absurdities, poor 
judgment, and so forth, but rather to suppose that his judgment must yet contain 
some truth and to seek this out, uncovering, at the same time, the deceptive 
illusion (the subjective ground that determined his judgment which, by an 
oversight, he took for objective), and so, by explaining to him the possibility of 
his having erred, to preserve his respect for his own understanding.  For if, by 
using such expressions, one denies any understanding to someone who opposes 
one in a certain judgment, how does one want to bring him to understand that he 
has erred? (MM 6:463-4) 
 
When we engage in, say, philosophical disputes with others, our utterances can be 
understood as (1) mere objections to a stated view, (2) indictments of the other person‘s 
philosophical abilities, (3) denials that the person is minimally rational, or (4) demands 
that the other person lose confidence in her own philosophical abilities or even in her 
own rationality.  That is, someone may criticize my philosophical abilities and, by his 
lights, think that mine are not very great but be ambivalent about whether I come to see 
the truth as he sees it.  He may even hope that I do not lose faith in my philosophical 
prowess and that I keep working at improving it.  Someone else, with the same 
statements, may be demanding that I lose confidence in myself – it‘s not just that she 
thinks I am a bad philosopher or even that if I came to see the truth I would agree with 
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her; rather, she is insisting that I cease valuing my abilities so highly.  It is one thing to 
criticize someone and another to demand that they criticize themselves. 
Third, during long periods of our history, it wasn‘t enough for white racists to 
disrespect African Americans by failing to see them as persons and by demeaning them 
with racist slurs, unfair treatment and the rest.  Unfortunately, it was also common for 
whites to think that African Americans thought too highly of themselves, as being on an 
equal footing with whites, and so demand that these people should ‗know their place‘ by 
seeing themselves as inferior to whites and dishonoring themselves by adopting servile 
attitudes and prostrating themselves in their words and manners. 
Finally, as David Sussman has persuasively argued, part of what makes torture 
such an egregious wrong is that it 
forces its victim into the position of colluding against himself through his own 
affects and emotions, so that he experiences himself as simultaneously powerless 




According to Sussman, when someone is tortured, the aggressor typically intends 
to use the victim‘s affects, emotions, and sensitivity to pain against her, by making her 
both identify with her non-rational reactions to the painful treatment and also see these 
reactions as foreign to her.  And intending to cause someone to become alienated and 
disintegrated in this way is profoundly disrespectful in the thick sense.  We could even 
imagine a different and less violent sort of disrespectful torture in which the torturer 
manipulates and coerces his victim, not by means of her affect and pain, but by playing 
her good nature and rationality against itself – he might construct an elaborate rouse in 
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which the victim is led to believe that she must perform some awful act to save her 
family and then use evidence of that act to force her to reveal some information. 
Following Sussman‘s lead, the common element that seems to explain why we 
tend to find these ways of treating others to be so disrespectful (in the thick sense) is that 
the actions are either (a) intended to cause others to lose respect for themselves as 
persons or they are (b) direct imputations on the person‘s basic self-respect.125   
Consider (a).  We can attempt to cause someone to lose thick respect for herself as 
a person in many ways, including insidious hints, outright gestures and dehumanizing 
treatment, and such treatment would be disrespectful (in the thick sense) even if our 
efforts did not succeed.  A stoic and self-assured slave may never be led to lose thick 
respect for himself as a person, but those who nonetheless endeavor to ‗break him‘ still 
appear to treat him with intense disrespect of the relevant sort. 
Now consider (b).  Sometimes, we impute the self-respect of others more directly 
by demanding that they lose respect for themselves, perhaps without actually intending to 
cause them to lose respect for themselves.  This can happen because we may not believe 
that our actions will have the effect of undermining their self-respect (perhaps we know 
the relevant people will never learn about what we do or we know that their self-respect 
is impervious to us) and supposing that to intend to do something is to believe that one 
will do it.  Nonetheless, our words and actions can have the illocutionary force of 
demands that others, for example, demean or humiliate themselves, so making these 
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demands is deeply disrespectful in the thick sense.
126
  It is sometimes even possible for 
our words to carry the force of a demand even without our having an intention to make 
one, if we unwittingly invoke an established social convention that gives the words that 
meaning.   
Take an analogy with insulting someone.  Sometimes we insult someone with the 
intention of causing them to be insulted (and perhaps also to recognize that we intended 
them to see this), but we can also insult someone when we know they will not be insulted 
(we may be talking about them behind their backs or subtly condescending to their faces) 
and even when we have no intention to insult them (we may be describing them with 
words that we did not know were insulting even though they are so according to common 
social convention).    
When we act with the intention of getting someone to lose respect for himself we 
dishonor him as a person by trying to tempt him to violate self-regarding moral duties, 
duties which I assume he has, to honor-respect himself as a person.  And it is similarly 
dishonorable to demand that he violate these duties.   
There is a potentially complimentary explanation for why these ways of treating 
others count as failures of honor-respect.  I consider this rationale more fully in the final 
section, but in summary:  When we make a demand that someone lose honor-respect for 
themselves, as opposed to, say, a request or a suggestion that they do so, what we are 
claiming in effect is that she does not have the right to honor herself as a person and that 
we instead have the right to substitute our own judgment for how she should see and 
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honor herself (if at all).  Acting with the intention to cause someone to lose honor-respect 
for herself implies something similar, a failure to acknowledge the right others have to 
honor-respect themselves.   
A partial argument for honor-respecting others as persons 
Why should we honor-respect persons as persons?   A common answer is that all 
persons have a sort of intrinsic, agent-neutral value that gives everyone reasons to respect 
them in the thick sense and for them to respect themselves in that sense as well.
127
  
Another possibility is that when we do not see others as persons or dishonor their moral 
status and rational capacities, we are more likely to treat them in other immoral ways.  Is 
there any other non-instrumental argument we could give for honor-respecting others as 
persons that does not depend on strong assumptions about intrinsic value, and also fits 
more naturally with the mostly negative character that basic honor-respect seems to have?  
Kant may have overstated the case when he claimed that duties of respect for others are 
always negative
128
, but it nonetheless seems to be a common feature of our moral 
experience that honor-respecting others most centrally involves keeping our distance, not 
interfering too much, or taking a hands off approach with regard to them – we must, at 
the very least, see them as persons and not dishonor their moral status and rational nature.      
I will now sketch a circumscribed argument that, if successful, shows that we 
have presumptive moral reason to honor-respect others in specific ways, namely by not 
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demanding or intending to cause them to lose honor-respect for themselves.  The series of 
examples from the last section illustrate, I think, the commonsense judgment that 
impugning the self-respect of others in these ways is especially dishonorable and 
disrespectful, so it will be a welcome result if we can show that we should presumptively 
refrain from doing so.  The argument as stated does not establish, however, that we have 
moral reasons to honor-respect others in the other ways I have discussed that do not 
appear to involve impugning the self-respect of another (although on reflection we may 
decide that many cases of disrespect actually have this feature) but I briefly suggest at the 
end how the basic strategy might be used to make a fuller case for honor-respecting 
others as persons.  
The argument takes its cue from a remark Kant makes about respect.  He says: 
It [the respect to be shown to others] is rather to be understood as the maxim of 
limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as 
respect in the practical sense (observantia aliis praestanda).  Moreover, a duty of 
free respect toward others is, strictly speaking, only a negative one (of not 
exalting oneself above others) and is thus analogous to the duty of right not to 
encroach upon what belongs to anyone. (MM 6:450). 
 
My argument sets out from the suppositions that persons are disposed to honor-
respect themselves, that is, they are disposed to see themselves as persons and to honor 
their rational capacities and moral status, and fully rational persons actually do honor-
respect themselves in these ways.  We are not assuming that these attitudes are justified 
responses to a perceived agent-neutral value within each person that, if it were there, 
would provide reasons for self-respect and respect from everyone else.  Rather, we are 
beginning with the assumption that, from each person‘s own perspective, we are disposed 
to honor-respect ourselves in ways that do not depend on or commit us to a prior agent-
neutral value.  The other assumption is that persons are disposed to accept and comply 
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with some sort of principle of reciprocity that essentially says that we should treat others 
only in ways that are justifiable to them and anyone else if they were fully rational. 
Now, persons are rationally disposed to honor-respect themselves as persons, and 
they also, we can assume, have a duty to do so.  This self-respect, however, can become 
distorted in at least two ways.  One the one hand, our self-respect may be minimal or 
non-existent – we may begin to see ourselves as something that does not have a moral 
status as great as do others, we may allow others to use us as they wish, we may let our 
rational abilities wither away, we may humiliate and embarrass ourselves, and so on.  On 
the other hand, our self-respect may grow too large – I may see myself as an excellent 
specimen of a person who as such enjoys an extremely high moral status; I may show 
exceptionally high honor to myself and so on.  These attitudes of high self-regard, if I had 
them, would almost inevitably lead me to compare myself to others, conclude that I am 
more honor-respectable than they are, and even demand or intend to cause them to honor-
respect themselves less and honor-respect me more.  Human nature, we might think, 
includes a strong tendency towards pride, self-conceit and arrogance, but also leaves 
room for servility as well.   
When our self-respect gets out of bounds on one end, we violate duties to 
ourselves, but when it gets too puffed up, our arrogance and pride can interfere in certain 
ways with the honor-respect that others have for themselves.  This can happen when our 
arrogance or pride leads us either to demand that others honor-respect themselves less 
than they should or to try lead them to do so.  There is therefore real potential for people 
to step on each other‘s toes, so to speak, in the claims they make – you demand I honor-
respect myself less while I claim a proper honor-respect for myself and the effects they 
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attempt to bring about – you try to make me lose honor-respect for myself while I try to 
retain it.  Because of our dispositions to reciprocity, it seems plausible that if we were 
fully rational, we would respond to this state of nature by agreeing to certain general 
principles requiring each of us to keep our self-respect in check and ensure that we do not 
interfere in inappropriate ways with the self-respect of others.  In particular, we might 
settle on assigning each person a presumptive moral right to respect herself within 
specified bounds and agree that certain demands, actions and attitudes count as putatively 
illegitimate interference in a moral sphere of self-respect that each of us is more or less in 
charge of for ourselves.  We have strong moral reason, therefore, to see others as having 
the right to respect themselves and the rational abilities to do so; we also have strong 
moral reason to honor their moral status and rational capacities by allowing them the 




Can we go further?  I‘ll end with a provocative, sketchy and tentative suggestion.  
What this argument has so far shown, if it is successful, is that we must not impugn or 
interfere with the honor-respect that others have a right to show themselves, but there 
seem to be many ways of demeaning, degrading and ridiculing others more directly, in 
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ways that are not designed to impugn or interfere with their self-respect. What reasons do 
we have not to disrespect others in these more direct ways?  When we employ demeaning 
punishments, whether or not we meant to impugn or interfere with the self-respect of the 
criminals, perhaps our actions nonetheless do, as a matter of fact, tend to interfere with 
their right to honor-respect themselves because such punishments usually cause people to 
lose honor-respect for themselves.  Consider what Kant says in his Lectures on Ethics: 
Since men are objects of well-liking love, in that we should love the humanity in 
them, even judges, in punishing crime, should not dishonour humanity; they must, 
indeed, penalize the evil-doer, but not violate his humanity by demeaning 
punishments; for if another dishonours a man's humanity, the man himself sets no 
value on it; it is as if the evil-doer had himself so demeaned his humanity, that he 
is no longer worthy of being a man, and must then be treated as a universal object 
of contempt (LE 27:419). 
 
There are other ways of interpreting this passage, but setting Kant aside, causal 
considerations about what sorts of actions tend to interfere with the rights of others would 
certainly be relevant if we were, for example, attempting to design and justify a system of 
publicly-recognized, socially-enforced rules about respecting each other as persons.  
Respect, expressions of respect and social moral rules 
Respecting someone as a person, in the sense I have been describing and arguing 
for, requires us to see her as a person, honor her as such and, I now emphasize, to express 
these attitudes.  Someone who saw others as persons and honored them as such, but who 
never gave any sign of these things, would not, it seems, be respecting them as fully as 
possible.  Seeing others as persons seems to require being disposed to acknowledge that 
we take them to be persons rather than something else.  The same goes for honoring 
someone, which we do not do merely by having certain emotions; we must also take 
certain stances towards persons about how we are to behave towards them, so sometimes 
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this stance must be operative in order to respect others and when it is then we are 
expressing respect for them.  Also, our self-respect is not only vulnerable to attack from 
others, but we often depend on communicated social affirmation to sustain it, which we 
need to do to some extent in order to have full respect for others.  Finally, disrespecting 
others often involves expressing disrespect when we, for example, ridicule them to their 
face, humiliate them in the eyes of others, refuse to acknowledge their presence and so 
on.   
Following established social moral rules can be ways of expressing respect to 
others and not expressing disrespect to them.  For one thing, social moral rules can give 
conventional meaning to actions, making them (perhaps unintended) ways of showing 
disrespect to others even of a sort that the actions themselves would not have were there 
no such rules.  For example, telling a white lie may not in itself be a way of disrespecting 
someone – in some cases lies of that sort are even ways of showing respect – but if our 
rules explicitly forbid white lies and you go ahead and tell me one then your action, 
because it is against the rules we have established among ourselves for regulating 
interpersonal behavior, may be a way of showing me deep dishonor.  Part of the reason 
for this may be that social moral rules are sometimes a way for us to operationalize and 
institute our shared conception of what a person is – a person for us may be, in part, one 
who is bound by the rules and who is protected by them.  The rules set out clear 
expectations and requirements we place on each other and they specify things we are 
responsible for along with potential excuses.  This forensic notion of a person is much 
like the way the rules of a game define what counts as a player in it, where a baseball 
player, for example, is defined as one who plays a certain role as specified by the rules of 
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the game.  In our society, then, part of what it is to see someone as a person is to see her 
as a co-participant in our moral code, and if we see her in that way and are disposed to 
express that we do, then we will be inclined to treat her in accordance with that code as 
well.  When others break the rules with regard to us, then, even when they do so in minor 
ways, can be taken as a deep dismissal of our status as a player in the moral game of our 
society, as a failure to see us as someone to whom the rules apply, and this can be quite 
devastating and perhaps more so when the infractions are more grave.  This is not to say, 
of course, that every time we break the rules towards someone, we fail to see them as 
persons – perhaps we see them as a person but also as an enemy who deserves our poor 
treatment – but when, for example, the Nazi‘s developed separate social moral rules 
about how to treat Jewish people, it soon became clear that in the society of that time 
these people were no longer seen as people at all.
130
   
One way of illustrating the point is to think about boxing, where it can be a sign 
of deep disrespect that one fighter refuses to throw a devastating left hook.  The informal 
rules of the sport require boxers of relatively similar abilities who are in a high-profile 
bout to fight as hard as they can without the confines of the other rules, so a boxer can 
disrespectfully taunt his opponent by breaking that rule and not throwing that powerful 
punch when an opening for doing so is clear to both boxers, even if no one else sees it.  In 
doing so, the one boxer is expressing that he does not see the other as a fellow fighter in 
the fullest sense.    
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It is a familiar idea from legal contexts that being a legal person is defined by the 
laws, rulings and so on of our society, but I think that our idea of being a moral person 
involves being one who can play certain roles as defined by our moral code, so if you 
violate my legal rights, you may express that you do not see me as a legal person, and if 
you violate my moral rights as defined by the rules then you may express that you do not 
see me as a moral person.    
A further point is that the notions of humiliation, ridicule, degradation, and the 
other ways in which we can dishonor someone are difficult to define with any great 
precision even though there are many core examples in which we recognize these things.  
Often moral judgment works well enough to determine when someone is being 
disrespected in these ways, but there is significant room for disagreement in many cases.  
One function that social moral rules can serve, then, is our need for publicity and 
determinacy when it comes to figuring out how to avoid disrespecting one another – the 
rules can institutionalize and structure our relations with one another so that, when we 
follow them, we are better able to respect one another even though it may be that no set 





EVALUATING SOCIAL MORAL RULES 
Codes of social moral rules are not all created equal.  They can be inefficient, 
convoluted, simplistic, stifling, exclusionary, sexist, racist, and in many other ways 
despicable; sometimes they are more the result of oppression, historical accident and 
superstition than calm and reasoned moral reflection; and parts of them can be 
maintained long past the circumstances in which their inclusion in the code originally 
made sense.  What is perhaps more common, however, is that the core of a society‘s 
moral code, which is the part of it that its members are most sure about and most firmly 
committed to, consists of prohibitions on those acts of killing, rape, torture, disrespect, 
intentional harm, lying, promise-breaking, theft, failing to give mutual-aid, etc. that are 
most obviously immoral, not just immoral from the perspective of the group but actually 
immoral.
131
  Anthropological evidence
132
 suggests that the core of most existing moral 
codes, which is partially the result of common experience and wisdom over millennia, 
has this morally laudable character – it is generally against the prevailing rules of any 
society, for example, to kill another member of the group intentionally for personal gain 
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without provocation when reasonably favorable conditions obtain, and this part of most 
any code is not likely to be given up easily.  While there seems to be a common core 
among many current and past moral codes, one that reflects some of the most widely-
shared and firmly-held moral convictions we have, prevailing moral codes still vary 
greatly with regard to what (if any) exceptions they allow to their general prohibitions on 
killing, lying, etc., how their most general and widely-applicable social moral rules are to 
be interpreted and implemented in concrete situations and what non-basic social moral 
rules they allow for particular groups or restricted areas of life (e.g. the classroom 
behavior of North Carolina Pre-K teachers).  This, the periphery of a moral code, which 
is the part of it that does not enjoy deep acceptance among the members of society even 
though they generally accept it to some extent
133
, is the key to explaining some of the 
most important ways in which moral codes can be defective and imperfect. 
The moral code of our own society, I assume, shares the morally justified core 
prohibiting the more egregious acts of killing, torture, lying, etc. but questions arise about 
whether our rules are, all told, the best ones for our social circumstances.  We might 
wonder whether our rules adequately handle ‗harder‘ cases in which we can, for example, 
lie to save the life of another, deceive someone in order to relieve her of great suffering, 
keep a promise that will profoundly embarrass someone else, save the life of one person 
or five people, coerce someone for their own good, and torture someone in order to 
prevent a disaster.  Even though the core of our code rightly includes general prohibitions 
on such things as disrespecting or torturing others, we might also wonder whether these 
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concepts are interpreted correctly in the code by lower-level rules that say more precisely 
what it takes, for example, to respect specific groups of people, such as women, 
minorities, the elderly, the disabled or the undeserving, in specific circumstances, such as 
in a hospital or prison setting.  And even though we are confident that the core of our 
moral code is more or less correct, we might also wonder in our more philosophical 
moods what justifies those deeply held prohibitions and requirements.  What we need to 
address these questions is a standard to which we can compare our own moral code, an 
ideal code of social moral rules worked out for our social world that includes the right 
sorts of exceptions and qualifiers, correctly interprets key moral concepts and helps to 
justify the core that is common between our actual code and the ideal one for us.   
The ideal code that is worked out for a society like ours may not be the ideal code 
for societies of even slightly different sorts, let alone ones that are far removed in time 
and social circumstance.  Our society has a functioning, liberal and reasonably just legal 
system that sets the background for so many of the moral issues we face, we have 
opinions, values and ideals that are commonly held along with a diversity of these things 
as well, we are free from extreme scarcity and strife, we have a sordid history with the 
ways we have treated various groups, along with much else, and all of this will be 
relevant to what set of social moral rules is best for us.  The most we may be able to say 
about what social moral rules apply universally, in all times and places, is to mention the 
relatively abstract, widely affirmed and morally justified core of social moral rules and its 
constitutive requirements, in certain circumstances, to respect others, be beneficent, and 
refrain from torture while admitting that the appropriate character for fully formed rules 
about these things may vary from context to context.   
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Our goal, in the long run, should be to develop an ideal code of social moral rules 
that is worked out for a society like ours that can be used as a standard of improvement 
for our own imperfect code.  Once we have a standard of this sort in hand, however, it is 
another question what we should do with it, and in particular whether those of us who 
discover it should begin following it immediately knowing full well that others will not 
initially follow suit.  This is the problem of utopianism, which is a perennial problem for 
ideal theory, that it can be disastrous, otherwise repugnant or personally devastating to 
follow the ideal in an imperfect world where others are not doing so and some are prone 
to take advantage of people who are.
134
  The right response, I think, is to distinguish as I 
have between the legitimacy or justifiability of a moral code and our obligation to follow 
it and admit, with the objection, that solidarity and respect sometimes give us moral 
reasons to comply with our actually existing moral code even when we know that it is not 
the best one available.  Fortunately there is substantial overlap between the actual and 
ideal codes, due to their common core; the ideal code is worked out for our specific 
circumstances and so is not likely to have an ‗other-worldly‘ character; and it is likely to 
require us to avoid disasters, so following the ideal code of the sort I envision may not be 
as problematic as other attempts at defining an ideal set of moral principles or rules.  An 
ideal code provides us with a goal, something to hope and aim for in the possibly distant 
future, but right now there are other values, ideals and duties at stake that complicate how 
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we should respond to that goal – perhaps we should sometimes follow the ideal code and 
break the actual one to set an example to others or appeal to their common moral 
conscience, but other times we might criticize the prevailing rules in personal 
conversations, public discussions, editorials or books, teach our children the better rules 
while still making them aware of our actual ones, stage protests, and otherwise look to 
models of the past who have managed to change common public opinion about such 
disparate things as homosexual relationships, segregation, the roles of women in the 
family and at work, recycling, and smoking in public places.  We may even need to settle 
on transition rules about how we should move towards the ideal, which may not be a 
static thing in any case because of the complicated interactions between an ideal model of 
social moral rules and an ideal set of basic political, social and economic institutions, so 
the ideal moral code against the background of our imperfect legal system may not be the 
best one if that system were to be improved as well.  These things work in tandem, then, 
but even making ourselves aware of the concrete possibility of a better moral code can be 
beneficial, by fortifying our faith in ourselves and our potential for creating and 
maintaining a better social world than some of the disheartening ones we have endured 
throughout history.
135
   
The task of constructing an ideal moral code for a society like ours promises to be 
extremely complicated, not only because it must be sensitive to various facts about us and 
our society but also because it involves so many facets of our moral lives.  Rather than 
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attempting to work out a fully comprehensive standard in one go, a better strategy may be 
to approach the problem piecemeal, taking our own code bit by bit and asking whether 
our rules about, for example, lying, torture or respect have the right exceptions, qualifiers, 
etc.  We will then have to fit together the provisional rules we settle on into a system of 
social moral rules, which will require rethinking some of those rules and making 
adjustments, and even more so when we try to fit this in with an ideal conception of 
justice.  We ultimately seek reflective equilibrium among ideals of justice, social 
morality, individual virtue, praise and blame, etc. but because so much depends on the 
details and the unity of moral and political philosophy is so enormously complicated, a 
piecemeal approach may be the best we can hope for. 
Anti-theory, absolutism and feasibility 
A deep suspicion one might have about the task I have described, of working out 
piece by piece an ideal system of social moral rules for a society like ours that can be 
used as a standard for improving the one we actually have, is that there is no underlying 
unity or structure to ethical thought so it will be impossible to define an ideal code of 
social moral rules of the sort I am describing.  Virtue ethicists and anti-theorists press the 
concern that morality is far too complicated to be systematized or codified in any useful 
way by principles and rules – imagine all of the values that must be included in the mid-
level that I am starting out with along with the enormous complexity of interpreting those 
values for particular conditions in isolation from each other, let alone rendering them 
determinate when they conflict with each other.  While the alternative they propose to 
imposing a structure on morality is not always clear, the gist I take it is that we should 
employ practical wisdom, careful reflection and judgment to decide what to do.   
127 
 
While I do not share this skepticism about the importance of normative ethical 
theory, there is much we can learn from this sort of view.  When we begin listing out the 
various aspects of morality, we find, in addition to ideas about what we ought to do, 
firmly held convictions about ideals, aspirations, virtues, supererogatory acts, praise and 
blame, values, the goodness of states of affairs, political justice, social moral rules, etc.  
With the anti-theorists, we should not assume from the outset that morality as a whole or 
even any one of its categories is codifiable by a set of simple principles, and some may 
not be codifiable by any principles at all.  My suggestion has been, however, that social 
moral rules are only one part of morality.  While they can be important in their own right 
as part of relationships of solidarity, they are not the whole of morality or even of what 
we ought to do, because, as I have argued, there is room for breaking even good rules.  I 
also agree that there may not be just one ideal moral code, or it may be a vague ideal.  
Nonetheless, there is certainly room for improvement in our own system of social moral 
rules, so there is good reason to examine and evaluate it one piece at a time, keeping in 
mind that its various parts must fit together into a coherent system of principles, and we 
should also work to institute the improvements we identify even if we never completely 
specify the final product.   
We must be particularly sensitive, however, to the underlying concern that any 
attempt to specify an ideal code of social moral rules will inevitably settle on rigoristic 
and inflexible rules.  From the perspective of commonsense morality, matters are much 
more complicated than can be captured with simple rules such as ‗never lie‘ or ‗never kill 
the innocent‘ in part because these rules can conflict with each other in real-world cases.  
Our own moral code makes some provisions for situations of this sort, although these 
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may not be the right ones.  If we start making all of the needed exceptions to social moral 
rules in our effort to construct an ideal code, however, the worry is that the rules will 
become convoluted, difficult to state and learn, and so no longer suitable for the valuable 
public role they play in solidary or respectful relationships; they may lose their status as 
rules altogether because rules are by their nature publicly known; and it just may be 
impossible for us to list out all of the exceptions.  The basic suspicion is that our ideal 
moral code will either rely on absolute prohibitions, which cannot be supported by 
commonsense morality, or it will need to include built-in exceptions to those prohibitions 
that could make them into algorithms that could be applied without moral judgment, 
which will result in unwieldy ‗rules‘ of the form ‗never x (lie, kill the innocent, break 
your promises) except in circumstances C1, C2…, C66,… , and (perhaps) Cn‘. 
It would certainly be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to list out, for 
example, all of the circumstances in which we are permitted to lie, particularly because 
there are so many types of lying and because our intuitions about lying may abandon us 
in the far-off philosopher‘s examples we would need to consult in order to specify a 
comprehensive principle of lying, if even there is any such thing.  Fortunately, the task of 
constructing an ideal code of social moral rules does not require us to try describing 
fully-specified principles of that sort because the public role that social moral rules play 
in a society sets limits on how complicated they can be and on what sorts of situations the 
rules must make provisions for.  Such rules, when they exist, are generally known and 
understood, because generally accepted, and it is close to public knowledge that the rules 
are generally accepted.  Being public in these two senses often affords social moral rules 
great instrumental value because people can mostly rely on each other to keep their 
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promises, tell the truth, refrain from killing innocent people, etc.  When social moral rules 
are a way of showing respect to one another, it is important that they be widely seen as 
such, which also requires them to be public in these two ways.  And, when social moral 
rules exist and are constitutive parts of relationships of cooperative solidarity, they serve 
as common grounds on which citizens stand in solidarity with each other, justify their 
actions to each other in discussions, and express mutual commitment to one another and 
to the ends they share.  This suggests that in addition to the two senses of publicity just 
mentioned, the justification of the rules would ideally be somewhat understood by most 
members and at any rate widely available to anyone who chooses to inquire about the 
connection between the rules and the shared ends of the group.  In light of the public role 
they are supposed to play in coordinating our activities, maintaining solidarity and 
expressing respect in a society like ours, we do not need them, nor do we want them, to 
render determinate answers on situations that we are unlikely to face in our social world.  
If our circumstances were to change drastically, a moral code worked out for the old 
context may become obsolete and we would have to try making a new one, but there are 
persistent problems we will most likely continue to face that are difficult enough, and it 
won‘t matter much to maintaining cooperation, solidarity or respect if the best code we 
can come up with for our society does not face up to possible but extremely unlikely 
cases.   Social moral rules that are to serve their public role must also be stable in being 
generally accepted as part of solidary or respectful relationships that members regard as 
important, worthy of their continued allegiance, and not easily overridable by other of 
their concerns.
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deliberation and public discussion, social moral rules must be sensitive to what 
information is available to those who must use them and how liable the rules are to being 
abused or ‗gamed‘.  The basic suggestion, then, is that for social moral rules to serve the 
valuable function of providing a public basis of justification and deliberation for people 
in solidary and respectful relationships, they must be sensitive to our limitations and 
capacities, which means among other things that they cannot be too complicated, 
overbearing, or oppressive and so will have to ignore certain fine-grained distinctions and 
concentrate on more pressing, practical concerns – sometimes there will be some small 
moral reason to make an exception to a rule that, if included, would make the rule too 
difficult to learn and apply. 
These practical concerns about publicity, stability, epistemic limitations and 
liability to abuse may seem to add further complexity to an already difficult task of 
specifying an ideal code of social moral rules, but actually I think they make that task 
somewhat easier because our moral intuitions have developed in response to and seem 
clearest in real-world cases in which these considerations are at stake.  We are quite 
familiar with confronting common moral questions from our own perspective, in which 
our information is limited and time is short.  We are also used to taking up the 
perspective of a legislator of sorts when we think more broadly about what the rules 
should be for our family, club, academic department, and even society, where we want 
rules that can serve the aims of the group, be useful to its members, secure something 
close to general agreement (at least in the long-run) so we are accustomed to considering 
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how our rules might be misunderstood, abused or unworkable and mostly limiting our 
focus to commonly recurring problems of our group.  It may even be a mark of careful 
moral deliberation about interpersonal morality that we combine these perspectives by 
thinking through our own moral problems as best we can given our epistemic situation, 
but also taking into account what the social moral rules would be like if they allowed 
everyone in our circumstances to act in one way or the other – if there were a publicly 
known permission to act in this way then the rules may lose the allegiance of some in the 
group or be abused by others then, I think, that would be some reason against doing so.  
In any case, our moral intuitions have been formed and shaped from within these two 
perspectives, where practical concerns are quite relevant, so it may actually be harder for 
us to get a firm grip on what is ‗objectively right‘ in philosophical examples that abstract 
from such real-world concerns.  
To illustrate:  The ideal rule about torture will not just list out every single one of 
the possible circumstances in which torture is forbidden and required because many of 
these abstract situations, which philosophers are prone to emphasize, are ones we are 
very unlikely to face and including them would make the rule less able to fulfill its public 
role.  If one of those cases were actually to arise, however, we would still have some 
reasons of solidarity and respect to follow the actual and ideal rules, which do not allow 
for torture in such cases even though the rules were not explicitly meant to apply to such 
far-off situations – this is part of what is so interesting about solidarity and respect – but 
torturing is not necessarily out of the question either because things may be so awful as to 
override those reasons and warrant nonetheless breaking those rules.  The ideal rule about 
torture for our society must also take account of the information we are likely to have, 
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our cognitive limitations in processing it and the time and pressures we have in 
attempting to do so – it will often be difficult for us to decipher the true intentions of a 
terrorist, for example, whether he knows the location of the bomb, whether there is even a 
bomb, how many people are likely to be hurt or killed by it, the probability that torturing 
him will be effective, etc., and we must take account of potential psychological 
propensities to rush to judgment or seek vengeance.  So if the rules are supposed to 
provide some guidance for how we should act, our rule must be relative to our epistemic 
situations and so include phrases such as ‗when you reasonably believe…‘, ‗when all 
available evidence…‘ or ‗after gathering as much information as possible, any reasonable 
person would suspect…‘.  And, if the rules are to be public knowledge and the focus of 
solidary relationships then they must not be too easily abused by people with our 
psychological makeup – a rule that allowed torture in rare cases may well lead 
overzealous police officers, for example, to torture suspects in cases that they mistakenly 
think are covered by the exemption.  Arguably these practical considerations taken 
together militate towards a rule that says never torture because the pure sort of ‗ticking 
time bomb‘ cases in which we might be tempted to torture are very unlikely to arise, even 
when they do we are unlikely to have much confidence about the relevant information, 
history has tended to show that there is a sort of ‗slippery slope‘ both for legislators and 
practitioners to allowing exceptions to rules about torture, and, as I have suggested, 
opposition to torture is a significant part of the society-wide solidary relationships we 
currently enjoy.  This is not to say, however, that torture is always wrong, even in a 
society that absolutely prohibits it. 
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Morality may not be wholly legalistic, but social moral rules by their nature are 
so, and they serve a valuable role as such, so we should endeavor to make our social 
moral rules the best they can be, not only as means of coordination, but also as 
constitutive parts of solidary and respectful relationships.   
Mid-level moral values 
How are we to go about specifying an ideal code of social moral rules if we are to 
avoid absolutism, on the one hand, and unfeasible and perhaps unspecifiable ‗rules‘ on 
the other?  Rule-utilitarians have an answer – we construct the ideal code by searching 
for the one that, if it were generally accepted and followed, would maximize overall 
utility.  The resulting set of rules would likely include exceptions of a normal sort, its 
rules would not be too complicated because if they were then they would lose their 
effectiveness, and all of these decisions are made within the same utilitarian moral 
framework that requires more calculation than moral wisdom.  The deepest problem with 
utilitarian theories of all sorts, however, is not the particular motives, actions, or rules 
they purport to justify – the math may well come out in their favor as far as these are 
concerned – but rather the underlying adherence to aggregate wellbeing as the sole moral 
value in terms of which everything else is justified.  We have deeply held, moral 
theoretical, intuitions about what basic values stand behind our lower-level moral 
judgments and convictions, and these intuitions conflict sharply with the utilitarian claim 
that all of morality is basically a matter of maximizing wellbeing, so we should examine 
these higher-level intuitions to see what values best explain our lower-level judgments 
evaluating particular motives, actions or rules.   
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If, however, we were to replace wellbeing with a plurality of commonly-held 
moral values of this sort in a similarly structured moral perspective to justify the common 
core of our actual and ideal moral code along with the periphery of an ideal one, what 
would those values be?  Here‘s a partial list:  freedom, equality, autonomy, self-respect, 
self-perfection, integrity, solidarity, knowledge, happiness, life, personal security, 
pleasure and the absence of pain, respect, beneficence, reciprocity and fairness.   
Included here are values that are widely affirmed, at least abstractly, though there 
is room for disagreement about how to interpret them more specifically.  Some of the 
values are more commonly discussed then others, but all are ones that would be widely 
endorsed on reflection.  A significant part of the problem with beginning with a set of 
values of this sort is getting more specific content out of them that can capture what it is 
we value when we value, for example, freedom or respect.  Earlier chapters on solidarity 
and respect tried to fill in some of the details about the nature of those values, and a 
similar treatment will be needed for the others as well in order to use them to specify a 
standard for improving our code of social moral rules.   
An outline of a framework for evaluating social moral rules 
In this section I begin to construct a framework for interpreting the mid-level 
moral values and applying them to the task of specifying a standard of improvement for 
our code of social moral rules.   
A conception of the person 
There are various ways we might proceed in trying to understand and interpret 
these values and apply them to questions about how to evaluate social moral rules.  For 
example, we might consult our intuitions about a host of real and imaginary cases, trying 
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to generalize our findings into a deeper understanding of the values and how they might 
be applied to questions about what social moral rules we should establish in our society.  
One of Rawls‘ great insights, however, was to note the overwhelming complexity and 
indeterminacy of interpreting values of this sort in any direct way that could be applicable 
to our world, particularly because going case by case may lead us to miss crucial 
systematic features of justice and, by extension, codes of social moral rules.  We can 
follow Rawls and instead try to interpret and apply these values in stages, beginning with 
a set of moral ideas that help to organize and structure them and then using the values to 
specify a more precise set of questions to be addressed in light of them.  According to this 
constructivist line of thinking, we draw from mid-level moral values and commonsense 
moral ideas about what it is to be a moral person, about the nature of an informal society 
of such persons (what makes one different from a mere collection of people or one with 
only a functioning legal system), and what role social moral rules should play in a society 
of persons of this sort.  We then model these conceptions in a procedure of construction 
that consist of a point of view, with certain constraints on information and motivation, for 
answering specific questions about how our code of social moral rules should be 
improved in light of the valuable role they can play in our society.   The basic idea, then, 
is that we can gain a fuller understanding of the values of freedom, equality and respect, 
for example, if we consider what it is to be a person who has the potential to be free, 
equal and respected and should be so. 
We have a moral notion of what it is to be a person, an idea that is not drawn from 
science or empirical research but comes from careful reflection about how we see 
ourselves.  When we ask what aspects of ourselves qualify us as persons, we find that it is 
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not our gender, race or genetic make-up.  But to determine what it is to be a person, we 
may appeal to an idea, which has deep roots in the ancients, that we better understand 
who we are as persons by thinking about what we aspire to be.
137
  Circumstance, genetic 
endowment and other factors beyond our control are most of what make us excellent 
athletes, good-looking, and famous, so on reflection while we may prize lives of that sort, 
they are not necessary parts of our idea of the best that each of us can be.  What comes 
closer to capturing this ideal, I think, is the idea of a person who is fully governed by 
reason.  This idea, or, better, ideal, is one possible source for our idea of the person.  If 
we explore our commonsense idea of what a fully reason-governed person is, then, we 
find that it is not just about someone thinking consistently and taking the necessary 
means to her ends.  But when we praise someone for being reasonable, we often mean to 
show approval for her moral character as well her commitments to certain ideals, 
projects, relationships, etc.  An ideally rational, reasonable person is one who is strongly 
disposed to act only in ways that are justifiable to others, to show herself proper respect, 
and otherwise abide by the requirements of morality; and is predisposed to judge her 
conduct according to those standards.  She also has the capacity and disposition to 
understand moral requirements, to judge when they apply, and to act accordingly even 
when her narrow desires pull her to do otherwise.  An ideally reason governed person 
does more than just take the necessary means to her ends and efficiently schedule them.  
She also has the capacity and disposition to weigh her options, decide for herself on 
plans, projects, commitments, values, ideals, standards, loyalties and relationships that 
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are not fully determined by her animal inclinations or mandated by morality, and pursue 
them effectively.  When it comes to her thinking, not only is she consistent and coherent, 
but she also has the capacity and disposition to seek more and better knowledge, think for 
herself free from external authority and prejudice, be open-minded, and exercise the other 
intellectual virtues.  More than this, a fully reason-governed person is by nature social – 
she not only wants to live with others on mutually agreeable terms but she actively seeks 
to engage and relate with other rational people by uniting with them, forming 
relationships and bonds, pursuing cooperative activities, establishing social unions and 
associations, and communicating with others.  Oddly enough, then, reciprocity is in part a 
self-regarding concern of an ideally reason-governed person – she wants for herself to be 
in certain kinds of valuable relationships with others that are possible only if the terms 
are justifiable to others.  Ideally rational persons are also pictured as finite and embodied 
human beings with our particular cognitive and physical structure, living in the natural 
order.  When they are fully governed by reason, and so free of prejudice, bias and other 
distorting influences, they will have natural dispositions to protect their own lives, seek 
pleasure, avoid pain, and pursue happiness.  Although there will be variations about, for 
example, the content of their desires and what makes them happy, these dispositions are 
general ones that all ideally reasonable people would have in virtue of their nature as 
such.  Most of us are not fully reasonable in this way, but when this ideal is brought to 
our attention, we see in our capacities to approach the ideal and our aspiration to do so.   
My suggestion, which can be found in commonsense and has roots in the 
Ancients and Kant, is that we are full persons in virtue of being finite and embodied 
human beings, with our particular cognitive and physical structure, living in the natural 
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order, and having to a requisite minimum degree basic rational capacities of thought, 
prudence and morality along with predispositions to exercise these various abilities.  Our 
moral capacities include the ability to engage in moral deliberation, exercise our 
conscience, form moral judgments, and act accordingly.  Prudential abilities include 
forming and pursuing personal values, which we do when we commit ourselves, in ways 
that do not depend on our concern for morality, to plans, projects, goals, ideals, standards, 
loyalties, relationships, and other such ends along with the ability to deliberate about our 
personal ends in light of our circumstances, talents and inclinations, and organize them 
rationally.  Our theoretical capacities include the ability to think for oneself, learn about 
the world, express ourselves, be open-minded, and see the world for what it is.  Also part 
of our commonsense idea of the person is that persons have a special in virtue of 
possessing to the requisite minimum degree basic rational capacities and dispositions of 
thought, prudence and morality. 
In light of this conception of the person, I make a few suggestions about how we 
might understand some of the mid-level values, while others I leave vague for now.  I 
emphasize, however, that these are not the only possible ways of filling out the values, 
but here they are as I understand them: 
Freedom – Two important senses of ‗freedom‘, though not the only ones, are: (1) 
the liberty to act without being constrained by the choices of another under rules or laws 
that apply to everyone; (2) being such that our claims on each other can be prima facie 
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Autonomy – Having autonomy in one sense, a sense that is different from but 
related to Kant‘s main idea of autonomy, is basically having the ability (along with 
actually deploying it) to think for oneself, form and pursue one‘s own values, plans, 
ideals, standards, relationships, etc., and engage in moral deliberation and reflection.  
These capacities can be affected by distorting influences such as unjustified threats, 
psychological oppression, manipulation, coercion, bribery, the use of drugs or alcohol, 
psychological vulnerabilities, along with unquestioned assumptions, ideology, prejudice, 
illusions, unquestioned tradition, superstition, psychological compulsion, prejudice, bias, 
weakness of will, intellectual weakness, immediate impulse and excessive emotion.  We 
are most fully autonomous in this sense when our moral and non-moral values, ends, 
commitments, projects and the like, along with our theoretical beliefs, are not the result 
of these things but instead are based on choices we make for ourselves. 
Equality – One important senses of equality is that people have a equal moral 
status in virtue of having equal basic rational capacities of thought, prudence and 
morality rather than needing to belong to some caste or race.  
Respect – properly honoring others as persons, which involves seeing them as 
persons, not degrading, debasing or humiliating them, and allowing them to exercise their 
prerogative to respect themselves. 
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Self-respect – seeing oneself as a moral person and honoring (and not 
dishonoring) oneself as such. 
Self-perfection – perfecting and improving our various capacities of reason, 
developing strength of will to do what she has most reason to do, improving her mind and 
body and not only just as means for the use of her rational capacities, and making herself 
a useful, thriving members of a community of other rational people. 
Integrity – this is basically a matter of developing, exercising, and integrating in 
to a single, unified agent the ‗higher parts‘ of her rational nature, including her capacities 
and dispositions of theoretical, moral, and prudential reason along with the strength of 
will to do and think in ways that she judges to be most appropriate. 
Solidarity – One sort of solidarity, which I call cooperative solidarity, is a matter 
of cooperating with others in support of shared ends and valuing for its own sake the 
relationships that form on that basis.  More generally, solidarity is being united or at one 
with a group of people with regard to something, such as a worthy struggle, a decent past, 
shared engagement in activities directed to common values, etc. 
Happiness – success in one‘s non-moral commitments, plans, projects and other 
personal values. 
Beneficence – a firm commitment to help others in pursuing their happiness. 
Reciprocity and fairness – a willingness to treat others only in ways that are 
acceptable to them, to listen to others, consider their ideas and proposals, and explain 
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A conception of society 
When we reflect on what a society is and what makes one different from a mere 
collection of people, we find that a society is not just a group of self-interested people 
who have managed to coordinate their behavior in mutually advantageous ways.  We can 
borrow a suggestion from Rawls, who thinks that a society exists when a group of people, 
who are citizens and see each other as such, are engaged together in cooperative activities 
over long periods of time on the basis of fair and publicly shared rules.
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  The citizens of 
a society cooperate in ways that further their own plans of life, so circumstances must be 
such that cooperation among them is possible and necessary
141
, but they do so within the 
constraints of fair rules that they generally accept and comply with as long as others do so 
as well.
142
  This means that societies cannot just be governed by complicated, abstract 
principles or propositions that no one knows, accepts, or affirms; instead, when societies 
exist, they are institutional structures governed by rules that are generally known, shared, 
complied with and so on.  We can further add that, for purposes of this framework, a 
society has a more or less functioning legal system; it is a democracy; and it exists in 
reasonably favorable conditions. 
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A procedure of construction 
The main social contract theorists were concerned with issues of justice and the 
structure of political institutions, but there is a leftover, unfinished, project of developing 
a contractualist account of social moral rules.  This is not as simple as applying one or 
other of the social contract theories directly to ethics.  For one thing, those views are 
structured around resolving certain problems of justice, which, perhaps unlike 
interpersonal morality, may be about impartially adjudicating conflicting claims that 
people press against each other or the state.  Our fundamental interests in this domain 
may therefore be more limited than when taking up certain moral matters, and the 
standpoint from which we assess these issues may be different as well.  Still, there is the 
potential to build a theory that takes up some of the general insights from this tradition 
but applies them in different ways to a separate set of questions. 
What would a defensible moral contractualism need?  At the very least, it would 
need more specific accounts of the problems that it aims to address, the standpoint that 
the parties are assumed to take up when assessing various proposals regarding those 
problems (a description of the ‗state of nature‘), and what is supposed to motivate them in 
accepting or rejecting those proposals. 
The most important component for the success of any contractualist theory is 
arguably an account of what is to motivate the parties who take up the relevant point of 
view since this is crucial for generating enough outcomes that are sufficiently 
determinate.  When we look back at how the main contractualist theories have 
approached this problem, the general tendency over time has been to make our 
fundamental interests more and more robust and morally loaded.  Hobbes is near one 
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extreme - he thought that our fundamental interests are in maximizing the satisfaction of 
our desires, which are predominantly for our own self-preservation and wellbeing.  Locke 
argues that because people are created by God and depend on him for our continued 
existence, we are all bound by natural law to obey him and preserve ourselves as the sort 
of thing that he created.  God endowed all of us with reason, he also made us free in our 
liberty to act and to acquire property within the bounds of natural law and equal in the 
jurisdiction we have over ourselves under these same laws.  We each therefore have 
strong moral reasons within the bounds of natural law to protect and preserve the 
fundamental interests we have in protecting our lives, liberties and properties.  Rousseau 
argues for a very robust and moralized set of fundamental interests.  On Rousseau‘s view, 
each of us has fundamental interests in protecting, developing and exercising our basic 
human capacities, which include faculties of free will, self-improvement, rational 
thought, sympathy, and the moral emotions.  He also thinks we have fundamental 
interests in preserving and sustaining our life, protecting our property, having the 
freedom to decide on and pursue our own good, not being dependent on the arbitrary will 
of another, and maybe also securing equal standing in society.  According to Kant, when 
it comes to the proper functioning of a state, our fundamental interests are in freedom, 
which is the liberty not to be bound by laws other than those that one gives consent, 
equality, in having an equal moral ability to bind others and to be bound by them, and 
independence, in having the requisite capacities to be a fully participating member of 
society.
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  For Rawls, our fundamental interests are in developing and exercising in a full 
                                                 
143
 MM 6:314 
144 
 
and informed way our two moral powers, the capacity to honor principles of justice and a 
willingness to reciprocate with others who affirm them, and the capacity to form, revise 
and pursue a conception of the good.  The primary goods of rights, liberties, 
opportunities, income, wealth and the social bases of self-respect are meant as all purpose 
means for securing these fundamental interests.   
The main contemporary attempts at a moral contractualism have seen a similar 
progression.  David Gauthier assumes that our fundamental interests are for maximizing 
the satisfaction of our coherent and considered preferences that do not range over the 
preferences of others.  He attempts to purify the motivations of the contractors of 
anything moral because his aim is to derive all moral requirements from ones of 
prudential rationality.  An advantage of his view, however, is that it allows for the use of 
rational decision theory to make the bargaining simpler and the outcome more 
determinate, but at the expense of implausible accounts of our fundamental interests, as 
being egoistic, and of justifiability, as just a matter of what would further these selfish 
aims.  For T. M. Scanlon, our fundamental interests are given by generic personal 
reasons, which are roughly any moral reasons that have to do with our own claims and 
status in our general situation, and include reasons to preserve our lives, avoid pain, and 
be treated fairly.  Scanlon makes moral considerations essential to what moves us to 
choose (interpersonal) moral principles because he thinks that people have moral self-
regarding reasons of this sort and that these are relevant to what they could reasonably 
reject, which, unlike on Gauthier‘s view, is an idea that depends on the willingness to 
find principles that others similarly motivated could not reasonably reject.  The problem, 
however, is that the theory leaves largely unspecified just what these reasons are that 
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motivate the parties in reasonably rejecting principles and how the reasons are to be 
weighed against each other. 
This general trend has perhaps come out of a recognition that part of what makes 
the idea of reciprocity so appealing is that it depends on basic self-regarding concerns for 
things other than our wellbeing.  At least intuitively, a proposed principle of justice that 
would make me somewhat happy at the expense of severely constraining my freedom 
would probably not be justifiable to me from an appropriately impartial perspective, and 
this seems to be a plausible explanation for why such a principle would probably be 
illegitimate.   
What is still needed, however, is a more precise and compelling account of what 
should move us if we were deliberating with others in a certain standpoint about 
standards of right and wrong. 
We may again appeal to the ideal of the person that we used to specify the nature 
of personhood for purposes of specifying a theory of social moral rules.  Fully reason-
governed people are our better selves, they are what we aspire to be, so one suggestion is 
that the social moral rules we should strive to bring about are the ones that would be 
chosen in an appropriate fashion by our better-selves.  Combining this with the basic 
contractualist theme, the idea is that for purposes of settling on mutually agreeable rules 
of social morality, parties who take up the moral point of view are assumed to be fully-
governed by reason but also mostly self-regarding, setting aside for these limited 
purposes whatever concern they have for others beyond their willingness to reciprocate 
with others.  When choosing principles of interpersonal morality, the parties would be 
imagined as ideally reason-governed people who are reciprocating but otherwise 
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motivated to find social moral rules for a society like ours that allow them to live as fully-
reasonable people.  Such a person, then, would will insist on her freedom to act, basic 
respect and beneficence from others, the opportunity to continue to respect herself, along 
with seeking to develop, protect, exercise, and perfect these various capacities and 
dispositions that are part of her nature as a reason-governed person.  A moral contract 
theory of this sort tries to capture the idea that (other-regarding) morality is essentially 
about providing the conditions in which we can live as fully reason governed people 
living alongside others under terms in which others can do the same. 
Although we are imperfectly rational, we share the same rational capacities and 
dispositions as people who are fully governed by reason – we are disposed to think for 
ourselves, follow requirements of morality, pursue our ends efficiently and so on.  A fully 
rational person is one who is living up to the requirements of reason because her rational 
capacities and dispositions are playing their proper roles, whereas we sometimes fail to 
live up to those dictates due to non-rational desires, inclinations, prejudices, bodily 
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, oppression from others, and the like.  If ideally rational 
people are moved, in virtue of their rational nature, to develop, exercise, protect and 
perfect their rational capacities and dispositions then that gives imperfectly rational 
people strong reason to do the same – we are unreasonable if we do not protect these 
fundamental interests in ourselves. 
There is a sort of tradeoff that contractualist theories face between how 
substantive the motivating values are and how strict the constraints on the parties need to 
be in order to achieve outcomes that are sufficiently impartial and determinate.  Rawls 
favored the relatively thin primary goods, so he thought he needed to impose the veil of 
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ignorance on the parties in the original position to ensure that they would reach a 
worthwhile agreement.  A set of thick values of the sort I have described, however, may 
allow for a different way of achieving impartiality in the legislative point of view, one 
that does not place such strict limitations on what information is available to the parties.  
The idea is that a proper specification of these substantive values may include criteria for 
the sorts of information that are relevant when applying them, allowing the parties to 
have access to any and all information as long as their deliberations respected these 
constraints that are inherent in the values themselves. The success of this approach to 
what information is available to the parties ultimately depends on the strength of the 
arguments from the mid-level values to particular moral conclusions, and in particular 
whether these arguments allow in only what on reflection strikes us as morally relevant 
information.   
In any case, so much for my rough and partial characterization of a moral 
framework for assessing social moral rules.  
Exceptions 
Whether or not this is the correct framework for assessing social moral rules, we 
can make some progress on connecting the mid-level values with standards for evaluating 
such rules by compiling a catalogue of devices that can be incorporated into them as we 
work piece by piece to construct a coherent and integrated code.  Except in rare cases, we 
must avoid absolutism in the rules we think should be adopted, and some may think that 
our only other option to deal with putative conflicts among rules, interpreting the values 
through rules, etc. is to use exceptions that explicitly specify conditions in which an 
otherwise forbidden act is permitted.  As we have said, however, building explicit 
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exceptions into a rule can have a cost in how well the rule can serve its public role, so if 
this were all we had to work with, our task might be doomed from the start.  However, 
exceptions are but one device available to us for building an ideal code of rules.  My aim 
in this section is to describe some of the other techniques we can use to take the raw 
material of the mid-level values and build it into an ideal code of social moral rules.   
In explaining these devices, along with some of the reasons we might have on 
certain occasions to use some over others, I will also try to illustrate how we might go 
about constructing an ideal code by focusing on how just two values, cooperative 
solidarity and basic respect for persons as persons, might be used to specify 
improvements to a very small part of our moral code, which has to do with the social 
moral rules that should govern sports teams and their fans.  I chose this example in part 
because it shows how cooperative solidarity and basic respect for persons as persons, or 
as I will mostly say, solidarity and respect, are two values that have a tendency to pull 
against each other when it comes to laying down social moral rules.  Solidarity tends to 
favor group cohesion and sacrifice whereas respect tends to favor allowing one another a 
prerogative to respect ourselves properly and generally protects us from being ridiculed 
and humiliated; but these values can also come together because, for example, standing in 
solidarity with others often requires that we see them as persons who are members of our 
group and honor them as such.  Sports teams, along with their coaches and fans, can 
exemplify a sort of cooperative solidarity, in which all may have shared ends of triumph, 
tradition, connection to a location, style of play, sportsmanship, etc. that they are 
supporting through cooperative endeavors in which players train and play the game, 
coaches prepare them to play, advise and strategize during the game and fans provide 
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money, emotional backing, advice, motivation, and expressions of support.  Everyone 
involved also values for its own sake the relationships that form on the basis of pursuing 
together these endeavors in support of shared ends.  Sports teams can also exhibit 
disrespect, when coaches, players and fans require and expect extraordinary sacrifice to 
the team, when players are seen more as pawns then as people, whey they are ridiculed 
and humiliated when they make a mistake in practice or in a game, and so on.  Matters 
can be worse when it comes to attitudes towards players, coaches and fans from other 
teams – they can also be the focus of ridicule, humiliation and violence.   
Levels - Sports teams vary in all sorts of ways – there are professional, amateur 
and intramural levels, youth teams and adult teams, teams in basketball, football and 
baseball, teams for men, women and both, and so on – and there are other kinds of 
associations other than sports teams, such as charity organizations, book clubs, academic 
departments, with their own more particular types that fall within each of them.  This 
suggests the first device for constructing an ideal code of social moral rules, which is to 
make use of levels of rules.  We need not begin with a specific sports team, think about 
what rules it should establish, and then move on to the next team – that would be 
extremely complicated because the rules we make for one will influence which we should 
make for the other.  What we can do instead is ask what rules should govern all sports 
teams, recognizing that some of them will be vague and subject to further interpretation, 
and then regard these rules as placing constraints on the more particular rules for baseball 
teams, which in turn place constraints on the more particular ones for professional 
baseball teams, and so on.  As we work to construct this hierarchical structure, however, 
we may need to make changes at higher levels in light of circumstances at the lower ones, 
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so all of the levels of rules must fit together in reflective equilibrium.  For example, at the 
level of specifying rules for sports teams, perhaps one says that players must not engage 
in unsportsmanlike conduct, while a more specific rule falling under this one for football 
might say ‗no excessive dancing in the end-zone‘.  There are higher levels of rules as 
well – one may say something like ‗do not intentionally kill an innocent person‘, and this 
rule certainly should limit the more specific rules about how fans should behave in the 
stands – this and other basic rules are taken as (often implicit) constraints on rules at 
lower levels.  Levels of rules, then, are defined by the groups of people they apply to, the 
areas of life they cover, and the way they constrain lower-level rules. 
Presumptions – When sports teams write down their codes of social moral rules, 
they sometimes include a preamble that lays out certain core values such as 
trustworthiness, respect, fairness and responsibility.  One way of interpreting this is that 
they are laying out certain presumptions, such as be trustworthy, be respectful, be fair, 
that need to be combined and interpreted in various ways before they can make be full-
blown rules in the code.  Presumptions are like prima facie duties in that if there are no 
competing presumptions that defeat it, then the presumption can be included in the code 
as a rule.  They do not have a weight, however, in the sense that consequentialists and 
reason-theorists sometimes say that reasons and prima facie duties have a weight, like 
vectors in physics, where combining presumptions is a matter of weighing and balancing 
the various ones at stake.  Instead, presumptions as I am thinking of them are want-to-be 
rules that do not retain their ‗weight‘ or ‗force‘ in the circumstances in which they are not 
appropriate or are defeated.  Presumptions are combined, then, not by summation but by 
judgment about what the values that justify them imply about the rules. 
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Limitations – the rules may be limited, as we have seen, to specific groups and 
particular areas of life and so may not apply, or may not apply in the same way, to other 
groups or circumstances.  For example, fans must not go onto the field of play during a 
game, but players are certainly allowed to do so, and fans may be as well at other times. 
Normal exceptions – These are exceptions of a clear sort in which, for example, 
we say that players must not engage in physical violence that is not part of the game 
except in cases of self-defense. 
Thick evaluative concepts – We might employ thick evaluative concepts, which 
are ones with some descriptive content and some evaluative content as well, which makes 
it impossible for us to tell just by the facts whether a rule that includes them is satisfied or 
not.  While we can leave the rules at that and rely on moral judgment to apply them, 
lower level rules may also be able to give more content to these concepts and allow them 
to be expressed to a significant extent by rules that only include descriptive concepts.  So, 
for example, at one level we may have a rule that says something like players, coaches 
and fans should not be obscene, and have a lower-level rule that lists out what, for 
purposes of that sport, count as obscene.  Another possibility is that the lower-level rules 
will be open-ended, already banning other, yet to be envisioned, obscenities.  Other 
possible rules include ones about being ‗modest‘ in success and ‗gracious‘ in defeat, not 
‗hogging the ball‘, and ‗sportsmanship‘. 
Reasonable – A related idea is that the rules could allow clauses about what is 
‗reasonable’, ‗too costly’, ‗too soon’, etc.  Fans, for example, should not consume ‗too 
much‘ alcohol, players should have a ‗reasonable‘ amount of personal time, the sacrifices 
they are required to make should not be ‗too costly‘ to them.  As before, we may just rely 
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on moral judgment to determine when these conditions are satisfied or we may institute 
lower-level rules about what counts as an ‗unreasonable‘ time commitment in one sport 
or another.
144
   
Group decision-making – the rules may also allow include mechanisms allowing 
the group on particular occasions to decide for itself what it will do or what it will require 
of its members.  Players may be allowed to take a vote on what sanctions should befall 
someone who ‗takes a dive‘ or makes an ‗honest mistake‘ in the course of a game. 
Individual decision-making – the rules may also allow individuals to decide how 
to act so long as they do so within certain specified constraints.  For example, the rules 
may allow coaches discretion about strategic matters in the game as long as they are 
ready to explain their decisions to the near satisfaction of the players and fans after the 
game.  Coaches, then, cannot do whatever they like when it comes to strategy, but the 
rules may not dictate specific decisions, just that coaches have certain aims, that they 
conscientiously work towards them, and that they can justify their choices afterwards.   
Supreme emergencies – we may build in exception clauses for supreme 
emergencies in which, for example, we are required to follow the rules of the game 
unless doing so risks severe harm to other players, coaches and fans.  Cases in which an 
exception of this sort might apply are mostly science fiction, but there is another way in 
which we can make allowances for supreme emergencies. 
Never in the real world – The code may include a rider or appendix that says that 
it is suited to reasonably favorable conditions that are likely to arise in our world but it 
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allows for the possibility of cases that may nonetheless justify breaking the code.  It may 
be that a player is allowed to ridicule a teammate if this is needed, for example, to keep 
the person from going to a stadium that is rigged with a bomb. 
Unthinkable – The code may also regard some cases as unthinkable and so 
explicitly allow gaps in which the code does not come down one way or the other, which 
is not to say that we are morally permitted to do whatever we like in such cases.   
Presumptive rules – Earlier we said that part of the task of constructing an ideal 
moral code is to combine various presumptions, which issue from the values we are 
attempting to institute, into rules, but in doing so we may just decide to include 
presumptions as rules in the code.  These will be more difficult to enforce, but we might 
say that player wellbeing or team spirit are important, though not overriding, 
consideration that players, coaches and fans must take into account when deciding what 
to do.  In other words, the rules may provide me with reasons that should factor into my 
decision-making but do not dictate what I should do.
145
   
Defeasibility clauses – we may also include rules that are defeasible in the sense 
that they apply except other things equal, except when they are defeated by other rules or 
considerations, but perhaps without specifying what those rules or considerations are, or 
only listing a few of them.  Coaches should be concerned with winning, but defeasibly so 
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when, for example, satisfying that requires disrespecting others, cheating, etc.  Judgment 
or lower-level rules will then be required to determine when this rule is followed.
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End-based rules – these rules require a firm commitment to some goal, value or 
end, but leave extensive latitude for how, when and to what extent that commitment is 
expressed in action.  Players may be required by the rules to have deep loyalty to the 
team, but this may come out in various ways such as coming to practice on-time, 
sacrificing personal projects and relationships when they interfere with the team, and 
perhaps even reporting various abuses to higher authorities. 
Priority rules – we can make rules at the same level lexically prior to others using 
second-order priority rules.  We may have, for example, a rule that says avoid supreme 
emergencies, and this rule is of a sort that it must be satisfied before other rules, such as 
ones about following the rules of the game, are consulted.  This way it is an often implicit 
background rule that, of course, players should avoid death and destruction and they 
should do this before even considering whether doing so will break the rules of the sport 
they happen to be playing at the time.  There can be priorities of other kinds, perhaps 
instituted as second-order rules about which of some first-order rules are to take 
precedence in cases of conflict.  Perhaps we have rules that forbid lying among 
teammates and others that forbid harming each other, so we may institute a third that says 
‗when these rules conflict, the one about lying takes precedence except when the 
potential harm is great‘. 
                                                 
146
 See Lance, Mark (2006), 'Defending Moral Particularism', in James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Pub.), 304-321 and Lange, Marc (2000), Natural Laws in Scientific Practice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
155 
 
Rules of punishment – there are other second-order rules we might institute 
having to do with what social sanctions or non-legal punishments people should receive 
for breaking the rules.  We may have a first-order rule about giving it one‘s all on the 
field and a second-order one that says what penalties those who are caught violating that 
rule should receive.  These rules can be specific in various ways – they may say that a 
player who is caught helping the other team for personal gain should be ostracized while 
one who is somewhat lazy during a game should be teased and made to run laps the 
following day. 
Mitigating circumstances – rules of punishment may also make allowances for 
circumstances in which a rule strictly applies but someone who nonetheless violated it 
then should receive less or no reprisal as a result.  For example, perhaps a player is 
disrespectful to a fan, but mainly because the person used racial epithets in the first place. 
Some of these devices are reducible to others with regard to what they require us 
to do, but there are interesting differences among all of them that will figure in to our 
decisions about which ones to use for particular issues.  Some devices require us to learn 
and remember more about the rules themselves, such as building in many normal 
exceptions, then others, such as using phrases such as ‗reasonable‘.  Some require more 
cognition and moral reflection when deciding on particular occasions what the rule 
requires, such as using defeasibility conditions and thick ethical concepts, while others 
are closer to algorithms, such as priority rules.  Some are more difficult to enforce, such 
as those requiring commitments to various ends, while others are easier to enforce.   
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